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Abstract
This study aims to investigate the causal e¤ect of nancial liberalisation policies on the
stability of banking sectors in selected countries in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA). The study
is motivated by theoretical emphasis on the competing inuence of nancial liberalisation
in fostering nancial development, but also giving rise to nancial systems that are more
vulnerable to systemic risk.
This thesis addresses critical issues concerning measures of nancial liberalisation used
in empirical studies. While di¤erent research bodies have produced several liberalisation
indices, most datasets cover developed and developing countries outside Africa. Most of
the existing indices are therefore not useful in cross-country and panel studies in SSA. To
address this measurement issue, this thesis constructs a new set of liberalisation indicators
using country by country information on the timing of seven liberalisation policies. The
study considers 12 SSA countries using the framework developed by Abiad et al. (2008).
Thus, this study extends the nancial liberalisation database of Abiad et al. (2008) from
14 to 26 SSA countries.
Making use of the expansive nancial liberalisation dataset for the 26 countries, the study
employs the ordered logit model to establish the response of nancial liberalisation to
systemic and non-systemic banking crises outcomes in 26 SSA countries for the period
1986 to 2006. The empirical results indicate that total nancial liberalisation reduces
the probability of either type of banking crises. Furthermore, specic policies such as
privatisation of state-owned banks as well as bank regulation and supervision promote
banking stability. However, other policies such as removal of entry and activity restrictions
increase the probability of the occurrence of both systemic and non-systemic banking crises.
Nevertheless, the destabilising e¤ects of these liberalisation policies are minimal in stable
economies that have well developed institutions.
To further analyse the inuence of nancial liberalisation on banking crises, this thesis
employs a 2 step approach. Firstly, the study tests the e¤ects of nancial liberalisation on
bank prots (proxy for franchise value). This follows theoretical claims that banks with
high franchise value shun the risk of bankruptcy and hence are more stable. Thus, in
the second empirical chapter, the study employs a two-step General Method of Moments
(GMM) approach in a dynamic panel framework, to examine the impact of liberalisation
policies on measures of bank protability. Empirical evidence presented in this thesis
shows that liberalisation policies that signicantly impact on the competitive environment
in which banks operate, have a negative causal e¤ect on bank franchise value. These
include elimination of entry restrictions and relaxing controls on security market policies.
On the contrary, reforms on prudential regulation and bank supervision, as well as bank
privatisation signicantly increase bank prot levels.
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The second step involves examining the consequent e¤ects of bank protability on banking
crises. The third empirical chapter of this thesis examines the e¤ects of liberalisation-
induced changes in franchise value on banking sector stability in SSA. To do this, the
study considers an indicator that captures changes in franchise value arising from nancial
liberalisation. The estimated values of this indicator are then used to relate the response of
nancial liberalisation to both systemic and non-systemic banking crises. Empirical results
indicate a positive relationship between this indicator and the likelihood of either type of
banking crises. The results suggest that some nancial liberalisation policies a¤ect banking
sector crises through their impact on bank franchise value. This result is substantiated by
empirical evidence established from a two-stage least squares methodology.
This study is the rst attempt to tackle issues regarding the link between nancial lib-
eralisation policies and actual occurrence of both systemic and non-systemic crises in the
SSA context. As such, the ndings of this thesis have important policy implications.
Since implementation of liberalisation policies is an on-going process, the study results
suggest that policy measures should emphasise development of appropriate infrastructure
concurrent with nancial liberalisation. For instance, legal and institutional frameworks
are crucial in curbing risk-taking incentives that may b a result of decline in franchise
value following nancial liberalisation. Such institutions will help contain the e¤ects of
liberalisation policies that adversely impact on banking stability. At the same time, well
developed institutions are ideal for reinforcing the e¤ects of policies that promote bank
stability. In such an environment, there is no need to trade o¤ e¢ ciency and stability
goals of competition arising from nancial liberalisation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background and Motivation of the Study
It is widely accepted that nancial sectors play a crucial role as conduits for economic
development. There is broad consensus in both theoretical and empirical research con-
cerning this pertinent issue (Beck et al., 2000; Levine et al., 2000; King and Levine, 1993).
This strand of literature argues that nancial liberalisation cultivates e¢ cient nancial
intermediation necessary for economic growth1. As such, the dawn of the 1980s saw many
African countries replacing former protectionist economic policies, blamed for economic
and nancial instability, with more market oriented policies.
In recent years, there has been a shift of focus from analysing the growth enhancing ef-
fects of nancial liberalisation, via nancial deepening, towards its role in nancial stability.
Specically, there is a perception based on a large body of scholarly work, that nancial lib-
eralisation produces banking systems that are more vulnerable to systemic risk (Caprio Jr
and Honohan, 2009; Hellmann et al., 2000; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Caprio and
Klingebiel, 1996). Systemic banking crises, in which large segments of the banking sys-
tem become technically insolvent and/or illiquid, have occurred with increasing frequency
across international markets since the 1970s. Bordo et al. (2001) show that the frequency
of banking crises has increased following nancial liberalisation of the 1980s to reach levels
not witnessed since the great depression. The repercussions of these crises have been huge
scal costs incurred as a result of both bailing out insolvent nancial institutions, and in
terms of output loss to economies.
This apparent linkage between liberalisation and banking instability prompted questions
regarding this "dark side" of nancial liberalisation. Theoretical research that nds a
1In this study nancial liberalisation is synonymous with nancial deregulation or nancial reform,
therefore these terms are used interchangeably.
1
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positive relationship between banking crises and nancial sector liberalisation, provides
three rationales for this link. The rst rationale stipulates that nancial liberalisation
erodes bank prots, as regulations that previously shielded banks from competition are
relaxed. Low prots transmit to low bank franchise or charter value (i.e. the capitalised
value of expected future bank prots), which in turn increases bank risk-taking incentives.
On this front, the work of Hellmann et al. (2000), Demsetz et al. (1996), and Keeley (1990)
establish that banks shun the risk of bankruptcy and are more conservative when they earn
monopoly prots2. With moral hazard and limited liability, banks in competitive markets
choose risky investments that yield high returns if the gamble succeeds, but bear little or
no risk if the gamble fails.
The second rationale is based on institutional aws arising from newly liberalised economies.
Implicit and explicit deposit guarantees increase moral hazard problems in newly liber-
alised economies. Furthermore, nancial liberalisation renders insu¢ cient the capacity of
regulators to monitor more banks with new and wider scope of bank activities, in periods
following nancial liberalisation. As such, liberalisation may increase bank fragility, and
as a result countries with high quality supervision have experienced less costly banking
crises (Noy, 2004; Rossi, 1999; Williamson and Mahar, 1998).
Lastly, the third rationale is based on the argument that nancial liberalisation contributes
much to uncertainty about prices and credit expansion. This heightens levels of credit risk,
interest and exchange rate risk, and liquidity risk that banks face (Allen and Gale, 1998;
Chari and Jagannathan, 1988; Kaufman, 1988). As demonstrated by Allen and Gale
(1998,2001), growth in credit, which often follows after nancial liberalisation, can cause
a bubble in asset prices. However, when the bubble bursts, a decline in the market value
of assets forces borrowers to default on loan payments and, as a result, banks incur huge
non-performing loans.
Much empirical work has also been done in recent years to ascertain the theoretical claims
and identify the causal e¤ect of nancial liberalisation on bank stability. One branch of
empirical studies uses computed measures of bank risk (for example, ratio of risk weighted
assets to total assets, market to asset ratio, volatility of credit to private sector and bank
stock price volatility), to assess how such risk is associated with di¤erent measures of
nancial liberalisation or bank regulation (Gonzalez, 2005; Keeley, 1990; Furlong, 1988).
Another body of research employs a dummy variable for the occurrence (or non-occurrence)
of systemic banking crises, using the limited dependent variable estimation technique. The
probability of a banking crisis is expressed as a function of a set of control variables in-
cluding di¤erent bank regulation or nancial liberalisation measures (Angkinand et al.,
2A recent strand in the literature suggests a negative relationship between competition and bank risk
taking. See for instance Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) and Boyd et al. (2006).
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2009; Barth et al., 2004; Noy, 2004; Rossi, 1999; Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998b).
Studies that use di¤erent measures of bank risk, and those that use crisis dummy variables,
also use di¤erent measures to proxy for nancial liberalisation. The cited studies estab-
lished that nancial liberalisation signicantly increases or decreases bank fragility. For
instance, Rossi (1999) nds that moving from a repressed to a more liberalised banking
system reduces the likelihood of banking crises, whereas Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache
(1998b) report contradictory ndings.
As part of the greater debate on the link between liberalisation and bank fragility, some em-
pirical literature focuses on the possible conduits through which liberalisation and/or bank
regulation could a¤ect nancial stability. This stems from observations that deregulation
of nancial sectors is expected to contribute to drastic changes in nancial market struc-
tures, which has implications for competition, concentration and consequently protability
in the nancial sector. On this front, Keeley (1990) documents a decline in franchise value
during deregulation periods in nancial markets in the United States (US), and links this
to increased bank risk-taking behaviour during periods of high failure rates for US banks.
Demsetz et al. (1996) also nd an inverse relationship between franchise value and mea-
sures of risk for bank holding companies in the US. Gonzalez (2005) and Hellmann et al.
(2000) nd that high regulatory restrictions reduce bank charter value, and banks with
low charter value take on more risk than those with higher charter values.
While theory presents a strong case for the positive inuence of nancial liberalisation
on banking crises, empirical work shows mixed evidence. Furthermore, studies that focus
on Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) have been sparse. In addition to that, another challenge
has been the unavailability of data on the measures of nancial liberalisation and bank
fragility that cover a wide array of countries in SSA. Most nancial liberalisation measures
examined in the available literature are limited both in terms of time coverage as well as
in scope. The truncated nature of such data, limits its usefulness in analysing the e¤ects
of liberalisation on long run performance of nancial sectors in cross-country and panel
studies.
Although previous studies provide useful insights into the e¤ects of some policies on bank
fragility, they fail to account for the e¤ects of a wide array of liberalisation policies. Kirk-
patrick and Green (2002) point out that weak regulation, often a consequence of over-hasty
implementation of a wide array of nancial liberalisation policies, has been associated with
economic decline and instability, with adverse e¤ects on nancial sector stability. Further-
more, Angkinand et al. (2009) point out that some degree of liberalisation is probably
required to set the process of banking crises in motion. However, binary variables often
used to proxy nancial liberalisation in the literature, do not capture the levels and rates
of implementation of policy changes, and hence have not been able to account for such
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causal claims3.
Lastly, not much attention has been given to empirical tests on the precise channels through
which nancial liberalisation could a¤ect the actual occurrence of either systemic or bor-
derline banking crises in SSA. This has been the case despite established theoretical sug-
gestions on probable conduits, including bank franchise value.
This study is therefore motivated by the observation that, although theoretical develop-
ments recognise the potential adverse e¤ects of nancial liberalisation on nancial stability,
empirical evidence on the e¤ects on countries in SSA is limited. This gap emanates partly
from previous data limitations on liberalisation measures. On this front, this study ex-
tends the liberalisation database of Abiad et.al (2008), by constructing seven liberalisation
indicators for 12 SSA countries, thereby extending the number of SSA countries from the
Abiad et.al. database to 26. The compiled indicators provide liberalisation measures that
capture the magnitude, pace, and timing of reform aspects, on a wide spectrum of SSA
countries.
This thesis evaluates the e¤ects of the seven nancial liberalisation policies on the likeli-
hood of systemic and non-systemic banking crises in 26 SSA countries from 1986 to 20064.
Specically, the study focuses on seven liberalisation policies: (i) credit controls and re-
serve requirement, (ii) interest rate controls, (iii) entry and activity barriers, (iv) state
ownership in the banking sector, (v) capital account restrictions, (vi) prudential regulation
and supervision of the banking sector, and (vii) securities market policy.
The study uses this data in three empirical tests. First, this thesis examines the e¤ects
of the liberalisation policies on banking sector crises. Second, the link between nancial
liberalisation and bank protability is examined. Lastly, the study tests if the link between
nancial liberalisation and banking crises can be explained by the inuence of nancial
liberalisation on bank franchise value.
1.1.1 Justication for the research
The US subprime crises of 2007, though concentrated in high income countries, presented
a reminder of the social and economic costs associated with periods of nancial crises, and
in particular, banking instability. Laeven and Valencia (2010) reiterate the commonalities
between the subprime crises and banking crises witnessed in the past. These include
observations that banking crises are often preceded by credit booms, large imbalances in
3Brownbridge and Kirkpatrick (2008) also note that data limitations on specic regulatory reforms
have in the past forced quantitative analysis in this area to be supplemented by qualitative analysis from
country case studies.
4A list of the study countries, banking crises episodes as well as the liberalisation periods is given in
Table B.0.1 in the appendix.
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private sector balance sheets, and growth in non-bank nancial institutions (Laeven and
Valencia, 2010). Such scenarios have often been associated with nancial liberalisation
in two ways. Firstly, weak regulatory oversight is akin to consequences of prudential
regulation and supervision lagging behind nancial liberalisation and innovation. Secondly,
the credit boom and subsequent crash in asset prices, broadly resembles the boom-bust
episodes, many of which followed periods of nancial liberalisation. Consequently, the US
crises stimulated renewed e¤orts in research regarding early warning indicators of banking
crises, policy responses, prudential regulation and bank supervision.
Liberalisation of nancial markets is a core element of policy reform especially for countries
in SSA, whose poor economic performance hinges on a su¢ ciently developed and stable
nancial sector. This study explores the relationship between these two very important
issues, namely nancial liberalisation and banking sector stability.
The focus of this thesis is on banking crises, since banks are often at the centre of most
nancial crises5. The banking sector in SSA generally accounts for more than 90% of total
nancial sector assets, and as such, its stability is a major policy concern. In addition,
banks play a crucial role in channelling funds to their most e¢ cient use in the economy.
Therefore, banking crises have the potential to cause serious damage to the economy, in
the form of direct output loss and bailout costs. Laeven and Valencia (2010) document
that the estimated output loss from the banking crises in Cameroon (1987) was 106% of
GDP, whilst 50% and 10% was realised in Kenya (1992) and Zimbabwe (1995) respectively.
This study focuses on Africa, the least economically developed region in the world, whose
economic and nancial performance has increasingly become a concern in African policy
circles. The banking industry in African countries provides a unique example of developing
economies which have witnessed a large number of bank failures. Statistical evidence on
banking crises in SSA reveal that from 1980 and 1990, 13 countries experienced systemic
banking crises (18 crisis episodes in all), from 1991 to 1995, 14 countries experienced
banking crises (21 episodes in all), and between 1996 and 2006, 9 countries experienced
systemic banking crises (11 episodes).
A majority of African countries liberalised their nancial sectors beginning as far back as
the early 1980s. One of the main objectives of nancial reform was removal of operating
obstacles in the nancial sectors to foster nancial deepening and ensure nancial stability.
Prior to liberalisation, nancial systems in the majority of countries in Africa had all the
hallmarks of nancial repression. This was a result of a widely held historical perception,
that post-colonial governments could promote development through intervening in nancial
systems.
5Banking crises often coincide with currency crises and sovereign debt crises. See for example Kaminsky
and Reinhart (1999) on banking and currency crises.
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In the light of these observations, this thesis attempts to address the following pertinent
questions: Has nancial liberalisation led to more unstable nancial systems? Is this e¤ect
dependent on specic types of liberalisation? Does the dynamic nature of liberalisation
policies matter? What are the probable channels through which nancial liberalisation
could a¤ect bank fragility?
While some of the literature have focused on various aspects of these questions, focus on
the African region has been very limited. A lot of the work done on nancial systems
in SSA focuses more on nancial intermediation, monetary policy, stock market and non-
bank nancial institutions development6. Factors underlying banking distress and crises
in Africa have been surveyed in the work of Popiel (1994), Brownbridge (1998), Honohan
(1993), and most recently Daumont et al. (2004). These qualitative surveys provide a
framework from which this study draws the main determinants for empirical explorations.
This thesis provides the rst attempt to explore the empirical link between a wide ar-
ray of nancial liberalisation policies and actual occurrence of systemic and non-systemic
banking sector crises in SSA. While countries in SSA continue to implement and modify
nancial liberalisation polices, this thesis responds to policy concerns regarding the e¤ects
of liberalisation on banking sector stability. As such, results from this exercise should
guide policy makers to understand the dynamics of nancial reform and banking system
stability in SSA.
1.1.2 Objectives of the research
This study has three key objectives shaped around the empirical chapters of this thesis.
The rst objective is to establish the causal e¤ect of nancial sector liberalisation on the
occurrence of systemic and non-systemic banking crises, in a sample of SSA countries.
To achieve this, the study examines if any new evidence can be drawn from testing the
impact of each of the seven liberalisation dimensions, and indices constructed from the
seven policies, on banking sector stability.
The second objective is to investigate the inuence of nancial liberalisation on bank prof-
itabality. The study uses amongst other liberalisation measures, an index of competitive
liberalisation, constructed using data on three liberalisation policies pertaining to (1) en-
try and activity barriers, (2) capital account restrictions, and (3) securities market policy.
These policies have a direct e¤ect on bank competition, and hence on performance out-
comes. The liberalisation data is compiled from Abiad et.al (2008), which is extended in
this thesis.
6Allen et al. (2011) provide a more detailed and most recent review of nancial systems in Africa.
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The third objective is to test if the linkage between liberalisation and banking crises can
be accounted for through the inuence of nancial liberalisation on bank franchise value.
This is done by assessing how changes in bank franchise value, resulting from nancial
liberalisation, impact on banking sector stability. To achieve this, the study considers an
indicator that captures how much franchise value co-varies with nancial liberalisation,
and uses the indicator in a model for the likelihood of occurrence of banking sector crises.
1.1.3 Structure of the thesis
Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the thesis. It gives the main theme, motivation
and the objectives of the thesis.
Chapter 2 gives the background to banking crises in Africa. A brief discussion of the
macroeconomic and nancial system developments in SSA is provided. In addition, details
on the correlations between nancial liberalisation and frequency of banking crises are
provided.
Chapter 3 provides an overview of theories on banking crises. This chapter seeks to
establish the theoretical framework that will be used in the empirical analysis.
Chapter 4 presents the rst empirical analysis. This chapter investigates the relation-
ship between overall nancial liberalisation, and specic liberalisation dimensions, and the
actual occurrence of either systemic or non-systemic crises. This chapter also answers
questions pertaining to whether the liberalisation e¤ect depends on institutional devel-
opment characteristics inherent in the liberalised economies. On this aspect, a pertinent
question amongst scholars is why prudential regulations already in place, and those still
being implemented, fail to e¤ectively contain banking sector crises.
Chapter 5 further investigates the ndings presented in Chapter 4, by examining possible
channels through which the e¤ect of nancial liberalisation may lead to banking crises.
Drawing from previous scholarly work, the thesis hypothesises that one such channel is
the reduction in bank franchise value. Therefore, in this chapter the thesis investigates
the determinants of bank protability accounting for the e¤ects of nancial liberalisation
on two main bank performance outcomes: return on assets and return on equity. The
empirical analysis is conducted in a dynamic panel framework, to account for persistence
of prots over time, using both country and bank-level data.
Chapter 6 investigates whether the changes in franchise value tested in Chapter 5 have
any signicant marginal probaility e¤ects on the occurrence of either systemic or non-
systemic banking crises. In a two stage framework, the study constructs a liberalisation-
franchise value indicator in the rst stage. This indicator is then included as a regressor in
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the second stage, in an ordered logit model for the likelihood of having no crisis, a systemic
crisis or a non-systemic crisis.
Chapter 7 concludes by rst making a summary of the empirical ndings and then sug-
gests policy recommendations based on these ndings.
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Chapter 2
Background to Banking Crises in
Africa
2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents an overview of the economic landscape that characterised most
economies in SSA over the last few decades. Indeed, many of the banking sector crises
recorded over the years have been inextricably linked with macroeconomic instability, in a
way that makes it di¢ cult to unravel the direction of causality (Caprio Jr and Honohan,
2009). This makes it important to identify both the micro and macroeconomic indicators
that were recorded before, during, and after banking crises.
The second part of this chapter discusses the underlying causes of banking sector crises
established in previous studies. This chapter concludes by presenting some trends in -
nancial liberalisation and banking crises in SSA. Thus, this chapter creates a platform for
the empirical work presented in subsequent chapters.
2.2 Economic Development
The 21st century has witnessed the recovery of overall growth in SSA. The economic
growth rate in SSA has averaged 1% from as far back as the early 1980s to around 1990,
and 3% for the period 1991-19991. The comparable rate for the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) was 2.1%, while Latin America averaged 1.7%,
during the period 1980 to 2000. The growth rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
improved from 3% recorded during the late 1990s, to 5% in 2007. However, economic
1In this section the statistics for SSA refer to the 26 countries in the study sample.
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growth tumbled from an average of 6% in 2008 to 2% in 2009, before improving slightly to
4% in 2010. The economic recovery has been attributed partly to economic and nancial
sector reforms that have been implemented since the 1980s (Allen et al., 2011).
Despite these remarkable developments, Africa has been regarded as the least developed
region in the world over the years. As presented in Table 2.2.1, GDP per capita for SSA
averages more than 50% lower than that of developing economies in Latin America and the
Caribbean since 1980. Table 2.2.1 also shows that in 2010, GDP per capita for Africa was
US$ 1,659 compared to US$8,650 for Latin America and the Caribbean, and US$ 22,435
for the more developed countries in Europe and Central Asia. This has been the trend
since the 1980s.
Table 2.2.1: GDP per capita in Selected Regions
Europe and Latin America Middle East Sub Saharan Africa
Central Asia and Caribbean and North Africa
1980-95 7749 2393 2216 575 713
1996 12380 3952 2646 565 732
1997 11713 4242 2697 571 746
1998 11991 4176 2587 525 716
1999 11852 3653 2720 512 713
2000 11121 3995 3002 515 726
2001 11221 3819 2919 488 691
2002 12267 3360 2860 500 680
2003 14914 3556 3143 623 803
2004 17335 4054 3568 758 946
2005 18381 4865 4168 863 1075
2006 19840 5662 4789 983 1225
2007 23110 6613 5488 1112 1395
2008 25270 7603 6713 1242 1606
2009 22101 7043 5814 1144 1482
2010 22435 8650 6585 1309 1659
Figures are in US$.Source: World Development and Africa Development Indicators, World Bank (2012)
At country level, the growth experiences are enormously diverse. While countries such
as Botswana and Cape Verde have grown consistently, other countries like Madagascar
recorded persistent declines in economic growth over the years. Table 2.2.2 reports that
growth rates declined by a minimum of 3% (2.5 standard deviations) in Benin and 8% (3
standard deviations) in Cameroon. Countries such as Zimbabwe and Cote dIvoire, are
amongst those countries that experienced positive growth in the early and late 1980s, but
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have witnessed economic decline in recent years.
Table 2.2.2: Macroeconomic Indicators in Selected Countries
GDP Growth Ination
86-90 91-95 96-00 01-06 86-90 91-95 96-00 01-06
Cameroon 5.65 2.92 0.42 0.78 3.75 8.61 0.53 1.74
Cote dIvore 1.93 3.71 4.46 1.35 2.99 1.08 2.89 0.72
Senegal 2.96 2.04 1.9 2.33 2.75 6.91 0.68 3.27
Chad 8.43 10.7 3.58 11.32 3.41 2.2 1.63 1.79
Botswana 4.96 2.11 2.08 1.02 0.18 0.23 0.18 0.26
Ghana 0.88 0.79 0.4 0.9 0.38 0.77 0.54 0.72
Kenya 1.2 2.02 1.71 2.08 2.01 7.87 0.58 0.96
Nigeria 4.38 1.67 1.76 3.69 2.75 0.27 1.1 0.62
Uganda 3.04 3.06 1.89 0.81 0.99 79.47 52.7 3.23
Zambia 2.96 5.55 3.16 1.21 0.51 1.1 0.37 0.40
Source: Authors calculations based on International Financial Statistics (IMF 2012)
and World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2012)
Data calculated as standard deviations of annual percentage changes.
Regarding ination, Table 2.2.2 shows that ination was high and volatile in the early
1990s, especially in Nigeria, Uganda and Zambia. In Zambia, ination accelerated to 193%
in 1993, shortly before the rst series of bank failures. In Nigeria, ination reached 70%
while in Uganda it skyrocketed to 230% in the 1990s. Interest rates were liberalised in most
countries around the same time, as such, nominal lending rates were high. Consequently,
real interest rates were substantially negative.
2.3 Financial Sector Development
Financial systems in the SSA region have recorded signicant developments since the turn
of the 21st century. Along with economic performance, nancial indicators have on average
been on an upward trend since 1980 through to 2007. Credit extensions to the private
sector rose from an average of 11% between 1986 and 1990, to 12.1% for the period 1991 to
1995. During the period 1996 to 2000, private sector credit decreased to 10%. This ratio
took an upward trend again between 2001 and 2006 and increased to an average of 16%.
These improvements have been linked to economic and nancial sector reforms that SSA
countries have implemented in the recent past (Allen et al., 2011).
Although overall credit extended to the private sectors in SSA improved between 1986 and
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2006, this was attained at very low levels and at a slower pace than in other developing
countries. Figure 2.1 depicts the low levels of credit that banks grant to the private
sector (%GDP) in SSA in comparison with other developing and developed economies.
Private sector credit has been below 20% since 1980 in SSA, whilst attaining levels in
other developing and developed economies of 25% and above 100% respectively.
Figure 2.1: Private Sector Credit in Selected Regions, 1980-2010
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Source World Development Indicators, World Bank (2012)
MENA refers to Middle East and North Africa
Although there is an upward trend in credit extensions to the private sector at the regional
level, the trend in individual SSA countries is less smooth. Both Benin and Cameroon
recorded a downslide from 25% to 14% and 9% respectively from 1985 to 2006, while
Chad experienced a decline from 12% to 3% during the same period. On the other hand,
countries with well developed nancial infrastructure, including South Africa, Mauritius
and Seychelles, recorded higher ratios. For instance, the ratio of private sector credit to
GDP in South Africa averaged 76% from 1986 to 1990, 88% from 1991 to 1995, 124% from
1996 to 2000, and 129% from 2001 to 2006.
On the liability side of the nancial intermediariesbalance sheets, both the ratio of nan-
cial system deposits and liquid liabilities to GDP have improved over the years, albeit at
a very slow pace (See Table A.0.1 in the Appendix). The ratio of liquid liabilities was in
the 25%-35% range during the period 1986 to 2007. The other regional blocks including
(1) Other developing countries, (2) East Asia and the Pacic, (3) Latin America and the
Caribbean, had gures no less than 40% during the 1995 to 2007 period. In fact this score
was above 50% in East and North Africa throughout the same period. The only notable
exceptions are South Africa and Seychelles which had high scores for both liquid liabilities
and nancial sector deposits as a percentage of GDP.
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2.4 Structure of the Financial Sector
2.4.1 Banking sector
The banking sector has the largest share in terms of total nancial sector assets in a ma-
jority of countries in SSA. In some SSA countries, banks contribute close to 90% of total
nancial assets (Quintyn and Taylor, 2007). Such countries include Gambia (97%), Mada-
gascar (98%), Mali (95%), Mozambique (95%), Mauritius (95%) as well as Nigeria (90%).
The nancial systems in countries such as Ethiopia (88%), Seychelles (87%), Gabon (84%),
Tanzania (78%), Zimbabwe (77%), and Malawi (71%) also exhibit high ratios of bank as-
sets to total assets. On the other hand, Botswana and South Africa are characterised by
low banking sector dominance in their nancial systems, with the share of bank assets in
total nancial assets of 40% and 25% respectively (Quintyn and Taylor, 2007).
The banking systems in SSA are highly concentrated and dominated by either a few large
foreign-owned banks, or state-owned banks. The presence of foreign-owned banks has been
attributed to nancial sector reforms implemented across the region from the 1980s. The
share of foreign-owned banks as a percentage of total banks increased from 40% to 56%
in East Africa, and from 48 % to 56% in Southern Africa during the period 1998 to 2006
(Allen et al., 2011). Overall, foreign banks account for an average of between 40% to 60%
of total bank assets in most SSA countries. Financial sector reforms have also resulted in
a reduction in state-owned banks as countries privatise state-owned banks.
2.4.2 Stock market
Signicant strides have been made in Africa to develop stock markets (Table 2.4.1). This
has been attributed to the specic nancial sector reform policies that targeted develop-
ment of capital markets. Whilst there were only ve stock markets in SSA before 1989,
liberalisation of nancial markets propelled the growth of existing markets and the estab-
lishment of several others (Yartey and Adjasi, 2007). As at 2010, there were 29 stock
exchanges in operation in Africa, 17 of which are in SSA with about 945 listed compa-
nies. Furthermore, a regional stock exchange that serves eight West African countries,
the Bourse Regionale des Baleurs Mobilieres (BRVM), was established in 1998 in Abidjan,
Cote dIvoire.
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Table 2.4.1: Stock Market Development Indicators in SSA 2008
Country Stock exchange Number of Market capitalisation Stock Traded Stock Traded
Year founded listed companies (%GDP) Total(% GDP) Turnover ratio(%)
Botswana 1989 44 26.4 1.07 3.05
Cameroon 2001 2
Cote dIvoire 1998 39 30 1 4
Ghana 1990 28 11.9 0.52 5.19
Kenya 1954 50 35.8 4.7 11.8
Malawi 1995 8 43.7 1.4 3.4
Mauritius 1988 40 35.7 4.2 8.9
Mozambique 1999
Nigeria(Lagos) 1960 223 24.9 9.6 29.3
South Africa 1887 410 179.4 146.6 60.6
Swaziland 1990 10 0.002* 0.03* 3.8*
Tanzania 1998 17 6.2 0.13 2.1*
Uganda 1997 14 21.3 0.5 5.4*
Zambia(Agric) 2007
Zambia 1994 16 11.1* 0.21* 2.1*
Zimbabwe 1993 81 487* 16.5* 6.2*
SSA 943 76.1 15.5 12.1
SSA** 61.2 3.3 7
Brazil 35.63 44 74
Indonesia 19.36 21.7 71.3
Mexico 21.25 9.88 34.33
* 2006 data **Average excluding South Africa
Source: World Bank Development Indicators (World Bank, 2012) & authors calculations
Despite these developments, stock exchanges in SSA remain thin and illiquid compared to
markets in both developed countries as well as other developing countries (Table 2.4.1).
The average ratio of market capitalisation to GDP in SSA was 76% in 2008. The ratio
of total stock traded to GDP was 16% in 2008 compared to 44% in Brazil and 22% for
Indonesia. However, these ratios were largely driven by the stock exchanges of South
Africa and Zimbabwe. South Africa recorded average market capitalisation ratios of 166%
(1994-1999), 186% (2000-2006), and 179% in 2008, while 487% was recorded for Zimbabwe
in 2008. South Africa also recorded 147% in the ratio of total stock traded to GDP in
2008. This score for SSA drops from 16% to 3% if South Africa is excluded.
In terms of liquidity, the stocks traded turnover ratio for SSA countries was low compared
to other developing countries. For instance, in 2008 this ratio was 6% in Zimbabwe, 29%
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in Nigeria, and 3% in Botswana compared to 74% in Brazil, 71% in Indonesia and 34% in
Mexico during the same period. The Johannesburg stock exchange in South Africa was an
exception, being liquid with 61% of stocks traded turnover ratio in 2008.
2.4.3 Other nancial institutions
The other nancial sectors, including the insurance sector, bond markets, derivative mar-
kets, as well as other non-bank nancial institutions are still in their infancy. There are
a few exceptions, for instance, markets in South Africa, Mauritius, Seychelles and Nigeria
are well developed. However, in most countries these markets have started to grow and
could potentially alter the structure of nancial systems in the near future.
2.4.4 Institutional framework
The nancial systems in SSA, like those in many developing countries, have for long been
characterised by impediments to e¤ective prudential sup rvision. The structural and in-
stitutional indicators provided by Mehran (1998) highlight deciencies in the institutional
environment in many SSA countries. In fact, the legal frameworks in most countries are
reported to be ine¤ective in facilitating the enforcement of nancial contracts and recov-
ery of loans and collateral. Furthermore, Gelbard and Leite (1999) report that the loan
recovery process was di¢ cult in 28 SSA countries, and nancial sector legislation was
barely adequate in 14 countries in their sample. Other institutional impediments to e¤ec-
tive supervision include shortage of skilled personnel, poor accounting standards, lack of
published nancial data on banks, as well as minimal penalties for submitting inaccurate
reports to the supervisors (Goldstein and Turner, 1996).
The institutional challenges that most countries face are a result of legal frameworks put
in place during the colonial eras of the 1970s and 1980s which have become outdated and
decient. One of the major challenges of these regulatory frameworks has been lack of pro-
visions for supervision of non-bank nancial institutions and stock markets. Furthermore,
most countries adopted the supervisory structures of their colonial powers. Former British
colonies housed bank supervision in the central bank, whereas former French colonies set up
independent agencies to carry out bank supervision (Quintyn and Taylor, 2007). Therefore,
central banks became the dominant bank supervisors across SSA. However, central banks
often lack independence, and the critical resources necessary for e¤ective examination and
supervision of the nancial intermediaries.
Furthermore, while nancial liberalisation opened up the banking sector and facilitated
the lifting of restrictions on asset choices of banks, minimal compensatory actions were
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put in place to strengthen regulatory oversight. In several countries, the capabilities of
central banks to provide regulatory oversight have not been upgraded to keep up with the
new nancial structures and instruments. These developments have prompted several SSA
countries to implement further reforms in order to update and modernise banking laws
and build bank supervisory capacities. While some progress has been made, prudential
regulation and supervision of banks in SSA remain highly constrained.
2.5 Determinants of Banking Crises
This section discusses the main determinants of the banking crises that a¤ected countries
in SSA over the last few decades. These form the basis for the explanatory variables that
are used for empirical analysis. Caprio Jr and Honohan (2009) dene a bank as being in
nancial distress when it is technically insolvent and/or illiquid, and a systemic banking
crisis occurs when a large segment of the banking system becomes nancially distressed.
Such crises involve widespread insolvency of banks leading to closures, mergers, takeovers,
or injection of government resources in response to the crisis.
Systemic and non-systemic banking crises experienced in SSA stemmed from both macro-
economic and bank fundamentals. Shocks to economic fundamentals including unstable
interest rates, ination and growth rate uctuations as well as poorly developed nancial
systems are all part of the internal factors a¤ecting banking crises. The exogenous factors
include deteriorating terms of trade, unstable international interest rates, exchange rate
volatility, decline in international capital ows, and economic recessions. Nevertheless, it is
important not to ignore the role that nancial liberalisation plays in engendering banking
sector crises amidst fragile macroeconomic environments.
The determinants of banking crises discussed in this chapter are drawn mainly from pre-
vious work that focused on African countries, including studies by Brownbridge (1998),
Brownbridge and Harvey (1998), as well as Kane and Rice (2001). Daumont et al. (2004)
also provide a comprehensive discussion of the most important sources of banking crises
in a sample of countries from SSA between 1985 and 1995.
2.5.1 Exogenous factors
Macroeconomic volatility
SSA economies were hit by a series of external shocks from the late 1980s. Figure A.1
in the appendix, shows the trends in terms of trade and foreign currency depreciation for
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periods before and after major banking crises in selected SSA countries. There was an
overall decline in terms of trade across all the countries over time. In addition, the o¢ cial
exchange rates in a selection of countries were highly volatile. The situation was aggravated
by the less diversied and hence high export concentration nature of SSA economies.
Countries in the West African Economic Monetary Union (WAEMU) that rely heavily
on agricultural exports were hard hit by the protracted decline in world prices of co¤ee,
cocoa, cotton, and oil from the late 1980s. In Francophone West Africa, these problems
were aggravated by the devaluation of the CFA franc. Similarly, the Ugandan economy
was adversely a¤ected by a decline in terms of trade shortly before the 1994 banking sector
crises2. In Cameroon, terms of trade tumbled by 56% during 1985-1992. Ghana faced a
large decline in cocoa exports in the late 1980s and a 1173% depreciation in its currency.
During the same period, the US dollar depreciated signicantly against major currencies
from its all time high in 1985 across most SSA countries.
Together all these shocks were transmitted to the banking sectors through sharp alter-
ations to the relationship between the values of bank assets and liabilities. The signicant
deterioration in terms of trade and decline in world agricultural prices impaired borrowers
ability to service loans. As a result, this exposed traders and banks across the region to
losses. Caprio Jr and Klingebiel (1996) provide evidence that 75% of the developing coun-
tries in their study which experienced banking crises experienced a deterioration in terms
of trade beforehand of at least 10%. Similarly, following the external shocks of 1987-1988
the banking systems in the WAEMU experienced severe crises; non-performing loans for
the seven countries amounted to six times the sum of bank capital and reserves (Azam
et al., 2004).
2.5.2 Internal factors
Ination and growth rate uctuations
Table 2.2.2 presented in the previous section shows a rising trend of volatility in ination as
well as economic growth rates across most countries. The acute macroeconomic volatility
across most countries impaired loan quality and hence exposed banks to huge losses. In
addition, economic contraction exacerbated non-performing loans, leaving banks unable to
repay their customersdeposits. Countries with high ination and growth volatilities also
exhibited volatile behaviour in bank deposits and private sector credit as a share of GDP.
For instance, share of deposits in GDP dropped signicantly in Benin, Cameroon, Uganda,
Nigeria and Zambia for the period 1990-2000. This was attributed to sluggish GDP growth
2The share of co¤ee in total exports was 78% in 1995/6 and 62% in 1998/90.
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and government decit nancing which reduced government deposits to banks (Daumont
et al., 2004). By contrast, countries such as Botswana, that recorded stable growth and
low ination rates over the years recorded good quality loan portfolios and experienced
stable banking systems.
Underdeveloped nancial markets
Inadequately developed nancial markets in Africa have been blamed for the sluggish
economic growth and fragile nancial systems in the region since the 1980s. Although most
countries took steps towards developing their nancial systems through policy reforms,
aggregate indicators of nancial development have, on average either stagnated or declined.
Mehran (1998) and Gelbard and Leite (1999) surveyed nancial markets in Africa, and
their overall nancial development index suggests that nancial markets in a majority
of countries in SSA remain underdeveloped even by the standards of other developing
countries.
Overall, poor development in nancial markets negatively impacted on banking system
stability as banks could not fully benet from the advantages associated with large sized-
markets, for instance greater e¢ ciency, cost e¤ectiveness and greater risk diversication
(Daumont et al., 2004). Furthermore, limited nancial instruments constrain bank liquidity
bases, thereby making banks susceptible to shocks.
Weak institutional structures
As discussed earlier, SSA nancial sectors are characterised by weak institutional struc-
tures. For the greater part of the period under study, the overall legal environment was not
conducive to bank stability. For instance, statutes were not clear on restrictions on insider
lending, investment in non-bank business and large credit exposures to a single borrower
(Brownbridge and Harvey, 1998). Moreover, political interference also kept some banks
insulated from inspections. Supervisors lacked political autonomy to inspect especially
state-owned banks, thus they could not exercise prompt corrective action for distressed
banks.
In addition, poor disclosure requirements denied creditors and depositors opportunities to
evaluate and monitor banks and deter them from excessive risk-taking behaviour. On the
other hand, bank supervisors could not monitor and discipline banks based on accurate
information. The implication of such institutional weaknesses is failure to provide an
environment where supervisors could inspect and regulate bank risk-taking. Banks also
had no recourse against delinquent borrowers. As a result, bank risk-taking could not be
curbed and non-performing loans accumulated across most banks in SSA.
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Bank ownership structure
Most African countries upon attaining independence, created nancial institutions in the
public sector or nationalised previous privately-owned nancial institutions. The objective
was to enable the new governments to exert greater control over the nancial system
and ensure that credit allocation was more supportive of the overall economic strategy
of the governments (Brownbridge, 1998). As a result, a majority of SSA governments
were heavily involved in their nancial systems. This gave rise to state appointment
of directors and top bank management (on political grounds and rarely by merit), lack
of autonomy by management to conduct e¢ cient banking operations, directed lending
to politically inuential people and parastatals at preferential rates regardless of their
protability, corruption, poor credit appraisals and loan recovery strategies, as well as
poor investment decisions.
Privately owned banks had the majority of their shares owned by one or few individuals, a
family, or companies directed by the same family. This resulted in highly concentrated own-
ership structures. The consequent weaknesses of these practices were widespread lending
irregularities. For instance, Brownbridge (1998) notes that where politicians were involved
as bank shareholders, they used their inuence on regulators and supervisors not to sanc-
tion banks even if clear violations were made. Furthermore insider lending was prevalent
in family-owned banks. This all translated into unprecedented increase in non-performing
loans and consequent bank failures in several countries under study.
Financial liberalisation
The economic and nancial instability experienced in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
changed the perception of most governments on the role of state interventions in the nan-
cial sector. The majority of SSA countries began to adopt nancial sector reforms. These
were largely drawn from the framework of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs)
supported by International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.
The main objective of the SAPs was to replace former protectionist economic policies
blamed for economic and nancial instability, with more market oriented policies. How-
ever, the introduction of nancial sector liberalisation was followed by a return to bank
instability. A majority of SSA countries experienced banking problems, many of which
were severe enough to be regarded as systemic, of similar or worse magnitudes as those
prior to liberalisation.
However, in other countries, liberalisation reduced the risk of bank distress attributed to
governments directed lending to economically unviable projects. For instance, nancial
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liberalisation in Uganda helped clean up small weak banks, and improved bank supervision
and the privatization of state owned banks which historically made huge losses. This left
the Ugandan banking system more stable than prior to liberalisation with non-performing
loans dropping from 29% in 1998 to 12% in 1999 and subsequently to 3% by September
2004.
2.6 Financial Liberalisation and Scope of Banking Crises
Tables A.0.2, and A.0.3 in the appendix show the dates of initial liberalisation e¤orts, the
crisis episodes, as well as the periods during which the banking crises experienced in these
countries lasted. For instance, the crisis in Ghana stretched over most of the 1980s and
1990s. In other countries such as Kenya, Guinea, Nigeria, Zambia and Zimbabwe, the
data shows how the episodes often recurred.
The crisis incidences experienced in SSA were largely systemic in nature. Non-performing
loans in most cases exceeded 75% of total banking assets in Benin, Chad, Guinea and
Nigeria at the peak of the crises. On the other hand, adverse loans ranged between 50%-
75% of total banking system loans in Cameroon, Kenya, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Tanzania
and Uganda. A striking feature about these events is that the period that recorded the
greatest number of crisis episodes coincides with the period associated with increasing
levels of nancial liberalisation.
Figure 2.2: Total Liberalisation and Banking Crises
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Source: Authors computations using data from Abiad et.al, (2008) and Laeven and Valencia (2010)
In Figure 2.2, finref is the total nancial liberalisation index for SSA countries between
1980 and 2006. The index is a weighted sum of seven liberalisation dimensions for each year
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for all the countries in the sample. The gure further indicates that the process of overall
nancial liberalisation in SSA was gradual between 1980 and 1987, accelerated sharply
between 1988 and 1998, before reaching its peak around 1999. It then slowed down and
maintained steady levels thereafter. Individual country indices however display varying
and less smooth progression with reforms, for instance, policy reversals were recorded in
Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe.
Figure 2.2 indicates that most crisis incidences were recorded between 1987 and 1995.
During this period, the liberalisation index lies between 2.5 and 9.0, perhaps indicating a
signicant number of nancial liberalisation policies implemented by a majority of coun-
tries. Therefore, this data seems to suggest that crisis periods were concentrated around
the periods during which the nancial liberalisation process was most intense. The next
section gives a detailed analysis of the di¤erent liberalisation dimensions and incidences of
both systemic and non-systemic banking crises in SSA.
2.6.1 Liberalisation policies and bank crisis frequency
This section discusses trends in crisis incidences and liberalisation policies in SSA. The
study makes use of liberalisation data constructed in this thesis and from Abiad et al.
(2008), as well as crisis incidences as dated by Laeven and Valencia (2010). Liberalisation
along each dimension is normalised between 0 and 3 as follows: 0= fully repressed, 1=
partially liberalised, 2= largely liberalised, and 3 = fully liberalised.
Figure 2.3 indicates that more countries eliminated entry restrictions completely (level 3)
than those that either partially liberalised (levels 1 and 2) or maintained entry and activity
restrictions. However, countries that fully eliminated such controls had higher incidences
of systemic crises (18%) than those that were fully repressed (13%).
Figure 2.3: Entry and Interest Rate Reforms
Source: Authors computations using data from Abiad et.al, (2008) and Laeven and Valencia (2010)
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Figure 2.3 shows that more observations are recorded under full liberalisation than under
full repression of interest rates. Similarly, systemic and non-systemic crisis incidences
reported under full repression (17% and 9% respectively) are less than those reported
under full liberalisation (18% and 12% respectively). That is, more crisis episodes are
recorded during full liberalisation periods.
Regarding credit controls, Figure 2.4 shows that there are more incidences of crisis which
coincided with largely liberalised systems (scale 2) than with either partially liberalised
(scale 1) or fully liberalised nancial systems (scale 3). Thus, there is an inverted u-shaped
relationship between removal of credit controls and banking crises.
The right panel in Figure 2.4 indicates that less countries have taken steps towards im-
plementing reforms in prudential regulation and bank supervision. However, there are less
incidences of banking crises in those countries that have implemented these reforms than
those that have not. This suggests that periods of lax supervision and weak prudential
frameworks seem to be associated with high incidences of both systemic and non-systemic
crises.
Figure 2.4: Credit Controls and Bank Supervision
Source: Authors computations using data from Abiad et.al, (2008) and Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Figure 2.5) conrm that few countries fully relaxed controls on security markets and capital
accounts. Total crisis incidences (both systemic and non-systemic) reported under fully
repressed markets are more than under fully repressed systems. However, fully liberalised
markets record less incidences of either type of banking crises. This indicates that partially
repressed markets seem to be linked with unstable banking systems.
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Figure 2.5: Security Markets and Capital Account
Source: Authors computations using data from Abiad et.al, (2008) and Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Regarding privatisation of previously state-owned banks, Figure 2.6 shows that incidences
of systemic crisis in cases where a governments share in banking sector assets is more
than 50% (level zero, fully repressed), are more than those recorded under fully liberalised
conditions (government controls less than 10% of banking sector assets, level 3). This
seems to suggest that reducing government dominance in bank ownership is linked with
stable banking systems.
Figure 2.6: Privatisation and Total Liberalisation
Source: Authors computations using data from Abiad et.al, (2008) and Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Lastly, the overall index of nancial liberalisation shown in Figure 2.6 is an aggregate
sum of the seven liberalisation policies. Since the liberalisation scores range from 0 to
3, the liberalisation index for the seven policies has a range of 0 to 21, with higher val-
ues corresponding to higher magnitudes of nancial liberalisation. The index shows that
fewer observations reported high magnitudes of liberalisation in comparison with those
characterised by low magnitudes. Initially, there is an increase in crisis frequency as liber-
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alisation progresses from largely repressed (scale 0-1) up to the next level (scale between
1 and 5). However, fewer incidences of systemic and non-systemic crises are recorded for
higher magnitudes of total nancial liberalisation.
2.6.2 The cost of crises
Banking sector crises have been associated with huge costs imposed on the real economy.
These are either scal costs, that is, how much it costs for the government to recapitalize
the banks and reimburse depositors, or the loss in output relative to, for example, the
trend growth rate. Table 2.6.1 presents statistics on output losses as a percentage of GDP
during and after banking crises years in selected economies. Countries such as Cameroon
su¤ered losses in output of 118% of GDP in 1987, while 45% % of GDP was lost in
Burkina Faso between 1990 and 1992, and Swaziland recorded 31% loss in output in 19953.
Compared to other developing countries, emerging markets, as well as developed countries,
the magnitude of output loss from crises has been more severe in SSA countries. For
instance, in 1991 Finland recorded a loss in output of 39%, while Brazil lost 12% of output
following the banking crisis of 1990.
Table 2.6.1: Output loss/GDP from Banking Crises
Africa Output Loss Emerging Markets Output Loss Advanced Economies Output Loss
(% of GDP) (% of GDP) (% of GDP)
Cameroon (1987) 118 Indonesia (1996) 68 Finland (1991) 39
Kenya (1992) 23 Malaysia (1997) 50 Japan (1997) 18
B. Faso (1990) 45 China (1998) 37 US (1988) 4
Senegal (1988) 33 Brazil (1990) 12 Sweden (1991) 0
Swaziland (1995) 31 Argentina (1988) 10 Norway (1991) 0
Source: World bank, 2000. Laeven and Valencia 2008. Initial year of banking crisis in parenthesis
3The cost of restructuring the banking system was equally high: 25% of GDP in Ivory Coast and 6%
of Gross National Product (GNP) for Ghana in 1989.
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Chapter 3
An Overview of the Theories of
Banking Crises
3.1 Introduction
Banking sectors form an important part of nancial systems. Banking theories assert that
the basis for banksexistence is to ameliorate risks that are associated with market imper-
fections (Freixas and Rochet, 1997). Their existence is justied by the unique functions
they perform as intermediaries involved in the deposit and lending business, o¤ering ac-
cess to payment systems and asset transformation, managing risk as well as information
processing. Banks play an intermediary role to overcome information asymmetries and the
associated problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. Unstable banks are unable to
perform these crucial functions. As a result, substantial e¤orts are made to understand
how banking crises manifest, and possible solutions to mitigate their occurrence.
This chapter gives an overview of banking crises theories. Although this review is not
exhaustive, it attempts to highlight the relevant theories related to the study of banking
sector crises. This chapter starts by introducing the panic-based theories of bank-runs.
These theories are based on uncertainties in liquidity demands by consumers. Thereafter,
modern day theories that attempt to explain occurrences of systemic and non-systemic
crises are presented. Most of these theories are based on asymmetric information between
banks and borrowers as well as depositors, and low returns in investments resulting from
shocks to economic fundamentals. These theories have traditionally been classied into
two broad categories, panic based and fundamental based (business cycle) models.
In addition, this chapter presents theories of banking crises that incorporate nancial
liberalisation. This review focuses on models relevant to developing countries that attempt
to establish the link between nancial liberalisation and banking crises.
25
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
The arguments from the models presented in this chapter form the basis of the theoreti-
cal framework for the empirical analysis presented in this thesis. In summary, this thesis
borrows from the panic based and business cycle models to test how economic agents, eco-
nomic fundamentals and government regulations a¤ect the balance between banksassets
and liabilities that may result in insolvency. With regards to nancial liberalisation, the
empirical analysis draws on the framework presented in the models by Hellmann et al.
(2000) and Daniel and Jones (2007). These models focus on the e¤ects of competition and
moral hazard on banking sector stability in liberalised economies.
3.2 Panic Based Models
This group of models views banking crises as random events that occur spontaneously
as a result of mob psychology or panic and are unrelated to changes in the economy
(Kindleberger, 1978). Bank runs are a rational response to consumer beliefs that a bank
run will occur. A bank will face large-scale withdrawals as a result of co-ordination failure
amongst depositors, that is, depositors withdraw for fear that all other depositors will with-
draw their funds. However, banks operate under fractional reserve systems in which they
collect deposits and invest a fraction of them in long term investments1. Bank balance
sheets are therefore characterised by a maturity mismatch between liabilities (predomi-
nantly deposits) which are short term in nature, and assets (loans) which are long term
and illiquid. Therefore, any sudden liquidity requirements may force banks to liquidate
their assets at a loss and thus, the banking crisis becomes self-fullling. Conversely, the
expectation of no crisis is also self-fullling, if no one expects a crisis, no crisis occurs. The
seminal work of Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) demonstrate how bank
runs arise from self-fullling expectations.
3.2.1 Diamond and Dybvig model of bank runs
In the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model, there are 3 periods T = 0; 1; 2. Each consumer
is endowed with one unit of homogenous consumption good during period 0 and nothing
thereafter. During period 0, agents are identical, but they do not know which type they
belong to. In period 1, they each have probability t of being type 1 (early consumers) and
probability 1  t of being type 2 (late consumers). The fact that the proportion of type 1
consumers is constant means that there is no uncertainty about the aggregate demand for
liquidity.
There is a single production process that yields R > 1, for every good invested in period
1See Freixas and Rochet (1997) for an overview of fractional reserve banking and models of bank runs.
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0, if held to maturity, that is in period 2 . For disinvestment in period 1, the yield is 1
for each good invested. Although early disinvestment is costly, units of the good may be
stored at no cost, from period 1 to period 2.
Because of the continuum hypothesis, t and 1   t are also the proportions of consumers
of types 1 and 2 respectively. Therefore, a fraction t of type 1 consumers has a utility
function
U(c1) (3.1)
and consumes c1. Similarly, type 2 consumers derive utility
U (c2) (3.2)
and consumes c2.
cT is period T consumption by agents of type T ,  is a positive constant less than unity.
u(c) is increasing, strictly concave, twice continuously di¤erentiable and satises Inada
conditions U 0(0) =1 and U 0(1) = 0.
At date t = 0, the consumer has a utility function that is state dependent and act so as to
maximise the utility functions expected value
EU = tu(c1) + 1  tu(c2) (3.3)
Maximising the expected utility (equation 3.3) derives the rst order conditions
u0(c1) = Ru0(c2) (3.4)
tc1 + (1  t)c2=R = 1 (3.5)
Given t, the optimal values c1(t) and c

2(t) of c1 and c2 are found by solving the rst
order conditions, equations (3.4) and (3.5). Equation (3.4) implies that the sign of c1(t)
equals that of c2(t), and equation (3.5) implies that c

1(1) = 1 and c

2(2) = R. In other
words, consumers will invest in period 0. In period 1, type 1 consumers will liquidate their
investments and consume 1 unit, whereas type 2 consumers will consume R in period 2.
This is an autarky situation where there is no trade in current and future consumption.
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Further restrictions proposed in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) regarding relative risk aver-
sion coe¢ cient of the utility function and the discount rate are that:
 cU 00(c)
U 0(c)
> 1 and 1=R <   1 (3.6)
These restrictions guarantee that the solution to equations (3.4) and (3.5) also satises
1 < c1(t) < c

2(t) < R (3.7)
for 0 < t < 1. As such,  < 1=R implies that c2(t) < R and c

1(t) > 1. This outcome is
better than the autarky condition, that is, the outcome that is attained if consumers are
left without any intermediaries, c11 = 1 and c
2
2 = R.
Bank deposit contract
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) suggest that the optimal solution in equation (3.7) can be
achieved by a demand deposit contract. The banking sector is perfectly competitive such
that the bank o¤ers a deposit contract and supports optimal risk sharing, where the bank
accepts a unit deposit in period 0, and o¤ers depositors an option to withdraw their funds
in either period 1 or 2. If the bank o¤ers an average rate of return such that early consumers
get r1 > 1 in period 1 and late consumers get less than R in period 2 i.e. r2 < R, then
r2 > r1 means the consumers smooth their consumption and their welfare improves from
that of autarky. Thus the contract enables the bank to insure depositors against the
uncertainty pertaining to their demand for liquidity.
However, this good equilibrium is only achievable if certain conditions are met. Let n be
the fraction of depositors who declare their intention to withdraw in period 1. The bank
can o¤er a demand deposit contract that o¤ers r1 to n consumers who withdraw their
funds in period 1. If n < 1=r1 then the bank will be able to pay
r2 =
[1  r1n]R
1  n (3.8)
per unit deposited to the remaining 1  n depositors in period 2.
If the fraction of type 1 consumers (t) is known ex ante, then the bank can optimally set
r1 = c

1(t). In addition, if t is known, and only t consumers withdraw at date 1 then n = t,
and r2 = c2(t). If every agent behaves rationally and the number of consumers who declare
their intention to withdraw in period 1 equals the number of type 1 consumers, then type
2 consumers have no incentive to consume early. This is so because type 2 consumers are
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guaranteed of consuming in period 2, and get a return higher than period 1 return, r2 > r1.
This is a good equilibrium.
However, a bad equilibrium is attained if n  1=r1. This is so because deposit contracts
promise payment on demand and yet funds are invested in long term assets, thus there
arises a maturity mismatch in the banksportfolio for n  1=r1. In this scenario only
1=r1 depositors can withdraw their funds before the bank runs out of funds and becomes
insolvent. The rest of the depositors will not receive anything in either periods. This
happens when type 2 consumers are not certain that n = t, and they fear that the other
type 2 consumers may withdraw during period 1. The expectation that a bank run may
arise forces even rational consumers to rush to withdraw their funds. The banks will
serve them sequentially until they run out of funds and becomes insolvent. Therefore, the
expectation of bank runs occurring becomes self-fullling, and the expectation does not
necessarily have to be driven by economic fundamentals (Mitsuo, 2007).
Policy relevance
The Diamond and Dybvig (1983) framework describes the e¤ect of co-ordination failure
based on a shift in expectations. Solvent banks may be pushed into failure due to liquidity
problems as a result of excessive withdrawals. However, this framework fails to explain
the cause in the shift in expectations, but simply refers to the factors causing the shifts as
"sunspots" (Lai, 2002). This problem of co-ordination failure calls for government inter-
vention to help co-ordinate patient consumers actions so as to ascertain a good equilibrium
outcome.
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) demonstrate that with no aggregate uncertainty, a suspen-
sion of convertibility policy can hinder the bad equilibrium that characterises bank runs.
The bank suspends any further withdrawals when a threshold level of early withdrawals is
reached. Under suspension of convertibility, late consumers are always assured of consum-
ing more in period 2 than in period 1 and therefore have no incentive to consume early.
However, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) nd that even a bank contract with suspension of
convertibility does not achieve optimal risk sharing. This is because deposit contracts as
well as investment decisions are taken prior to the realisation of t, the fraction of early
consumers, whereas optimal risk sharing involves consumption levels that are contingent
on t being realised.
Lender of last resort and deposit insurance schemes are also possible intervention measures
for potential bank runs. Deposit insurance schemes were proposed to eliminate equilibrium
bank runs as suggested in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). However, several researchers have
criticised the desirability of such schemes arguing that deposit insurance may increase moral
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hazard as well as bank risk-taking incentives (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002). If
the bank can perfectly predict the number of early consumers, it would simply hold reserves
su¢ cient to meet their demands. Some studies have however found evidence that if the
premiums for the deposit insurance scheme are not fully reective of the riskiness in bank
portfolios, deposit insurance may increase bank instability by increasing moral hazard
(Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002). Similarly, lender of last resort schemes may
create incentives for banks to take excessive risks.
The Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model has formed the basis of most empirical analysis
in the banking crises literature. This model highlights that the bad equilibrium is a result
of banks running out of reserves, and being forced to further liquidate their assets before
maturity. As a result, bank assets fall short of liabilities, hence banks become insolvent.
The bad equilibrium therefore captures banking instability in which bank runs nullify
optimal risk sharing.
Although the model explains how bank runs occur, it fails to account for how either of
the two equilibria is selected. Since depositorsbeliefs are coordinated by "sunspots", and
there is no real explanation of what triggers a crisis, the model as it is presents challenges
for use in policy analysis (See Babus et al., 2009).
3.3 Business Cycle Models
The business cycle set of theories views banking crises as an intrinsic part and a natural
outgrowth of the business cycle and a result of shocks to economic fundamentals (Babus
et al., 2009; Allen and Gale, 1998; Kindleberger, 1978)2.
One strand of the business cycle models, often referred to as information-based models,
focuses on the role of information asymmetry in triggering banking crises. These models
introduce some information uncertainty into the Diamond and Dybvig framework to co-
ordinate agentsactions. Morris and Shin (2001) argue that assuming common knowledge
regarding economic fundamentals in the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model contributes
to co-ordination failure and multiple equilibria in the model. As such, in the Morris and
Shin model, agents are allowed to have some idiosyncratic uncertainty about economic
fundamentals. The result is a unique equilibrium, where bank runs occur with a positive
probability. Goldstein and Pauzner (2002) similarly introduce noisy observable information
signals which serve to co-ordinate patient depositorsactions and lead to a selection of
either the good or the bad equilibrium. There is a possibility that shifts in beliefs as
modelled in the panic based theories are correlated to changes in fundamentals. Therefore,
2Allen and Gale (1998) review studies that focus on models in which bank runs are an intrinsic part of
the business cycle.
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these models imply that there is some correlation between the occurrence of panics and
economic fundamentals (Lai, 2002). Bank runs are more likely to occur where there are
poor economic fundamentals.
Chari and Jagannathan (1988) focus on a signal extraction problem where a part of the
population receives information on the future asset payo¤s. In this model the proportion
of early consumers is uncertain, hence there is aggregate liquidity risk in the economy. The
deposit contract is such that agents who deposit one unit of endowment in period 0 receive
a return of 1 in period 1 or an equal share of bank prots in period 2. While each early
consumer withdraws in period 1, late consumers have the option of withdrawing some or
all of their deposits in period 1.
The uninformed agents co-ordinate on the number of observed early withdrawals. They
try to deduce whether withdrawals are due to a bad signal observed or simply a result of
high liquidity needs. Uninformed agents may fail to deduce whether depositors queuing up
for withdrawals are early consumers or informed consumers who have received bad news.
In this case, they all rush to withdraw their funds and a bank run ensues. Therefore, bank
runs may occur not only because fundamentals have given a bad signal but also because
liquidity needs turn out to be high.
Kindleberger (1978) posits that bank runs are endogenous to the business cycle, emerging
at the peak of the expansionary phase of the cycle. This theory suggests that during
an economic upturn, banks expect stronger economic growth in the future and therefore
expand their allocation of credit to the real sector. As a result, banks become highly
leveraged (exposed to large amounts of credit). However, in the event of a sudden economic
downturn, rm performance declines and they fail to repay their loans. Despite the non-
performing loans, depositors still seek to withdraw their funds. As a result, banks are
caught between the illiquidity of their assets (loans) and the liquidity of their liabilities
(deposits). Thus, they su¤er huge losses. Consequent systemic bank failures become a
result of exposure of many banks to such shocks.
On the other hand, if depositors receive information about an impending economic re-
cession, they rush to withdraw their funds as they anticipate nancial di¢ culties in the
banking sector (Jacklin and Bhattacharya, 1988). In contrast to the Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) model, crises are a result of agents receiving negative information about unfolding
economic circumstances and not random events triggered by a sunspot signal. Gorton
(1985) develops a model in which depositors receive a noisy signal on the value of bank
assets. Where the signal suggests a low value for bank assets, a bank run ensues. This has
repercussions even on solvent banks. Consistent with this line of argument, Gorton (1988)
nds evidence from the US during the early twentieth century, which is consistent with
the view that bank panics are intimately related to the state of the business cycle. These
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bank panics could be predicted by a leading economic indicator based on the liabilities of
failed businesses.
Allen and Gale (1998) model a bank which holds illiquid assets with risky returns. In
contrast to the Diamond and Dybvig model, the Allen and Gale model stipulates that
both early and late consumers are guaranteed equal level of consumption. Economic agents
can observe a leading economic indicator that provides information on future bank asset
returns. They further show that if depositors expect a su¢ ciently low return on the risky
asset, depositors withdraw their funds in anticipation of poor bank performance. As a
result, a bank run occurs. Although consumers are paid sequentially in this model, every
consumer is paid equally in the event of a bank run. The Allen and Gale model therefore
di¤ers from the Diamond and Dybvig model in that in the former, bank runs are a result
of low returns to assets and not due to expectations of bank runs by agents.
There are several other models in which bank runs are triggered by real shocks to the
economy, for instance, models that link asset price bubbles and banking crises (Allen and
Gale, 1999). These models incorporate a banking system that intermediates the payments
that support the asset market. The expansion in credit that usually follows nancial
liberalisation pushes up asset prices. A sudden collapse of these prices either because of
low returns or tightening of credit by monetary authorities, negatively impact on banks
that hold stocks or real estate or that have made loans to the owners of these assets.
Following the bubble burst, banks incur huge defaults and large loan losses, which spill
over to the real economy.
Panic based models take the liquidation cost of long term assets to be exogenous. However,
other models proposed consideration of other sources of liquidity, to which banks experi-
encing bank runs can resort. These sources include asset markets or interbank markets.
This therefore endogenises the liquidity cost for banks that turn out to be illiquid. A
bank that faces liquidity problems can liquidate its long term assets by issuing securities
or claims on its long term assets. Alternatively, the bank can borrow from the interbank
market. If the markets for liquidity are e¢ cient, banks with liquidity problems are able to
liquidate their assets at fair values and solve their liquidity problems. At the same time,
those with excess liquidity have an incentive to lend to illiquid banks.
Asymmetric information and market power can lead to ine¢ ciency in the liquidity markets
(Lai, 2002). Banks with liquidity needs may be forced to dispose of their long term assets
at prices below their fair market value or fail to borrow funds from the interbank market.
Therefore, a bank that has liquidity problems may fail despite being solvent. Consequently,
a systemic failure sets in if the problems faced by one bank spread to other banks in the
banking sector through contagion.
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3.4 Financial Liberalisation in Banking Crises Theo-
ries
A central theme of the fundamental-based models is that bank runs are more likely to
occur where there are poor economic fundamentals, whether economic agents are fully
informed or not. These models underline the e¤ect of mass-withdrawals by depositors if
they anticipate poor performance by banks or low returns to their investments. In this
regard, nancial liberalisation that removes ceilings on lending rates may result in unstable
and less predictable rates of return. Furthermore, unstable interest and ination rates
resulting from nancial liberalisation make forecasting di¢ cult for banks and economic
agents. Bell and Pain (2000) point out that if, for instance, banks fail to correctly forecast
movements in the yield curve, the value of bank assets may become less than that of
liabilities as the rate of return on assets falls below the rate of return on liabilities.
Central to the models in which bank runs are triggered by economic fundamentals, is the
role played by asymmetric information in triggering banking crises. While credit booms
during economic upturns may leave banks highly leveraged, banks tend to overlook prob-
lems of moral hazard and adverse selection during such booms (Bell and Pain, 2000).
However, in liberalised economies, banks are limited in their use of appropriate pricing
and screening of transactions. It is also di¢ cult for them to use other methods of minimis-
ing risk such as taking collateral or asset portfolio diversication, because of moral hazard
and adverse selection problems prevalent in free markets. As such, nancial liberalisation
aggravates the e¤ects of shocks to fundamentals in triggering bank panics.
The theme of this thesis is drawn from the broad theoretical literature on the link between
nancial sector liberalisation, banking sector performance, and banking sector stability.
The majority of studies that examine the impact of liberalisation and regulation on banking
sector fragility are drawn from the work of Keeley (1990). Based on this work, di¤erent
studies adopted di¤erent approaches regarding the overall link between deregulation and
banking stability. Some of the theoretical models that attempt to incorporate nancial
liberalisation into banking crisis theories are discussed next.
3.4.1 Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (HMS) model
Hellmann et al. (2000), developed a model in which controls on deposit rates act as a
disincentive for banks to invest in risky portfolios. In this model banks in a competitive
market choose to invest their assets in a gambling portfolio, that has a higher return than
a safe portfolio. In the event that the gamble succeeds, the banks receive the benets.
However, because of limited liability, the banks pass on the losses to the depositors and
33
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
deposit insurers in the event that the gamble fails.
Financial liberalisation increases competition in the banking sector by reducing entry and
activity barriers, as well as eliminating controls on interest rates. In a competitive envi-
ronment, bank earnings from prudent investments are relatively low. As such, banks are
inclined to invest in risky potential assets.
Banks can be forced to invest in safe assets because of high capital requirements which
compel banks to internalise the adverse consequences of gambling (capital-at-risk e¤ect).
However, high capital requirements raise bank costs, and reduce bank prots, and hence
lower bank franchise values. Low franchise values have the e¤ect of eroding incentives
for investments in safe assets (franchise value e¤ect). This increases the moral hazard
problem that capital requirements sought to eliminate in the rst place. Hellmann et al.
(2000) argue that the only incentive for banks to invest prudently is bank franchise value
which is put at risk when banks invest in risky portfolios.
While capital requirements can o¤set the bank risk-taking incentives aggravated by lib-
eralisation, the model establishes that banks have to be forced to hold ine¢ ciently high
amounts of capital. In a free market, banks compete for deposits by o¤ering higher deposit
rates, which increases their costs. Capital requirements will only reduce the incentive by
banks to bid up deposit rates if they push up bank costs to su¢ ciently high levels to dis-
courage banks to pay any higher deposit rates. As such, capital requirements act as an
indirect mechanism for lowering deposit rates. Therefore, pareto-e¢ ciency is unattainable
without deposit controls. Instead, the risk of bank failure is reduced more e¤ectively by a
combination of deposit rate control and capital requirements policy.
In the HMS model, the bank o¤ers an interest rate of ri whereas competing banks o¤er
r i3. Total deposits are given by D(ri, r i) which is increasing in ri and decreasing in
r i . The bank faces a moral hazard problem in choosing its loan portfolio. It can invest
in either a prudent asset which has a return of , or in a risky asset.
The risky investment yields  with probability , and  with probability 1 . The expected
return of the risky asset is smaller than that of the prudent asset,  >  + (1  ). The
model assumes that although the regulator cannot monitor the investment portfolio ex-
ante, the regulator inspects the banks at the end of each period. If the bank invests in a
risky portfolio, and the gamble fails, the yield for the risky investment is . As a result,
the bank becomes insolvent, and its franchise is revoked4. However, if the gamble succeeds,
the bank earns a higher private return, that is  > . The bank invests its capital k, with
3The bank operates in a competitive market and collects funds from depositors who have deposit
insurance, such that the volume of deposits depends only on the interest rate o¤ered.
4The bank becomes insolvent assuming the return on the risky investment when the gumble fails is
insu¢ cient to cover all depositor funds. This follows from the fact that  >  + (1  ).
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an opportunity cost of , as well as the deposits that it mobilises.  is assumed to be larger
than  to signify that capital is costly. The total investment is therefore (1+ k)D(ri, r i).
The bank prot margin on each unit of deposit less the cost of capital is mp(ri, k) =
(1 + k)   k   ri. Therefore, total bank prots from investing in the prudent asset is
given as
p(ri,r i,k) = mp(ri,k)D(ri; r i) (3.9)
Similarly, the gambling margin, which depends on whether the gamble is successful or not,
net of the cost of capital is given by mg(ri, k) = ((1 + k)  ri)  k. The total prot, in
each period, of investing in the risky asset is given as
g(ri,r i,k) = mg(ri,k)D(ri; r i) (3.10)
If  is the discount rate, banks maximise the expected discounted prots V =
PT
t=o 
tt,
and the expected prots from investing in a prudent asset Vp(ri, r i,k) =
p(ri,r i,k)
(1 ) , and
Vg(ri, r i,k) =
g(ri,r i,k)
(1 ) for investing in the risky asset. If the interest rate cost of deposits
is denoted by r, then the banks will choose to invest in the prudent asset if Vp(r, r i,k)
 Vg(r, r i,k), otherwise they invest in the risky asset. The model develops a constraint:
g(ri; r i; k)  p(ri; r i; k)  (1  )Vp(r; r i; k) (3.11)
in which the one period rent that the bank expects to earn from the risky investment must
be less than the amount the bank loses in terms of the franchise value, if the gamble fails
with probability (1  ). From (3.11) the model derives a critical deposit rate ^r(k), below
which the bank would rather invest in a prudent asset:
^
r(k) = 1  

  
1  

(1 + k) +  [(1 + k)  k] (3.12)
Maximising expected prots, under the condition that the interest rate o¤ered by com-
petitors equals the rate the bank o¤ers for prudent asset investment yields
mp(rp; k) =
D(rp; rp)
(@D(rp, rp)=@ri)
(3.13)
Equation (3.13) denes the deposit rate for investing in the prudent asset as
35
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
rp(k) =
[(1 + k)  k] "
"+ 1
(3.14)
where " is the interest rate elasticity of deposit. Since Vp is a decreasing function of capital,
k, then increasing banks capital only reduces the value of the expected prots. If the bank
were to choose the prudent asset then rp(0) = "=" + 1. Financial liberalisation has the
e¤ect of increasing competition in the markets. As competition increases and the elasticity
increases innitely ("!1), this raises rp(0) ( approaches ), and franchise value becomes
very small. However, if the deposit rate exceeds the critical threshold
^
r(k), then the bank
is better o¤ investing in the risky asset because, above the critical threshold, expected
returns from the risky asset exceed returns from the safe asset. In sum, in a nancially
liberalised market with su¢ ciently high interest rate elasticity of deposits, the bank will
choose to: (1) invest in a risky asset, (2) hold no capital, and (3) pay rg(o) = "="+ 1.
As argued above, imposing capital requirements as a regulatory measure may force banks
to invest in the safe asset, as banks seek to avoid bearing the downside losses if the gamble
fails. However, the HMS model shows that a pareto-e¢ cient outcome is achieved by
a combination of minimum capital requirements and deposit rate controls. The model
establishes an equilibrium in which deposit rates are controlled and banks hold a lower
level of capital, rather than the one imposed by a policy of capital requirements only.
Furthermore, controls on deposit interest rates e¤ectively reduce competition in the deposit
market, increase per-period prots, and hence franchise values. As shown in equation
(3.11), banks will choose to invest in safe assets as long as the franchise value at risk is
more that the expected gain from investing in the risky asset.
The HMS provides the following important rationales for the empirical analysis.
 Financial liberalisation increases nancial fragility by increasing competition in the
banking sector.
 There is no competitive equilibrium in which a bank will choose to invest prudently,
therefore gambling is more certain in periods following nancial liberalisation.
 Besides capital requirements, restrictions on entry, scope of activity and enhancing
direct supervision are some of the policies that can be implemented as tools to curtail
risky bank behaviour.
 The only incentive for banks to invest prudently is bank franchise value, therefore,
the probable negative e¤ect of nancial liberalisation on bank protability reduces
the incentive for prudent bank behaviour.
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3.4.2 Daniel and Jones (2007) model
Daniel and Jones (2007) develop a model that captures the dynamic e¤ects of liberalisa-
tion and their contributions to banking crises. An important assertion in this model is
that existing literature points to institutional aws in newly liberalised economies such as
(1) implicit and explicit bail-out schemes that increase moral hazard problems, and (2)
increased competition. However, Daniel and Jones argue that these mechanisms, besides
being static in nature, are not unique to nancial liberalisation. The model illustrates
that nancial liberalisation a¤ects the evolution of banksfranchise value, the returns to
gambling, the banks net worth, and aggregate capital stock.
The rst period, which comes immediately after nancial repression, is characterised by
low bank capital stock, with high marginal productivity. Foreign nance is assumed to be
expensive and bank net-worth is limited. As a result, banks charge high loan rates. High
returns to capital also imply that rms are not likely to default. Therefore, during this
period, bank margins are high and incentives to take risk are minimal.
The next period, shortly after (but not necessarily immediately after) nancial liberal-
isation, is characterised by growth in capital stock, decline in marginal productivity of
capital, and availability of cheap foreign debt. As a result, loan interest rates begin to fall,
current bank prot margins decline, and future prots are expected to fall. It is at this
point, when bankscost of bankruptcy (the foregone future prot) falls, but the returns on
risky assets are high, that bank risk-taking behaviour as well as chances of having banking
crises are high. However, in the periods that follow, banks become conservative and pre-
fer to be less leveraged. Therefore, the model establishes that increased bank risk-taking
behaviour is inherent in emerging markets, during the transition from nancial repression
to liberalisation.
In their model, Daniel and Jones (2007) further argue that the series of events leading to
banking crises occur even if the banking system is well designed or competition is sti¤ in
the long run. The simulations from the model illustrate that, in the long run, even though
franchise values are minimal, the returns to gambling are even lower due to low interest
rate spreads. The spreads are, however, high enough to yield some positive franchise value,
hence the banks become risk averse. In the high risk period, future interest rate spreads are
expected to be low relative to the current interest rate spreads. As a result, the expected
gains from gambling outweigh the expected costs. Therefore, the model concludes that,
while institutional aws and sti¤ competition increase the vulnerability of economies to
banking crises, nancial liberalisation, in and of itself, contributes to banking crises in
developing countries.
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3.5 Summary and conclusion
This chapter reviews banking crisis theories, either under panic based models or business
cycle-based models. Theories that incorporate nancial liberalisation in explaining banking
crises have also been discussed. The rst group of theories of bank runs discussed are based
on bank panics resulting from co-ordination failure. In these models, excessive withdrawals
may push solvent banks into failure as a result of liquidity problems. In the fundamentals
based models, bank runs are correlated to the state of the business cycle. The cause of
the shifts in expectations that trigger excessive withdrawals are labelled "sunspots" in the
panic based models. Changes in information or signals received by economic agents trigger
the shifts in expectations in the fundamental-based models.
Allen and Gale (2001) reconcile these two basic theories of banking crises. They show that
sunspots are a limiting case of real exogenous shocks that fuel a crisis. They argue that
sunspot theory actually depends on fundamentals. Whereas weak fundamentals are not
su¢ cient to trigger banking crises, the presence of weak fundamentals may be su¢ cient to
cause self-fullling expectations that trigger crises. The sunspot theory does not predict
a crisis, but allows for the possibility of a crisis, whereas business cycle-based theories are
able to predict crises.
Financial liberalisation, adopted in many developing countries in order to increase e¢ -
ciency in nancial intermediaries, can have adverse e¤ects on banking stability. Some of
the models discussed in this chapter establish that the link between liberalisation and crises
in banking is through increase in competition that undermines prudent bank behaviour.
Hellmann et al. (2000) show that deposit rate controls stabilise banks by reducing compe-
tition in the deposit market, thereby increasing bank prots and hence franchise values.
Banks with high franchise value behave more prudently. Daniel and Jones (2007) argue
that banking crises are inherent in developing market economies during the transition from
nancial repression to nancial liberalisation. As such banking crises occur shortly after
nancial liberalisation. However, beyond this period, the returns to gambling become less
than the costs of gambling, and thus, banks become risk averse and less leveraged.
Although the theory of banking crises has traditionally assigned depositor bank runs a
central role in the occurrence of crises, sudden depositor runs have featured in only a
minority of cases in recent years. In fact, recent episodes of banking crises have often
been a result of adverse shocks arising elsewhere in the economy (Demirguc-Kunt et al.,
2006). Banking crises in SSA countries have largely been systemic in nature but seldom
characterised by bank-runs. As such, the emperical estimation in this thesis draws more
from the business cycle models than from the models of bank runs.
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Chapter 4
Liberalisation Policies and Banking
Crises in Sub Saharan Africa
4.1 Introduction
By the late 1980s several countries in SSA had moved towards liberalising their nancial
markets after decades of nancial repression. Most countries abolished credit controls and
reduced or removed compulsory reserve requirements. They also privatized state owned
banks, removed interest rate ceilings, relaxed capital account restrictions, eased bank en-
try requirements, and eliminated restrictions on scope of banking activities. Nowadays,
countries are strengthening prudential regulations and supervision. Based on the work of
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), liberalisation of nancial markets (also referred to as
deregulation or nancial reform), provides a remedy to problems associated with repressive
policies in developing countries. However, the scope and frequency of bank failures in SSA
over the last two decades have clouded the benets of nancial liberalisation 1.
So far, there has been a lot of research on the link between liberalisation and bank sta-
bility (Angkinand et al., 2009; Shehzad and De Haan, 2009; Daniel and Jones, 2007; Gi-
annetti, 2007; Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2005; Noy, 2005; Bayraktar and Wang,
2004; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998a). However,
researchers have not agreed on a precise conclusion. Research that nds a positive rela-
tionship between systemic banking crisis and banking liberalisation have so far provided
three rationales for this relationship: (i) banking liberalisation erodes monopoly prots
and reduces the opportunity cost of bankruptcy, therefore enhancing incentives for exces-
1Laeven and Valencia (2008) identied 103 countries that experienced systemic banking crises. Of
these, 36 (35%) are in Africa, accounting for 45% of total crisis episodes. Between 1976 and 2005, 65% of
SSA countries experienced systemic banking crises and this gure increases to about 83% with borderline
crises. This compares to only 28% recorded in emerging market economies for the same period.
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sive risk-taking (Zhao and Murinde, 2009; Hellmann et al., 2000; Keeley, 1990; Rhoades
and Rutz, 1982); (ii) competitive pressure on banks resulting from liberalisation can drive
banks to broaden their lending commitments to include the real estate and securities mar-
kets. This may result in rapid credit growth which can drive an asset price bubble. When
the bubble bursts, it suppresses the ability of borrowers to repay loans. An upsurge in
loan defaults causes banks to incur huge non-performing loans. The US mortgage crises
of 2007 is a classic example of this "boom and bust" behaviour in asset prices. Allen
and Carletti (2011) argue that the US crises was mainly caused by a bubble in real es-
tate. When the bubble burst, there was a collapse in the securitized mortgage markets,
which caused problems in the nancial institutions that were eventually transmitted to the
real economy; (iii) weak supervisory capacity and under-developed prudential regulatory
frameworks drive banking crises in developing countries (Noy, 2004; Rossi, 1999; Williamson
and Mahar, 1998; Lindgren et al., 1996). An increase in the number of intermediaries and
widening of scope of bank activities after nancial liberalisation stretches existing monitor-
ing capacity. Several researchers have used the Miniskyian theory to argue that hedging,
speculation and Ponzi schemes are nurtured in liberalised economies, unless authorities
take concurrent steps to enhance bank supervision. However, such a simultaneous process
of liberalisation and improving bank supervision (re-regulation) imposes heavy regulatory
costs on banks (Zhao and Murinde, 2009). Such regulatory costs have an e¤ect of reducing
the cost of bankruptcy and consequently increase risk-taking incentives by banks.
On the other hand, a di¤erent strand of literature suggests a negative relationship between
liberalisation and banking crises (Boyd et al., 2006; Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005). Follow-
ing nancial liberalisation, the competitive culture amongst banks promotes stability of
banking systems. This is achieved through facilitating diversication of bank portfolios,
widening of the depositor base and adoption of advanced risk-management standards from
new foreign players in the market (Carlson and Mitchener, 2006; World Development Re-
port, 2002; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 1998). Under this view, overall stability of banking
systems improves through consolidation, as weaker banks are forced out of the system,
either through voluntary liquidation or mergers. In addition, other studies argue that by
increasing competition, nancial liberalisation increases e¢ ciency in banking sectors. At
the same time, e¢ cient banks engage in rigorous screening and monitoring of borrowers,
hence incur fewer non performing loans (Schaeck and Cihak, 2010).
Given the analysis above, it follows that previous research provides mixed evidence that
makes it di¢ cult to draw conclusions on the relationship between nancial liberalisation
and banking stability. A key contributor to such mixed evidence is the use of di¤erent
measures of nancial liberalisation as well as diverse measures of banking crises.
The goal of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive empirical analysis of the impact of
nancial liberalisation on banking industry stability in SSA during the past few decades.
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To achieve this goal, an empirical strategy which takes into account all the methodological
shortfalls so far encountered in the literature is used. These shortfalls include varying
banking liberalisation indicators, banking crises indicators, and simultaneous bias.
The indicators of banking liberalisation which have been identied in literature include:
(i) a dummy variable for the presence of controls on interest rate ( Noy, 2004; Weller, 2001;
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998b), (ii) a measure of capital account liberalisation
(Eichengreen and Arteta, 2002), and (iii) intermediation measures such as ratio of liquid
assets to GDP ( Aziakpono, 2004; Allen and Ndikumana, 2000). These studies restrict
nancial liberalisation to one or few items in a range of liberalisation policies. However, in
the case of SSA countries, liberalisation episodes entailed reform along distinct but inter-
related dimensions, at di¤erent implementation rates and levels. While some countries
opted for liberalising all previously controlled activities of their banking sectors, others
partially liberalised their banking sectors, leaving some dimensions under government con-
trol. Others moved rst from fully controlled to partially liberalised, and then to fully
liberalised banking sectors. There have also been cases of withdrawal and policy reversals
as well as re-implementations. The indicators used in previous studies are therefore not
appropriate for the empirical analysis in this chapter.
Regarding indicators of banking instability, those most often used in the literature are: (i)
a dummy variable to capture the occurrence of banking crises (Noy, 2004; Weller, 2001;
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998b), or (ii) measures of bank risk-taking (Shehzad and
De Haan, 2009; Gonzalez, 2005; Demsetz et al., 1996; Keeley, 1990)2. These two indicators
have some inadequacies in the SSA context. The dummy variable indicators do not take
into account the non-systemic banking crises. Since non-systemic episodes are sometimes a
result of government corrective policies which weaken the severity of systemic crises, such
exclusion can induce several types of bias in the results. Unavailability of bank-level data
from most SSA counties has limited the use of other measures of bank risk-taking in the
literature.
The empirical strategy adopted in this chapter attempts to solve all the shortfalls men-
tioned above. The study focuses mainly on SSA which is a specic group of countries that
have experienced major banking crises, and have implemented several types of nancial
liberalisation policies over the last few decades. To account for banking liberalisation in-
dicators, this study uses the Abiad et al. (2008) database on nancial liberalisation. This
database was further extended by constructing seven liberalisation indices using the data
collected from 12 SSA countries not covered in the Abiad 2008 study. Together, the lib-
eralisation data tracks the presence of restrictions in seven aspects of the nancial system
in 26 SSA countries.
2See Tchana Tchana (2008a) for a discussion on the weaknesses of dating crisis based on market events.
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The liberalisation components used in this study capture and reect the extent and level
of liberalisation, and the actual types of restrictions that existed or have been abolished.
Furthermore, this data captures policy reversals, as well as the implementation rate. It is
unlikely that the dichotomous variables used in previous studies could have been able to
capture such characteristics of liberalisation.
To account for banking crises indicators, the study constructs a banking crisis index that
incorporates both systemic and non-systemic banking crises in SSA. This crisis indicator
allows for more than two (ordered) response categories. The variable takes the value of
0 if there is no crisis, 1 for non-systemic crises and 2 for systemic crises. This is the
most comprehensive crises index for SSA countries to be used in the analysis of banking
instability and nancial liberalisation.
Given that the dependent variable is an ordered variable, the relevant discrete method
in this panel data context is an ordered probit or logit model in panel data setting. To
compute the marginal e¤ects of this model the study uses the two-step method developed by
Hove, Tchana-Tchana and Touna-Mama (2011). Using this method, the study investigates
how di¤erent liberalisation policies a¤ect the occurrence of both systemic and non-systemic
banking crises in SSA. In fact, banking industries in these countries provide a unique sample
of developing economies which have witnessed a large number of bank failures during the
past two decades.
The empirical results suggest that total liberalisation reduces the probability of occur-
rence of both systemic and non-systemic banking crises. However, di¤erent liberalisation
policies have di¤erent e¤ects. For instance, while removal of entry and activity restric-
tions signicantly increases the probability of occurrence of banking crises, privatization
of mainly state-owned banks as well as bank supervision have negative e¤ects. Thus, the
results support deregulation policies implemented alongside prudential regulation, as well
as improving the institutional environment, to o¤set the positive impact of these policies
on banking sector stability. The results are robust to various discrete econometric model
specications as well as banking liberalisation, and banking crisis indicators.
The rest of the the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 presents a theoretical as well
as empirical literature review on the link between nancial liberalisation and banking crises.
Data and empirical methodology is presented in section 4.3, while section 4.4 presents the
results and analysis of the empirical model. Section 4.5 presents the sensitivity analysis.
Finally, section 6 presents a summary of the results and the conclusion.
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4.2 Literature Review
A wide range of theoretical and empirical studies exist on the link between banking liber-
alisation and banking crises. The theoretical studies often focus on the channels through
which banking liberalisation a¤ects banking crises, while empirical studies aim at verifying
if theoretical links are supported by statistical evidence. This section aims at reviewing
the existing literature around this subject, as well as identifying the gaps in knowledge,
with a focus on SSA countries.
A large proportion of literature supports the premise that there is increased bank fragility
in more competitive markets such as in liberalised nancial markets (See for example
Angkinand et al., 2009; Shehzad and De Haan, 2009; Noy, 2005; Noy, 2004; Hellmann
et al., 2000)3. These studies suggest that liberalising nancial markets can lead to nancial
instability through two main ways: (i) the erosion of previously gra ted monopolies of
existing banks (monopoly power hypothesis- See Noy, 2004), and (ii) the increase in general
risks that banks face in their otherwise usual operations.
The monopoly power hypothesis stems from the argument that nancial liberalisation
breaks down the monopolistic structures of most banking systems by allowing more players
to enter the banking system as well as removing price oors and ceilings. In fact, Hellmann
et al. (1999) argue that deposit rate controls enable banks to earn both current and future
prots where the capitalized value of these prots contribute to the banks franchise value.
Given that liberalisation increases competition, thereby shrinking bank prot margins, it
therefore reduces franchise values. This implies that the costs of bankruptcy are reduced.
As a result, liberalisation increases the incentives to hold riskier loan portfolios. As such,
the monopoly power hypothesis suggests that banks with low franchise value are prone to
gambling, and have less incentives for investing in safe portfolios (Gonzalez, 2005; Hellmann
et al., 2000; Hellmann et al., 1999; Keeley, 1990).
Financial liberalisation increases the exposure of banks to three basic sources of risk: credit
risk, liquidity risk, and interest and foreign exchange rate risk. Financial liberalisation
contributes to credit expansion, but during such expansion, excessive credit risk is un-
dertaken. Such heightened levels of risk often turn into banking crises (See for example
Wilmarth Jr, 2003; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Allen and Gale, 1998; Mishkin, 1996).
In fact, any real shock to the economy can turn an asset boom to a bust resulting in the
collapse of stock and real markets (Allen and Gale, 1999). This sequence of events im-
plies losses for many economic agents. In order to reduce their losses, agents will rush to
liquidate their investments. Eventually, investment and overall economic activity declines
causing loan-defaults by debtors. This gives rise to a surge in non-performing loans and
3This is referred to as the competition-fragility view ( Beck, 2008; Berger et al., 2009).
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banking crises may follow this wave of defaults. Financial liberalisation therefore leaves
banks exposed to higher risks.
The removal of ceilings and oors during nancial liberalisation results in unpredictible
and more volatile interest rates. As a result, uncertainty increases in the banking system.
Banks are inclined to nance high risk projects and charge high risk premiums. Thus, in
free markets, banks are more likely to hold high risk portfolios than in controlled markets
(Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998b).
Several studies have tested the theoretical claims on the positive link between nancial
liberalisation and banking crises using empirical data for both developed and developing
countries. Diaz-Alejandro (1985) refers to the nancial crises of the early 1980s as unin-
tended consequences of nancial liberalisation in Latin America. Several other studies have
found empirical evidence that conrms that a banking crisis is more likely to occur after
nancial liberalisation (Noy, 2004; Weller, 2001; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Demirguc-
Kunt and Detragiache, 1998b). Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005,1998a) nd that
liberalisation of interest rates is strongly and positively correlated with the occurrence of
banking crises. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) proxy nancial liberalisation with a two-
year lagged domestic credit growth and nd evidence that in 18 out of 26 banking crises,
the nancial sectors had been liberalised in the preceding ve years.
Another strand of literature argues that nancial liberalisation is positively correlated
with banking crises because of insu¢ cient supervision of nancial sectors (lax supervision
hypothesis) (Noy, 2004). Financial liberalisation entails the withdrawal of governments
involvement in the banking sector, and in most cases government monitoring mechanisms
are turned into regulatory forbearance. Financial reform then implies a change in the
rules and regulations under which banks operate, and bank managers have to manage
risk in an unfamiliar environment. This new environment stretches available monitoring
capacity, if no simultaneous adjustments to supervisory resources are implemented. Yet,
regulatory authorities in developing countries often face challenges that include lack of
autonomy and insu¢ ciently trained supervisors. Furthermore, lifting activity restrictions
may create new institutions and at the same time increase the volume and complexity of
nancial transactions, which may fall out of the old regulatory frameworks. As such, if
the regulatory framework does not keep pace with the new instruments and institutions,
enforcement is weakened, and bank risk-taking behaviour may increase.
Various studies have empirically tested the e¤ects of supervision and prudential regulation
on banking crises (Barth et al., 2004; Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2005; Demirguc-
Kunt and Detragiache, 1998a; Lindgren et al., 1996). Barth et al. (2006) test the impact of
all possible regulations on bank stability and their results vary with di¤erent regulations.
Angkinand et al. (2009) emphasize the importance of capital regulation and supervision,
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arguing that the probability of crises increases with liberalisation especially where super-
vision is weak. However, Noy (2004) nds weak evidence that prudential supervision helps
stabilize the banking sector after nancial liberalisation.
Another strand of literature nds evidence that liberalisation reduces chances of banking
crises. As acknowledged above, the main argument presented in this literature is that
banking competition has a negative impact on bank risk-taking behavior. Some empirical
studies have provided evidence to this view. For instance, Shehzad and De Haan (2009)
use a database of 33 developed and developing countries, and establishes that conditional
on e¤ective banking supervision, most nancial reform policies reduce the likelihood of
systemic crises. Angkinand et al. (2009) nd that crises are likely to occur after some
degree of liberalisation and not necessarily full liberalisation. They nd an inverted U-
shaped relationship between liberalisation and the likelihood of crises.
Other studies have found no evidence of any positive link between nancial liberalisation
and banking crisis. Bordo et al. (2001) examine the e¤ects of capital controls on banking
crises and found no signicant correlation. Eichengreen and Arteta (2002) use the presence
(or absence) of capital account controls as a proxy for external liberalisation. The study
nds that capital account liberalisation had no inuence on the occurrence of banking
crises.
4.3 Methodology
This section presents the empirical strategy of this chapter.
4.3.1 Model specication
This study employs the ordered logit model to analyse the response of both systemic and
non-systemic crises to nancial liberalisation. It is the relevant model given the discrete
and ordered nature of the dependent variable.
This study tests the hypothesis that various nancial liberalisation policies increase the
probability of the occurrence of banking crises. The study assumes that the underlying
variable behind the occurrence of banking crises is a linear function of banking liberalisation
and some control variables. This underlying variable is referred to as banking instability,
Bkinst (hereafter).
Bkinstit = i + Libit + Zit + "it; i = 1; :::N and t = 1; :::; Ti (4.1)
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"it  D(0; 1)
where Lib is a matrix of liberalisation policies, Z is a matrix of control variables that are
capable of explaining crisis,  and  are slope coe¢ cients, i is a vector of individual country
e¤ects while "it is a vector of error terms, i and t are country and time indices respectively,
N is the total number of countries and Ti is the total number of time observations for
country i. D(0; 1) is a probability distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 1.
Lib is a matrix of seven di¤erent liberalisation policies which include: (i) credit controls and
reserve requirements (cr), (ii) interest rate controls (ir), (iii) entry and activity restrictions
(ent), (iv) state ownership in the banking sector (pvt), (v) capital account restrictions
(intk), (vi) prudential regulation and supervision (sup), and (vii) securities market policy
(secmkt).
Z is a matrix of control variables which include: (i) macroeconomic variables (real gdp
growth (rgdpg), ination (infn), real interest rate (rir) as well as change in terms of trade
(tot)), (ii) banking system characteristics variables (liquidity (liq), share of private sector
loans to GDP (cr=gdp), lagged real credit growth (crgrt 2), as well as ratio of broad money
to foreign reserves (m2res)), (iii) institutional and regulatory quality variables (GDP per
capita (gdppc), rule of law (rlaw), governance (gov), required reserves (reqres), as well as
presence of explicit deposit insurance (depins)). Each cross section unit is observed for a
period t, and t = 1; 2:::T and it varies across i countries, i = 1; 2:::N depending on data
availability.
Bkinst is an unobserved variable. In fact the study observes the occurrence of only three
states of nature, non-crisis, non-systemic crisis, and systemic banking crisis states. These
states of nature can be labelled as ordered variables that are referred to as banking crises,
hereafter crisis: The study assumes that
crisisit =
8><>:
0 if Bkinstit  Lit
1 if Lit  Bkinstit  Uit
2 if Bkinstit  Uit:
(4.2)
L and U are threshold parameters reecting the change from no crisis to non-systemic
crisis, as well as from no crisis to systemic crisis states repectively. To reduce the length
of the equations, the following notations are set:
Yit = crisisit and Xit = i + Libit + Zit:
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Therefore, Yit is the new dependent variable, Xit is the new set of exogenous variables
and  is the new vector of parameters. The structural xed e¤ects logit model for the
unbalanced panel data is written as:(
Bkinstit = Xit + i + it; i = 1; :::; N and t = 1; :::; Ti
Yit = 2 if Bkinstit > Uit; 1 if Lit  Bkinstit  Uit, and 0 otherwise.
(4.3)
Where i is the unobserved country specic heterogeneity and it  logistic distribution.
The response probabilities of the occurrence of banking instability outcome are:
P (Yit = 0) = P (Bkinstit  Lit) = F (Lit  Xit); (4.4)
P (Yit = 1) = P (Lit  Bkinstit  Uit) = F (Uit  Xit)  F (Lit  Xit); (4.5)
P (Yit = 2) = P (Bkinstit > Uit) = 1  F (Uit  Xit): (4.6)
The parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood and the log likelihood function of
the logistic function is:
ln(L) =
NX
i=1
TX
t=1
(
1[Yit=0] ln[F (Lit  Xit)] + 1[Yit=1] ln[F (Uit  Xit)  F (Lit  Xit)]
+1[Yit=2] ln[1  F (Uit  Xit)]
)
(4.7)
where F (:) is the cumulative probability distribution function of  and 1[Yit=j]; j = 0; 1; 2
is the indicator function of the set [Yit = j]:
4.3.2 Marginal e¤ects of the discrete choice panel model
In discrete choice models, the parameters that are generally provided are the marginal
e¤ects because they have reasonable asymptotic properties and can be interpreted easily
(Wooldridge, 2001). The study uses a three-step procedure developed by Hove et al. (2011),
to estimate marginal e¤ects. The rst step consists of estimating the discrete choice panel
model and then obtaining the estimated parameter b: The second consists of computing
the predicted probabilities for each outcome using b, that is:
bpjit = prob(Yit = j); j = 0; 1; 2:
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These probabilities are given by:
bp0it = F (Lit  Xitb);bp1it = F (Uit  Xitb)  F (Lit  Xitb),bp2it = 1  F (Uit  Xitb):
The third step consists of computing the marginal e¤ects of each outcome by regressing
bpjit, the rst di¤erence of bpjit on Xit; the rst di¤erence of Xit as follows :
bpjit = Xitj + jit; for j = 0; 1; 2: (4.8)
jit=Xit  N(0; 2)
Where j is the vector of parameter values in regression j and jit the panel error term for
regression j. The marginal e¤ect is then given by
bj = (X)0 (X) 1 (X)0 (bpj) ; (4.9)
which is the estimated value j using the xed e¤ect standard panel regression. It is a
fair approximation of the marginal e¤ects given that logarithms of most key exogenous
variables are used.
Angkinand et al. (2009) suggest using lagged explanatory variables and dropping years
following the onset of banking crisis to deal with simultaneity bias which may be caused
by reverse causality between crises and liberalisation. In addition, Demirguc-Kunt and
Detragiache (2005) point out that the behaviour of some explanatory variables may be
a¤ected by the crisis itself. To deal with such feedback e¤ects, they suggest excluding from
the sample, years in which the crisis is unfolding. This study adopts a similar approach,
all independent variables are lagged by one period. In the robustness checks, the study
excludes from the sample crisis years following the onset of a banking crisis. For the years
where the crisis duration is not known, three years following the onset of the crisis are
droped from the sample (See Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005)).
Another methodological concern is the use of xed e¤ects model, considering that using
xed e¤ects imply that countries that had not any banking crises would be dropped from
the regression (See Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 1998b). In this thesis, there are only
two countries from the study sample which recorded no crises at all. However, in unreported
results, the study estimates random e¤ects models, with robust and clustering standard
errors by country, and the results are not signicantly di¤erent from the baseline estimation
results.
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4.4 Data and Variable Description
This section presents the database and provides a detailed description of variables.
4.4.1 Database
This study is carried out on an unbalanced panel data. Observations on di¤erent groups
do not cover the same time periods. Macroeconomic data is drawn from World Banks
World Development Indicators (WDI), while microeconomic data is drawn from IMFs
International Financial Statistics (IFS). Although all SSA countries from WDI database
are initially considered, others are eliminated due to unavailability of macroeconomic data.
Systemic crisis data is obtained from the dated episodes of banking sector crises by Laeven
and Valencia (2008, 2010) Non-systemic or borderline crisis data is drawn from Kane
and Rice (2001) and Caprio and Klingebiel (2003). In order to minimise bias and to
avoid reducing the sample size, this study does not exclude countries which implemented
nancial liberalisation but do not experience banking crises.
Data on nancial liberalisation variables is taken from Abiad et al. (2008). While Abiad
et,al provide data on 7 liberalisation policies for 14 SSA countries for the period 1973 to
2005, this study extends this dataset in two ways. First, data is compiled on the 14 SSA
countries for the year 2006. Second, information on liberalisation policies for 12 other SSA
countries from 1986 to 2006 is collected. This brings the study sample to 26 SSA countries,
and the study period is extended from 1986 to 2006. Countries that liberalised only a few
facets of their nancial sectors but experienced crises during the study period are included
in the sample as controls.
The majority of countries in the sample adopted liberalisation policies in the late 1980s,
hence the study stretches over periods before, during and after major nancial liberalisa-
tion episodes. The period was also characterised by macroeconomic turbulence across the
African continent. These economic dynamics are expected to have a¤ected bank perfor-
mance in a signicant way, and therefore should be reected in the level of bank stability.
The details on the construction of the liberalisation data are discussed in the data appendix.
Table B.0.1 in the appendix presents the variables used in the empirical analysis. However,
the descriptive statistics of these variables are detailed in Table 4.4.1 and all the variables
are discussed in detail in the next section.
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Table 4.4.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
Crisis 546 0.49 0.81 0 2
Liberalisation Policies
nreform 546 9.06 5.81 0 20
ent 447 2.15 1.09 0 3
ir 483 2.13 1.16 0 3
cr 462 1.69 1.03 0 3
sup 483 0.84 0.78 0 3
pvt 462 1.62 1.04 0 3
intk 462 1.19 0.91 0 3
secmkt 462 1.02 0.91 0 3
nlib 546 0.82 0.39 0 1
Institutional Variables
gov 546 -0.02 1.27 -2.5 2.5
lgdppc 544 6.22 1.12 4.63 8.93
pressf 546 0.69 0.71 0 2
depins 546 0.13 0.33 0 1
Macroeconomic and Banking Characteristics
crgdp 544 29.62 192.54 1.58 42.35
m2res 546 0.982 0.215 0.0091 148.3
liq 546 17.37 16.01 0.18 118.7
crgr_2 542 9.58 20.58 -10.99 34.55
rgdpg 546 3.68 4.99 -19.01 33.63
rir 534 5.63 14.33 -110.06 48.39
ctot 443 1.46 8.02 -54 71.75
infn 543 17.86 40.03 -30.16 49.53
Table 4.4.1 shows that in terms of degree of liberalisation, entry restrictions and interest
rate liberalisation are the most advanced dimensions in the sample. On the other hand,
regulatory and supervisory reform is the least advanced dimension with an average scale
of 0.84, on a scale of 0 (no reform) to 3 (fully liberalised). The total liberalisation index
has an average score of 9 out of a maximum score of 20. The standard deviations for
liberalisation policies give evidence of signicant variations across the di¤erent dimensions
and countries. There is also evidence of di¤erences among countries, as shown by large
standard deviations for variables such as ratio of private sector credit to GDP and lagged
credit growth.
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4.4.2 Variable description
This section provides a description of the variables used in the empirical analysis.
Banking crises variable
The literature provides many denitions of what constitutes a banking crisis. This is
because banking crises have several dimensions4. This study adopts the denitions of
systemic crises and non-systemic banking crises used by Caprio Jr and Klingebiel (1996)
and Caprio and Klingebiel (2003), and have been similarly adopted in Laeven and Valencia
(2008).
A crisis is classied as systemic if at least one of the following conditions apply: (i) the ratio
of non-performing loans to total loans in the banking sector is at least 10%, (ii) the cost of
any rescue operation is at least 2% of GDP, (iii) banking problems have resulted in large
scale nationalization of banks, (iv) occurrence of extensive bank runs, (iii) the adoption of
emergency measures such as deposit freezes, prolonged bank holidays or deposit guarantees
by the government in response to the crisis.
A crisis is classied as non-systemic if some of the countrys major banks su¤er little erosion
of their ownership capital. This includes banking system distress events that a¤ect isolated
banks but are not systemic in nature. Non-systemic episodes are usually either contained
by some regulatory measures, or a¤ect a small section of the banking system. Using these
denitions, 95 systemic and 35 non-systemic crises in 24 SSA countries over 21 years were
identied.
Liberalisation variables
This study uses liberalisation data for seven facets of the nancial sector. These include (i)
credit controls and reserve requirements, (ii) interest rate controls, (iii) entry and activity
barriers, (iv) state ownership in the banking sector, (v) capital account restrictions, (vi)
prudential regulation and supervision of the banking sector, and (vii) securities market
policy. Data for 14 countries in the study sample is drawn from Abiad et al. (2008). These
countries include Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote dIvoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mada-
gasca, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.
This study extends the above dataset by constructing a new database for similar liber-
alisation policies as in Abiad 2008, for 12 other SSA countries. The countries include
4Tchana Tchana (2008b) reviews the following four denitions of what is considered a banking crisis
by di¤erent authors. i) liquidity crisis in the banking system ii) credit crunch crises iii) solvency crisis and
iv) combination of insolvency and liquidity crisis that leads to bank runs and bank closures.
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Botswana, Chad, Gabon, Gambia, Lesotho, Mali, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Siera
leone, Swaziland, and Zambia. This study adopts the methodology used in Abiad et al.
(2008), including using the questions to guide the coding for the 7 liberalisation dimensions.
The details are provided in the appendix.
In brief, total nancial liberalisation progressed slowly between 1986 and 1992. The pace
increased between 1993 and 2000, before slowing down again after 2001, across all coun-
tries. The variables are less smooth for individual nancial liberalisation policies. The
variables also exhibit some positive corelation (Table B.0.3 and Figure E.3 in the appen-
dix). However, the computed annual changes for each liberalisation policy presented in
Table B.0.4 are less correlated and hence are used in the analysis.
Macroeconomic variables
The literature on business cycle models of bank runs posits that banking fragility increases
during downturns of business cycles. As such, the study includes the following macro-
economic variables to capture economic uctuations. The real GDP growth ( rgdpg) is
used as a control for cyclical output e¤ects. During recessions, credit quality is likely to
deteriorate, thereby negatively a¤ecting loan repayments and resulting in increase in loan
defaults.
The GDP deator is used to proxy ination (infn). It is included to control for macro-
economic volatility. The real interest rate ( rir) is used to capture the potential adverse
e¤ects of high interest rates on bank balance sheets.
The variable change in terms of trade (tot) is included to control for external macroeco-
nomic volatility, for instance sudden adverse movements in terms of trade, real exchange
rates or sharp uctuations in world interest rates. This variable also makes it possible to
test if crises are not due to excessive foreign exchange risk exposure.
Banking system variables
Liquidity (liq) is measured by the ratio of bank cash plus reserves to bank assets. If the
banking system is liquid, adverse macroeconomic shocks are less likely to increase the
chances of a crisis. The ratio of private sector credit to GDP ( cr=gdp) controls for bank
exposure to the private sector. Research has shown that most banking crises are preceded
by a boom in private credit (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). Therefore, lagged real credit
growth (crgrt 2) is included in this study to control for asset market booms that may
trigger a crisis when the booms burst. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998b) argue
that systemic banking crises may be associated with sudden capital outows in countries
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with exchange rate pegs. As such, the ratio of broad money to foreign exchange reserves
(M2=gdp) is included to control for this e¤ect.
Institutional and regulatory quality variables
Banking sector problems may be increased by fraud, weak enforcement of loan contracts
and prudential regulations, especially where the legal system is not very e¢ cient. Gover-
nance (gov) and press freedom (pressf) are included to measure the quality of the legal
and political systems in a country. Since these variables capture the administrative ca-
pacity of governments which determines the e¤ectiveness of prudential supervision, low
values may mean more opportunities for moral hazard and hence increase the possibility
of banking crises.
GDP per capita (gdppc) is included to control for the level of economic development in the
country and hence general institutional quality. The presence of explicit deposit insurance
(depins) is also included as a regressor. Deposit insurance is expected to reduce the oc-
currence of banking crises after liberalisation by eliminating the possibility of self-fullling
panics analyzed in the model by Diamond and Dybvig (1983). However, high deposit insur-
ance cover can increase moral hazard and bank risk-taking behaviour. Therefore, apriori,
the e¤ect of deposit insurance is ambiguous.
4.5 Model Estimation and Result Analysis
Tables 4.5.1, 4.5.2, and 4.5.3 present the results of the ordered logit regressions estimating
the relationship between nancial liberalisation and banking crisis, controlling for relevant
variables. The results are explained in terms of marginal probability e¤ects. Column
(1) corresponds to the aggregate nancial liberalisation index while columns (2) to (7)
correspond to di¤erent nancial liberalisation policies.
4.5.1 Banking stability and nancial liberalisation
The baseline model in Table 4.5.1 column (1), presents strong evidence that total nancial
liberalisation has a negative marginal probability e¤fects on the occurrence of both systemic
and non-systemic banking crises, contrary to widely held perceptions. This relationship
between the occurrence of banking crisis and liberalisation is signicantly negative at 1%
level.
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Data presented in Table 2.2 shows that about 50% of countries that took some major moves
towards liberalisation had experienced banking crises prior to liberalisation, whilst the
other half experienced banking crises after implementing nancial reforms. This seems to
suggest that nancial liberalisation improved stability by enabling banks to better diversify
their asset portfolios as well as widening their depositor base. Diversication insulates
banks from shocks that are specic to certain economic sectors, regions or type of bank
activity. In addition, stability might also have been achieved through improved e¢ ciency
as a result of heightened post liberalisation competition.
These results are consistent with ndings in previous research. For example, Carlson and
Mitchener (2006) nd that states in the US that deregulated bank branching laws had fewer
bank failures in the 1920s. Similarly, Gonzalez (2005) reports that banks in 36 developed
and developing countries outside Africa (except South Africa) with stricter regulations
take higher risk, and hence face more chances of failure than those in countries with less
restrictive laws.
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As mentioned earlier, this study focuses on the relationship between specic components
of banking liberalisation and the occurrence of banking crises.
Liberalisation of interest rate controls is considered rst. Results presented in column
(2) suggest that interest rate liberalisation has a positive, though insignicant marginal
probability e¤ect on the occurrence of systemic banking crisis in SSA countries. The
marginal probability e¤ects are stronger for systemic crises than non-sytemic crises. This
contradicts results reported in previous studies. In fact, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache
(1998b) nd a positive and signicant relationship between these two variables. Similarly,
Angkinand et al. (2009) report a positive relationship between behavioral liberalisation
(interest rate and credit controls) and banking crisis incidences.
The results suggests that in SSA banking crises seem not to be related to higher levels of
interest rates. In addition, the interest rate variable used in this study capture nancial
liberalisation which was implemented in stages as well as instances where policy reversals
were encountered. In fact, the interest rate variable is captured on an ordinal scale, taking
the value of 1, if government sets ceilings or oors for both interest and deposit rates,
and 2, if government allows interest rates to uctuate within a band, and 3 if ceilings,
oors or bands on interest rates are all eliminated. From the study sample, countries such
as Nigeria moved from total interest rate controls to complete removal of lending rate
ceilings as well as removal of deposit rate oors over time. Other countries, such as Ghana
and Kenya, moved from full repression to full liberalisation. On the other hand, other
countries like Zimbabwe, moved from complete government control to largely liberalised
banking sectors. Zimbabwes nancial sector moved back to a partially controlled system
when the government re-introduced lending rate controls. Therefore, given that the interest
rate variable used in the current study captures all such developments, the result is not
totally surprising.
Regarding controls on entry and activity restrictions, the results suggests that relaxing
such restrictions increases the marginal probability e¤ects of bank failure. This result
seems to suggest that increasing the number of players in the market causes an increase in
bank failures as lower prots from a competitive banking environment distort risk-taking
incentives of banks. The results also suggest that fewer restrictions on bank activity may
lead to banks diversifying into high risk areas. This is consistent with ndings by Lepetit
et al. (2008), that expanding into non-interest income activities increases insolvency risk.
The probability of occurrence of systemic crises induced by removal of entry and activity
restrictions is higher than that of non-systemic crises. This may reect the weaknesses of
domestic banks that sprouted after easing of entry requirements in the majority of SSA
countries. This increase put pressure on implicit government deposit insurance schemes
and resulted in central banks failing to contain the spreading of bank failures to the rest
of the banking sector through the contagion e¤ect.
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Removing controls on credit allocation reduces the marginal probability e¤ects of both sys-
temic and non-systemic banking crises. Brownbridge and Harvey (1998) report that prior
to nancial liberalisation, several state owned banks accumulated non performing loans as
a result of non-repayment of loans by poorly performing parastatals as well as institutions
from "priority sectors" to which banks were obliged to o¤er credit at below market rates.
As such, removal of compulsory credit quarters, ceilings and preferential interest rates on
credit lines improved the banksnancial positions, and as a result contributed to bank
stability. Thus, the negative result on removal of credit controls may be justied on these
grounds.
Results presented in column (5) show a positive and signicant relationship between bank-
ing crises and removal of restrictions on ow of international capital. As expected, greater
capital outows increase the likelihood of banking crises, especially for less developed
countries. Capital ows are subject to asymetric information, agency problems, adverse
selection, and moral hazard problems. At the same time, inadequate institutional and
prudential arrangements that characterise developing economies may fail to deal with the
risks associated with diverse types of capital ows.
Reducing the share of government assets in the banking sector through increased privati-
sation has a negative e¤ect on both systemic and non-systemic banking crises (column 6).
The study observes that state owned banks were characterised by poor loan procedures
and had loan recovery rates less than 50% in a majority of the study countries. This result
is intuitive, it suggests that reducing state participation in banking systems reduces bank
failure rates signicantly.
Lastly, there is a negative and signicant relationship between liberalisation of security
market policies and banking crises. This supports the claim that stock market development
improves bank stability through easing liquidity constraints. Allen et al. (2011) and Allen
et al. (2012) surveys on stock market development in SSA report a positive performance
of stock markets in liberalised markets. As such, liberalisation of security market policies
promotes competition and hence bank stability through nancial deepening and improved
e¢ ciency.
4.5.2 Bank supervision and prudential regulation
Several studies observe that well developed regulatory institutions that enhance e¤ective
supervision mitigate the positive impact of nancial liberalisation on banking crises. In
this section this link is revised for SSA countries using results reported in Tables B.0.5,
B.0.6, B.0.7 and B.0.8 in the appendix. In these tables, column (1) presents the results of
the baseline specication, and column (2) presents the results of the specication with an
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interacting dummy variable between the index of nancial liberalisation and bank super-
vision. Columns (3) to (8) present results for the relationship between banking crises and
various liberalisation policies, conditional on prudential supervision. The results show a
negative and signicant marginal probability e¤ect of liberalisation on banking crises.
To understand these results more clearly, the following observations are made. Firstly,
for the prudential regulations and supervision variable, a greater degree of government
intervention is coded as a reform, thus a higher ranking shows the presence and e¤ective-
ness of government supervision and prudential regulation. Secondly, the lax-supervision
hypothesis discussed earlier suggests that an e¢ cient supervisory structure reduces the
destabilising impact of liberalisation on banking sector. The empirical results seem to
substantiate these observations. Specically, strengthening the supervisory and regulatory
framework helps to contain the impact of other liberalisation policies on banking crises. To
investigate this further, the previous regressions were re-run, but in these regressions the
variable for bank regulation and supervision is considered as one of the control variables.
The objective here is to observe the impact of other liberalisation policies on banking crises,
given the di¤erent levels of bank supervision in each country.
In Table B.0.5, the nancial reform index and an interactive term finrefsup, (nreform
 sup), are included as explanatory variables in columns (1) and (2) respectively. The
coe¢ cient of the index for total liberalisation, finreform changes to positive, though
it is not signicant (column 2). However, the interactive term is negative and strongly
signicant. This result strongly supports the stabilising e¤ect of e¢ cient supervision and
prudential regulatory structures.
Interest rate liberalisation and easing entry requirements have positive and signicant ef-
fects on banking crises (columns 3 and 4, Table B.0.6). However, the statistical signicance
of the coe¢ cient on ent is weak. This suggests that strong institutional environments mit-
igate the destabilising e¤ects of increased entry into the banking sector (column 4).
Results in Tables B.0.7 and B.0.8 report that liberalisation of credit controls, bank privati-
sation, and security markets reduce the probability of banking crises as established in the
rst set of results. The e¤ect on capital account liberalisation is positive but insignicant
(column 6). This conrms the importance of e¤ective prudential and regulatory strucures
to contain the risks associated with complex capital ows.
Removal of controls on credit allocation has a stabilising e¤ect as banks are able to extend
loans only to credit-worthy debtors and at market determined rates. The present result
suggests that this impact remains in force in the presence of e¢ cient bank supervision.
This result is consistent with the argument presented in Brownbridge and Harvey (1998),
that forcing banks to give credit to selected sectors without paying due regard to the credit
worthiness of the borrowers compromises the quality of bank loans. Evidently, removal of
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such controls alongside strengthening of prudential supervision enhances bank stability.
Overall, the results presented in this section are consistent with the view that, if nan-
cial liberalisation is not concurrently implemented alongside e¤orts to improve prudential
regulation, it is more likely to increase bank risk-taking behaviour and lead to subsequent
crisis. However, information provided in Table E.1.1, in the appendix, suggests that in
SSA countries, measures to improve bank regulation and supervision lagged behind other
liberalisation dimensions between 1986 and 2006. As emphasised in Mishkin (1999), it is
imperative to have proper bank regulatory and supervisory structures in place before or
alongside nancial liberalisation. This helps to reinforce the positive e¤ects of nancial
liberalisation, while containing the negative impact of liberalisation on banking sector.
4.5.3 Institutional and regulatory quality
The results presented in Tables B.0.9 and B.0.10 establish that explicit deposit insurance
has a positive and signicant marginal e¤ect on banking crises. Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) suggest that deposit insurance schemes may mitigate the incentives by agents to
run on illiquid but solvent banks. However, these results are consistent with ndings by
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) that explicit deposit insurance is associated with a
higher probability of banking crisis. Whilst some countries in SSA were encouraged to set
deposit insurance schemes over the years, the empirical results suggest that such schemes
have a negative impact on prudent bank behaviour.
The variable GDP per capita is a proxy for institutional development. The negative re-
lationship suggests that developing economies with poor institutional structures are more
vulnerable to crises. This is further supported by the negative relationship exhibited by
the coe¢ cient on pressf (Table B.0.10, column 3 ). However, the e¤ect is only signicant
at 13% level. Another proxy for institutional development, the quality of governance in
the country, is not signicant.
Reserve requirements are included to proxy bank regulations in an economy. Results
presented in column (2) of Tables B.0.9 indicate a negative relationship between reserve
requirements and banking crisis occurrence. This may suggest that such banking regula-
tions work to reduce risk-taking incentives. Tchana Tchana (2008a) similarly nds that
an increase in the level of reserve requirements reduce the probability of occurrence of a
banking crisis.
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4.5.4 Other control variables
Macroeconomic variables
Several macroeconomic variables in the empirical tests presented in this chapter signi-
cantly a¤ect the probability of banking crises. GDP growth has a negative and signicant
e¤ect in all specications. Similarly, high interest rates have positive e¤ects on bank crises.
Thus supports the assertion that high and volatile interest rates reduce the quality of loan
portfolios and compromise loan repayment by borrowers. Such loan defaults contribute to
high ratios of non-performing assets to total assets and consequently, to higher incidences
of banking crises.
The coe¢ cient on ination is generally positive and signicant. High levels of ination
increase the probability of banking crises, due to its impact on nominal interest rates and
hence bank balance sheets. These results suggest that banking crises increase during peri-
ods of low GDP growth, high interest and ination rates, and are consistent with results in
reported by (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2005; Gonzalez, 2005; Noy, 2004; Demirguc-
Kunt and Detragiache, 1998b). Change in terms of trade is generally not signicant.
Banking system characteristics
The ratio of broad money to foreign exchange reserves, m2res, has a positive and sig-
nicant marginal e¤ect on the probability of having either type of crises. This suggests
that vulnerability of banks to speculative attacks which may result in sudden capital out-
ows increases the probability of a banking crisis. This result is consistent with that of
Angkinand et al. (2009) and Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998b).
The ratio of private sector credit to GDP, cr=gdp, has positive and signicant marginal
probability e¤ects on occurrence of either type of banking crisis as expected. Lagged
credit growth, crgr_2 is generally not signicant. Finally, the results also suggest that
more liquid banking systems reduce the likelihood of a banking crisis.
4.6 Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis
This section conducts various robustness and sensitivity tests of the results.
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4.6.1 Logit estimation
In the rst robustness check, the study assumes a crisis dummy variable that takes the value
of 0 for non-crisis periods, and 1 in the rst year of each crisis episode (whether systemic or
non-systemic crisis)5. Therefore, the study species a multivariate logit regression model
to estimate the probability of occurrence of a crisis in liberalised nancial sectors. Table
B.0.11 in the appendix shows the results from this estimation.
Column (1) reports the results of the relationship between total liberalisation and banking
crises while Columns (2) to (7) report results for di¤erent liberalisation policies. The
results in column (1) indicate that total nancial liberalisation reduces the probability of
banking crises (albeit only signicant at 10% level). A similar relationship is reported in
the results from ordered logit estimation.
The other liberalisation policies generally bear the same relationship as in the baseline
model. Privatisation, relaxing credit controls and security market policy have negative
marginal probability e¤ects, while removal of entry restrictions and capital account liber-
alisation have positive e¤ects. The other explanatory variables generally have the same
signs and are of similar signicance as in the main model already presented. These ndings
conrm that the results in of this study are neither driven by endogeneity, neither are they
sensitive to model specication.
4.6.2 Liberalisation dummy variable
In the second robustness test, the study employs a dummy variable for nancial liberali-
sation (finlib) instead of the index for total liberalisation finref . This dummy variable
takes the value of 1 starting from the year in which reforms on interest rate controls were
initiated, and 0 for all the years prior to the interest rate liberalisation, to proxy total
liberalisation.
Table B.0.12 reports a positive and signicant relationship between liberalisation and the
occurrence of both systemic and non-systemic crises. While this result is not consistent
with the one established using total nancial liberalisation index, the result concurs with
the one pertaining to interest rate liberalisation in Table 4.5.1, except that the coe¢ cient
is now signicant. This result concurs with those reported in studies that used a similar
dummy variable to proxy total liberalisation, and concluded that nancial liberalisation
increases bank fragility. The coe¢ cients on the other variables are not signicantly di¤erent
from the baseline results.
5Years following the onset of banking crisis are excluded.
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In other unreported results, the crises variable is replaced with non-performing loans and
bank z-score. The sample period is reduced due to limited data on non-performing loans
and bank z-score. The results are however not signicantly di¤erent from the ones pre-
sented earlier.
Banking sector fragility index
The crises identication based on events in the baseline specication has been criticised
in some research circles6. The basis for the criticism has been that it presents a selection
bias by focusing on some strict set of events. This implies that this method only captures
crises episodes that are so severe that they trigger the occurrence of these market events,
otherwise episodes that are contained by corrective policies are not captured by this method
(Tchana Tchana, 2008a).
In this section, the study constructs an index similar to the one used by Tchana Tchana
(2008a). The Banking System Fragility Index (BSFI) is a weighted index of the three
major types of risks that banks are exposed to: credit risk, proxied by domestic credit to
the private sector; liquidity risk which is captured by bank deposit growth; and exchange
risk proxied by foreign liabilities growth. The index is given as;
BSFIit =
NDepgit +NPvtcrit +NFLit
3
(4.10)
NDepgit =
Depgit   depg
depg
where Depgit =
LDepgit   LDepgi;t 1
LDepgi;t 1
NPvtcrit =
Pvtcrit   pvtcr
pvtcr
where Pvtcrit =
LPvtcrit   LPvtcri;t 1
LPvtcri;t 1
NFLit =
FLit   fl
fl
where FLit =
LFLit   LFLi;t 1
LFLi;t 1
Depg is the real growth rate of bank deposits, Pvtcr is real credit to the private sector
whilst FL is total real foreign liabilities.  and  are the mean and standard deviation
for the three variables respectively. This index captures the distinctions in banking crises
that may have arisen due to problems within the banking sector or deepened by underlying
fragilities in the banking system from those resulting from macroeconomic events, outside
the banking sector. Using this index as the dependant variable, the study runs similar
regressions as in the baseline model. However, the results are not signicantly di¤erent
from the ones already established.
6See for instance Boyd et al. (2009).
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4.7 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter examines the relationship between nancial liberalisation policies and the
probability of occurrence of banking sector crises in a sample of SSA countries. The study
employs seven di¤erent liberalisation components that capture the extent and the progress
made with reforms as well as regulatory and supervisory contributions made during nan-
cial liberalisation. In addition, a composite index for total nancial liberalisation used in
this analysis is constructed from these policies. The study also makes use of a banking
crisis variable that encompasses both systemic and non-systemic banking crises. As such,
the crises variable allows for 3 response categories. The study therefore species an or-
dered logit model to analyse the response of both systemic and non-systemic crises to the
implementation of nancial liberalisation policies.
The results of the empirical estimations show that total nancial liberalisation has signi-
cant negative marginal probability e¤ects on sytemic and non-sytemic banking crises. This
relationship is reinforced in well developed institutional environments that enable e¢ cient
bank supervision as well as prudential regulation. Thus, conditional on prudent supervi-
sion, the results report evidence that overall liberalisation does not necessarily increase the
chances of banking crises occurrence.
Regarding specic policies, the results show that di¤erent nancial liberalisation policies
have the following marginal probability e¤ects on bank stability.
 On the one hand the removal of entry and activity restrictions has a positive and
signicant impact on the occurrence of banking crises. This result seems to conrm
the notion that as more banks enter the market, bank failures are likely to increase
as lower prots resulting from competition encourage banks to take on more risk.
This result, therefore, does not support the stabilising e¤ects likely to arise from
diversication opportunities as a result of removal of activity restrictions. Similarly,
relaxing controls on international capital ows has positive marinal probability e¤ects
on systemic and non-systemic banking crises
 On the other hand, nancial liberalisation reduces the likelihood of banking crisis
when the following variables of liberalisation are used:
Removal of controls on credit allocation reduces the likelihood of banking crisis.
This conrms the view that removal of compulsory credit quarters, ceilings and
preferential interest rates on credit lines to poorly performing institutions may
improve banks nancial positions, and as a result contribute to bank stability.
Bank privatisation has a negative and signicant e¤ect on banking crisis. This
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implies that reduction of the share of government assets in the banking system
has the e¤ect of stabilising banking sectors in the SSA region.
Reforms that entail strengthening supervision and prudential regulation have a
negative impact on banking crises. This negative relationship is strongly sig-
nicant in all the model specications presented in this study. Furthermore,
interacting the prudential supervision variable with liberalisation policies con-
rms that prudential regulation policies help contain the destabilising e¤ects of
some nancial liberalisation policies.
The study nds a negative and signicant relationship between removal of con-
trols on security markets and the probability of banking crisis occurrence, al-
though weakly signicant in some specications.
 Finally, this study does not nd convincing evidence that removal of controls on
interest rates has positive marginal probability e¤ects on systemic banking crises, a
result that is common in previous studies. This result is intuitive given the manner
in which most SSA countries implemented interest rate liberalisation. There are
several cases of partial implementation and policy reversals, which were not captured
in previous research. The empirical results concur with those of previous research
regarding a positive link between interest rate liberalisation and banking crises when
a dummy variable for the presence or absence of interest rate controls is used.
Overall, empirical results from this study provide clear and robust evidence that di¤erent
liberalisation policies have varying marginal probability e¤ects on banking crises incidences
in SSA countries. While several previous studies agree on a positive and signicant rela-
tionship between liberalisation and banking crises, this study shows that this assertion is
true when removal of controls on entry and activity restrictions, and removal of restric-
tions on ow of international capital are considered as the liberalisation variables. Indeed,
other liberalisation policies, for instance, removal of credit controls, privatisation of pre-
vious state-owned banks, and strengthening prudential regulations have stabilising e¤ects
on banking crises. As such conclusions drawn from analysing similar relationships should
be made with regard to specic liberalisation policies.
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Chapter 5
The E¤ects of Financial
Liberalisation and Competition on
Bank Protability
5.1 Introduction
The debate on the link between nancial liberalisation and banking crises prompted re-
searchers to investigate possible conduits through which the e¤ects of liberalisation are
transmitted to banking sector fragility/stability. Two main channels have been suggested
in the literature. The rst conduit, the franchise value channel, set forth in Keeley (1990),
focuses on the e¤ects of nancial liberalisation on bank franchise value. In his model,
Keeley (1990) argues that reforms in the US laws governing state branching, multibank
holding company, and interstate expansion led to increased competition and erosion of
bank monopoly prots.
The Hellmann et al. (2000) model reviewed in chapter three of this thesis, presents an ar-
gument similar to that propounded by Keeley (1990). In addition, the literature on bank
regulation points out the importance of entry barriers in enhancing protability through
protecting banks from competition, unsafe and unsound banking practices and bank fail-
ures (Athanasoglou et al., 2006). Banks protected from competition gain monopoly power
and acquire high prot margins. However, when laws that restrict inter-bank competition,
as well as competition from non-bank rms are relaxed, competition increases and there is
a general decline in bank prots (see for instance Claessens et al., 2001; Berger, 1995)
Conversely, some sections in the lierature suggest that nancial liberalisation positively
a¤ects bank protability. For instance, proponents of nancial liberalisation argue for the
removal of operating obstacles in the banking sector in order to foster competition and
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e¢ ciency. In accordance with this theory, more (cost) e¢ cient rms earn more prots.
This is supported by the Industrial Organisation (IO) theories on banking which posit
that e¢ ciency drives protability. Therefore, nancial liberalisation through enhancing
e¢ ciency in the banking sector, fosters bank protability. This leaves the debate on the
link between nancial liberalisation and bank protability open for empirical verication.
Despite established theoretical e¤ects of liberalisation on bank protability, little indepth
empirical research has been undertaken on this link. The literature that focuses on SSA
is scant. While countries in SSA are characterised by the dorminant role of the banking
sectors, nancial reforms aimed at liberalising these sectors have witnessed development
of stock markets and non-nancial intermediaries such as life insurance companies and
pensions funds. Implementation of these reforms has brought about changes in the legal,
institutional, structural, regulatory, and supervisory frameworks of the nancial systems,
with consequent e¤ects on banking activities and perfomance. As a result, investigating
bank protability in SSA has become more relevant.
The goal of this chapter is to test how nancial liberalisation policies, implemented across
SSA countries, inuenced market structure and bank protability, while accounting for
macroeconomic, institutional, and bank-specic determinants of bank protability. Sev-
eral studies have examined determinants of bank prots in several countries and geographic
regions, focus on SSA region has been limited. Furthermore, the current study specically
accounts for the e¤ects of nancial liberalisation policies implemented in countries in SSA
since the late 1980s. This study argues that changes in regulatory conditions- for instance,
regulatory reforms relating to entry and activity restrictions, international capital ows
and security market policy- increase bank competition and a¤ect bank performance. The
hypothesis for this chapter is that nancial liberalisation, by increasing competition in
the banking sector, erodes market power and previously earned abnormal bank prots.
This hypothesis draws on both theoretical and empirical literature that examines the im-
pact of nancial liberalisation on competition, which is then linked to literature on bank
protability.
The study hypothesis focuses on changes in market structures induced by nancial liber-
alisation. Therefore, it is necessary to test this model using data that covers the period
when liberalisation policies were expanding in both scope and intensity. In this regard this
chapter uses annual country and bank level data from an unbalanced panel of 144 banks
from 25 SSA countries over the period 1996 to 2006. A list of the countries and the details
of the banks from each country is in Table C.0.1 in the appendix. In specifying the model,
the study accounts for prot persistence by employing a dynamic panel framework using
the Arellano-Bond (1991) two-step General Method of Moments (GMM) approach.
This study nds mixed results regarding the relationship between nancial liberalisation
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policies and bank protability. While competitive liberalisation signicantly reduces bank
returns, total liberalisation does not seem to have any explanatory power for bank prof-
itability. Furthermore, the results show a negative and signicant relationship between
specic liberalisation policies including relaxing entry and activity restrictions, scrapping
of controls on interest rates, and relaxing controls on security market policies. On the con-
trary, reforms on prudential regulation and bank supervision, as well as bank privatisation
signicantly increases bank prot levels.
The empirical results also highlight that bank specic, macroeconomic and institutional
variables are important determinats of bank protability in SSA. The results show evidence
of moderate prot persistence, implying signicant competitive conditions in SSA nancial
markets. Bank capital, credit risk and bank size have positive e¤ects on bank protability,
while bank costs have the opposite e¤ect. Economic growth, GDP per capita, and ination
signicantly increase bank prots while the other measures of institutional and regulatory
environment have no siginicant e¤ects on bank prots.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: The next section outlines the stylised facts
on nancial liberalisation and bank prot trends in SSA. Section 5.2 provides an overview
of established theoretical and empirical research relevant to this study. Section 5.3 outlines
the empirical strategy, presents the data and describes the variables used in the emperical
analysis. Section 5.4 presents the model estimation and analysis of results. Finally, section
5.5 presents the sensitivity analysis, summarises and concludes.
5.2 Financial Liberalisation and Bank Protability Trends
Commercial banks in countries in SSA perform better, in terms of return on assets and
net interest margin, than banks in other developing countries (Flamini et al., 2009). As
presented in Table 5.2.1, return on assets averaged 3% in the last decade for the African
continent. However, di¤erent countries and regional groups reported varying protability
during the period 1990 to 2005. For instance, countries in west and southern Africa
reported average prot rates of about 5%. This compares to an average rate of about 1%
recorded in North African countries. Net interest margins, a measure of bank e¢ ciency,
provides a similar picture.
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Table 5.2.1: Bank Perfomance Measures in Selected African Countries
Regional block Country Return on Assets Net Interest Margin
1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005
Cameroon -0.001 -0.003 0.005 0.043 0.049 0.046
Gabon 0.029 0.03 0.02 0.134 0.57 0.33
Ethiopia 0.01 0.012 0.012 0.026 0.244 0.107 0.264
East and Central Africa Kenya 0.010 0.019 0.003 0.016 0.149 0.069 0.073 0.067
Madagasca 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.09
Malawi 0.02 0.037 0.005 0.028 0.016 0.121 0.123
Mozambique 0.01 -0.09 0.005 0.1 0.08 0.08
Uganda -0.052 0.014 0.038 0.033 0.083 0.112 0.117
Average 0.02 0.004 0.022 0.09 0.14 0.14
Burkina Faso 0.02 0.006 0.004 0.066 0.053 0.058
Ivory Coast 0.002 0.028 0.005 -0.048 0.038 0.067 0.058 0.064
West Africa Ghana 0.045 0.023 0.02 0.104 0.107 0.095
Nigeria 0.025 0.001 0.04 0.023 0.058 0.079 0.085 0.064
Senegal 0.026 0.016 -0.01 0.053 0.058 0.049
Average 0.06 0.05 -0.009 0.074 0.072 0.066
Botswana 0.024 0.014 0.035 0.041 0.063 0.084 0.05
Rep of South Africa 0.01 0.014 0.01 0.023 0.043 0.051 0.048 0.067
Southern Africa Zambia 0.057 0.043 0.058 0.044 0.147 0.120 0.103
Zimbabwe 0.027 0.019 0.045 0.134 0.064 0.184 0.317
Average 0.03 0.023 0.037 0.061 0.081 0.109 0.134
Algeria 0.004 0.01 0.016 0.036 0.061 0.037 0.05
North Africa Egypt 0.015 0.015 0.011 0.001 0.023 0.021 0.022 0.019
Morocco 0.007 0.01 0.011 -0.002 0.067 0.065 0.041 0.034
Tunisia 0.01 0.013 0.013 -0.001 0.02 0.031 0.032 0.028
Average 0.011 0.011 0.004 0.037 0.045 0.036 0.036
Source: Beck et al (2010), Authors calculations.
One of the reasons cited for high protability of commercial banks in Africa is the risky
nancial environments (Flamini et al., 2009). This claim is based on weak legal institutions
that fail to enforce contractual agreements and hence suppress creditor rights. This charac-
teristic is common across many countries in SSA. Similarly, economic under-development
in the region exposes banks to risk as low growth promotes deterioration of credit quality,
and hence increased loan defaults. In addition, poorly developed prudential and supervi-
sory frameworks also expose banks to high risk. Poor monitoring may give rise to banks
earning high returns, though from high risky projects. In such a high risk environment,
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arbitrage ensures that the riskier assets get high rates of return.
Bank regulations and market power also have signicant e¤ects on bank returns. Whilst
nancial liberalisation is expected to promote competitive markets, oligopolistic structures
in some banking sectors in Africa are a possible cause of supernormal returns. Alternatively,
high loan rates in liberalised and less concentrated markets may result in higher returns
than those in controlled markets.
Table 5.2.2 does not give a distinct positive correlation between concentration
Table 5.2.2: Bank Concentration and Protability in Selected Countries
CR ROA ROE
Country 1996 2000 2006 1996 2000 2006 Trendz 1996 2000 2006 Trendz
Botswana 0.97 0.93 0.80 0.02 0.04 0.03 " 0.25 0.35 0.49 "
Burkina Faso 0.87 0.67 0.02 0.006 -0.008 # 0.16 0.07 -0.08 #
Cameroon 1 0.82 0.65 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 " -0.39 0.7 0.13 "
Ethiopia 0.9 0.85 0.88 0.02 0.01 0.03 " 0.35 0.11 0.33 #
Gabon 1 1 0.96 0.03 0.03 0.03 + 0.13 0.25 0.26 "
Ghana 0.99 0.93 0.79 0.02 0.02 0.003 # 0.17 0.32 0.11 #
Kenya 0.7 0.55 0.59 0.01 0.003 0.02 " 0.13 0.04 0.15 "
Ivory Coast 0.96 0.83 0.75 0.02 0.01 -0.01 # 0.29 0.2 -0.31 #
Madagasca 1 0.83 0.74 0.04 0.04 0.03 # 0.9 0.30 0.28 "
Mali 0.91 0.84 0.76 0.01 0.002 0.01 + 0.18 -0.06 0.15 #
Malawi 0.92 0.86 0.04 0.05 0.04 + 0.28 0.47 0.35 "
Mauritius 0.98 0.89 0.72 0.01 0.02 0.01 + 0.12 0.13 0.12 +
Mozambique 0.8 0.82 0.01 -0.09 0.03 " 0.09 1.18 0.26 "
Nigeria 0.82 0.42 0.39 0.02 0.04 0.03 " 0.29 0.32 0.19 #
Senegal 0.94 0.72 0.64 0.01 0.02 0.01 + 0.13 0.19 0.16 "
Sierra leone 1 0.97 0.89 0.06 0.12 0.02 # 0.45 0.65 0.19 #
South Africa 0.92 0.81 0.90 0.03 0.01 0.03 + 0.16 0.06 0.19 "
Uganda 0.84 0.57 0.65 -0.02 0.04 0.03 " -0.18 0.47 0.28 "
Zambia 0.86 0.69 0.58 0.06 0.06 0.05 # 0.42 0.36 0.32 #
Zimbabwe 0.98 0.97 0.83 0.03 0.05 0.15 " 0.35 0.48 0.82 "
Algeria 0.91 0.87 0.87 0.004 0.01 0.01 " 0.04 0.08 0.12 "
Egypt 0.71 0.57 0.57 0.02 0.01 0.01 # 0.19 0.11 0.21 "
Tunisia 0.54 0.46 0.45 0.01 0.01 0.002 # 0.12 0.12 -0.04 #
Source: Beck et al. (2010) and Authors calculations. CR is bank concentration ratio measured as
assets of three largest banks in total commercial bank assets. ROA and ROE is return on
average assets and return on average equity respectively.zchange between 1996 and 2006 rates
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levels and return on assets. In fact, while concentration levels have decreased between 1996
and 2006 in SSA countries, statistics in Table 5.2.2 indicates that more countries reported
marginal increases in rates of return on assets than those that reported declines in the
same prot measure. However, an equal number of countries did not record any signicant
changes in return on assets. North African countries (Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia) report
lower concentration ratios than SSA countries, and generally declining rates of return on
assets. A similar trend is also observed with regard to rates of return on equity.
Concerning the inuence of bank regulation on bank prot measures, statistical evidence
shows that there is a correlation between liberalisation policies implemented over time,
and bank prot measures, which are proxies for franchise value. As discussed in detail
later, there seems to be negative and signicant correlations between some prot measures
and di¤erent liberalisation components such as relaxing entry restrictions and removal of
interest rates and credit controls.
Figure 5.1 shows the trends in three measures of bank protability as well as total nancial
liberalisation in SSA between 1990 and 2005. The scales are normalised between 0 and 1.
Figure 5.1: Financial Liberalisation and Bank Prot Measures in SSA (1990-2005)
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Source: Beck et.al (2010) and authors calculations using Bankscope data.
Finref is the nancial liberalisation index
Return on equity shows a general upward trend and reaches a peak in 1998, and thereafter
takes a gradual decline. A similar trend is observed for net interest margins, though this
measure is not as volatile as return on equity. Return on assets shows a gradual decline
throughout the 1990 to 2006 period. On the other hand, nancial liberalisation shows an
upward trend from 1990 and reaches a peak in 2000, before taking a slight decline in 2004.
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5.3 Literature Review
This section presents an overview of previous research relavant to the current study. Since
the present chapters hypothesis hinges on the e¤ects of nancial liberalisation on bank
prots through its e¤ects on competition, a brief review of bank competition models is
presented rst. The monopoly model of banking is presented to highlight the market
conditions that may exist prior to nancial liberalisation, while the monopolistic model
represents liberalised markets.
5.3.1 Financial liberalisation, bank competition and protability
The pioneering work of Bain (1951) provides a basic framework for rm behaviour in a
competitive environment, under the neoclassical theory of competition. This theory views
competition as a state that would prevail if there were no entry and exit controls in the
market. Firms take prices as given. The larger the number of rms the more e¤ective
their competitive behaviour and the less concentrated the market structure. Conversely,
the fewer the number of buyers and sellers, the more oligopolistic and monopolistic their
behavior, and consequently the more the prots realised. The basic model used to account
for di¤erences in prots is thus given by:
 = f(Cr;M) (5.1)
where Cr is rm concentration ratio and M captures imports and other external costs to
the rm. As such, nancial liberalisation impacts on bank prots indirectly through its
e¤ects on Cr.
While most early theories of bank competition were drawn from the neoclassical assertions,
the IO approach to the economics of banking considers banks as rms that react optimally
to the environment in which they operate. This approach deals with market size, rm
growth, market perfomance, and market structure in the banking industry. The Klein-
Monti model (Klein, 1971; Monti, 1972), forms the basis of the IO models of banking
competition.
The monopoly model of banking
The Klein-Monti (hereafter KM) model assumes a single bank in the economy. An indi-
vidual bank is not able to inuence market price and/or output. The bank chooses among
three assets: cash reserves, loans, and treasury bills. There are three types of liabilities,
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demand deposits, time deposits, and equity capital that is exogenously set. The bank faces
a cost function denoted by C = C(D;L), where D and L represents the production costs
of bank deposits and loans respectively.
The central bank reserve coe¢ cient is . The aggregate compulsory reserve is expressed as
R = D. As such, the net interbank position of each individual bank is R = (1 )D L.
The bank faces a downward sloping demand for loans L(rL) and upward sloping deposit
function D(rD). Therefore, the inverse demand and supply functions are rL(L) and rD(D).
The bank decides on the amount of loans L and deposits D which a¤ect the corresponding
interest rates (rL, and rD). The money market rate is denoted by r.
The prot function for the bank is thus given by the sum of interest margins on loans and
deposits, net of production costs.
(L;D) = rL(L)L  r(D(1  )  L)  rD(D)D   C(L;D) (5.2)
Prot maximisation, assuming that the prot function is concave and twice di¤erentiable,
yields the following rst order conditions:
@
@L
= r0L(L) + rL   r  
@C
@L
(L;D) = 0 (5.3)
@
@D
=  r0D(D)D + r(1  )  rD  
@C
@D
(L;D) = 0
Thus, a monopolist bank stipulates the optimal stocks of loans (L) and deposits (D);which
are independently determined. The optimal solutions for the loan and deposit rates, rL
and rD are similarly determined. As such, the lending decision for the bank L(rL) is
independent of the deposit supply function D(rD).
The elasticities of demand for loans, and supply of deposits are dened as "L =   rLL0(rL)L(rL) >
0, and "D =
rDD
0(rD)
D(rD)
> 0 respectively. Substituting these expressions in equation (5.3)
yields:
rL   r   C 0L
rL
=
1
"L(rL)
(5.4)
r(1  )  rD   C 0D
rD
=
1
"D(rD)
The left hand side of both lines in equation (5.4) are the Lerner indices (price minus
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marginal cost divided by price) for loans and deposits respectively. The Lerner index
describes the relationship between elasticity and price margins for a prot maximising
rm. Equation (5.4) states that in equilibrium, a monopolist rm sets the quantity of loans
and deposits in order to equate the Lerner indices to inverse elasticities. In the banking
literature, the Lerner indices reect market power in the loan and deposit markets. The
greater the market power, the smaller the elasticities, the higher the Lerner index, and
hence, the higher the intermediation margins (lower deposit rates and high lending rates).
In monopoly markets, price is always greater than marginal cost, hence the Lerner index
is closer to unit. However, for competitive markets, price equals marginal cost and the
Lerner index becomes zero.
An important implication of the monopoly model is that intermediation margins can only
be reduced if more substitutes for banking products (competition) are introduced in the
market. Regulatory structures in an economy, for instance, barriers to entry, interest
rate contols, and other structural regulations, shield existing banks from any potential
competitors. As such, the intermediation margins are wide, and monopolist banks earn
high prots.
Equilibrium solutions under perfect competition can be derived analogously. The compet-
itive equilibrium solutions however yield the equation for the interest rate spread.
rL   rD = r + @C
@L
(L;D) +
@C
@D
(L;D) (5.5)
Equation 5.5 states that the intermediation margin in a perfectly competitive market is a
function of the reserve ratio and sum of the marginal costs of servicing loans and deposits.
As such, the competitive pressure in a perfectly competitive market is capable of inducing a
fall in prices of nancial goods and services. This will erode monopoly prots that otherwise
would be enjoyed by banks in non-competitive markets (Besanko and Thakor, 1992).
The imperfect competition model of banking
The imperfect or oligopolist competition model of banking addresses some of the shortcom-
ings of the monopolist model. This model approximates practical banking behavior. Banks
operate in monopolistically competitive markets, with a nite number of other banks, N .
As such, the imperfect models assume an imperfect Cournot competitive framework.
For simplicity, the study maintains the assumptions of the basic KM monopoly model
of banking. Banks in the oligopolistic model have a linear cost function Cn(L;D) =
LL+ DD where n = 1; :::; N . Each bank takes the amount of loans and deposits chosen
by other banks as given. A bank chooses its own amount of loans and deposits and
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maximises the following prot function1.
 =
( 
rL
 
Ln +
X
m6=n
Lm
!
  r
!
Ln +
 
r (1  )  rD
 
Dn +
X
m6=n
Dm
!
Dn
!
  C(Ln, Dn)
)
(5.6)
Freixas and Rochet (1997) show that by solving the objective function, the Cournot equi-
librium gives a vector for N rms, of the stock of loans and deposits, (Ln,D

n)n=1:::;N , such
that for every n, the stock of loans and deposits (Ln,D

n) maximises prots for each bank.
The solution derived gives a unique equilibrium. In equilibrium, each banks stock of loans
and deposits are Ln =
L
n
and Dn =
D
n
.
Maximising the prot function yields:
@n
@Ln
= r0L(L
)
L
N
+ rL(L
)  r   L = 0 (5.7)
@n
@Dn
=  r0D(D)
D
N
+ r(1  )  rD   D = 0
The results in equation 5.7 show that the optimal amounts of loans and deposits are
determined solely by the two separate rst order conditions. An important deduction is
that the bank lending decisions are independent of the depositssupply function.
Rearranging equation 5.7 and making use of the equilibrium solutions of rL and r

D , the
equations can be re-written in terms of elasticities as follows:
rL   (r + L)
rL
=
1
N"L(rL)
(5.8)
r(1  )  rD   D
rD
=
1
N"D(rD)
The equilibrium solutions are similar to the ones obtained under the bipolar case of
monopoly except that the elasticities in equation (5.8) are multiplied by the number of
banks in the market, N . The monopolist equilibrium solution is therefore a case where
N = 1. The implication of this analysis is that the larger the number of entrants (N large),
the less the market power, the greater the elasticities. As a result, intermediation margins
are lower than the ones obtained by the monopolist bank.
1Unlike in the perfect competition model, the oligopolistic model takes into account the inuence of the
stocks of loans and deposits on both the loan and deposit interest rates, rL(L) and rD(D), respectively.
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In liberalised nancial sectors, the regulations that limited competition are removed, and
more nancial intermediaries enter the market. As N ! +1, then the market structure
becomes very competitive. Conversely, when competition is weak (N small), the Lerner
index is large and banks have more market power. When N = 1, and price is higher than
marginal cost, the bank earns more prots. Intuitively, if N > 1, and a rm decides to
leave the industry, quantity falls, and price rises, and hence prots for the remaining rms
increase.
Summary The theories of bank competition described in the preceding section reveal
the following points that are pertinent to the formulation of the model in the empirical
methods section.
 More market power (controlled markets) implies smaller elasticities, higher Lerner
indices, and hence higher intermediation margins (bank prots)
 A rm in a monopolistically competitive rm maximises prots by setting the quan-
tity of loans and deposits to equate the Lerner indices to the product of inverse
elasticities and the number of banks in the market. With nancial liberalisation,
N ! +1, market power is reduced, the elasticities become large, the Lerner in-
dex is lower and intermediation margins are lower than those derived by monopolist
banks, and hence bank prots are lowered.
 In the extreme case of perfect competition, monopoly prots are dampened by the
e¤ects of intense competition on prices of nancial goods and services (price falls,
and quantities increase).
5.3.2 Financial liberalisation and market structure
Financial sector reforms that encompass scrapping of bank entry and activity restric-
tions should ideally promote competition in the banking sector. The resultant degree of
competition in turn determines market structure (degree of concentration) and therefore
prot margins that banks realise. Early research on the structural e¤ects of liberalisa-
tion on bank protability started with the application of two competing hypotheses; (a)
the market power hypothesis, which comprise the Structure-Conduct -Performance (SCP)
paradigm and Relative Market Power hypothesis (RMP); and (b) the E¢ cient Market
hypothesis (EM) (Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Molyneux and Forbes, 1995; Lloyd-Williams
et al., 1994; Hannan, 1991).
Both theories underscore the importance of competition as a determinant of protability.
The studies based on this hypothesis have used market structure indicators such as con-
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centration ratios and market share, to measure the degree of competition and e¢ ciency
respectively within the market.
The SCP hypothesis asserts that increased market power yields monopoly prots and hence
predicts a positive relationship between protability and degree of market concentration.
Similarly, the RMP hypothesis asserts that rms with large market shares use their market
power to extract higher prots. As such, there is a positive relationship between prots
and market share. Contrary to these two market power theories, the EM theory argues
that market concentration may simply be reecting rm-specic e¢ ciencies (Peltzman,
1977; Demsetz, 1973). Firms earn higher prots because they are more e¢ cient, hence they
obtain larger market shares and consequently the market becomes concentrated. Therefore,
rms do not necessarily earn higher prots because they are exploiting market power
associated with high concentration.
In fact, the e¢ cient market hypothesis argues that rms earn higher prots because they
have lower costs. This may be due to either superior management and production tech-
nologies (X-e¢ ciency), or because they produce at more e¢ cient scales than others (Scale
e¢ ciency). Market share and prots will be correlated but without any causal relationship
between prots and concentration (Berger, 1995; Smirlock, 1985). The positive prot-
concentration relationship thus reects a positive correlation between size (market share)
and e¢ ciency.
The competing interpretations of the theoretical predictions of both the market power and
e¢ cient structure hypotheses in banking, prompted researchers to seek empirical consen-
sus. Bourke (1989) and Molyneux and Thornton (1992) argue that increased deviations
from competitive market structures are reected in increased concentration and subsequent
monopoly prots. In other studies, Gibson (2000) and Athanasoglou et al. (2006) conrm
a positive relationship between measures of bank protability and concentration in Greece
and South-Eastern Europe respectively. Using data from 80 developed and developing
countries, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) report that bank concentration ratio has
a positive and signicant impact on bank protability. Chirwa (2001) similarly reports
a signicant relationship between monopoly power and bank protability in Malawi. In
contrast, Smirlock (1985), Berger (1995) and Athanasoglou et al. (2008) nd no evidence
in support of the SCP hypothesis, with results showing a negative relationship between
concentration and protability. To some extent, Smirlock (1985) conrms the RMP hy-
pothesis as they nd evidence of a positive (though weak) relationship between prot and
market share, suggesting that increased market power raises prots.
Regarding the e¢ cient market hypothesis, Berger (1995) reports a positive relationship
between prots and market share as well as between prots and X-e¢ ciency. Smirlock
(1985) also nds a positive relationship between prot and market share. Findings by
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Berger (1995) suggest that e¢ ciency may both raise prots and lead to market share gains
that in turn may increase concentration. Contrary to these ndings, Chirwa (2001) nds
no evidence to support the EM hypothesis in the Malawian banking sector.
5.3.3 Bank prot persistence
The importance of competition in determining prot levels has been emphasized in the lit-
erature on prot persistence rst developed by Mueller (1977). The key argument in this
body of literature is that prots that are earned in one period may persist in the following
periods due to stringent entry restrictions that protect monopoly prots. Convergence of
prots to their average levels is slow to non-existent in heavily controlled markets and high
in liberalised and competitive markets. Ideally, the rate of return for rms in liberalised
markets should tend towards the competitive rate over time thus e¤ectively eliminating ab-
normal prots. Following this pioneering work of Mueller (1977), there is a well established
body of literature on the persistence of prots in the manufacturing and service indus-
tries2 (Glen et al., 2003; Glen et al., 2001; Goddard and Wilson, 1999; Roberts, 1999; War-
ing, 1996). Research that focuses on similar e¤ects of competition on the rate at which
above or below average bank prots subsequently dissipate is scant.
Levonian (1993) reports high levels of prot persistence for banks with supernormal prots
in the US which is attributed to regulations that dampen forces of competition. Goddard
et al. (2004) nd evidence of signicant prot persistence in European banking sectors
despite growth in competition. The degree of persistence is higher in countries with more
regulated banking sectors. Gibson (2000) and Athanasoglou et al. (2008) report the pres-
ence of moderate prot persistence in Greece. In another recent contribution, Goddard
et al. (2011) nd that persistence of prots is positively related to the size of entry barri-
ers and negatively related to GDP per capita growth rate. Similarly Berger et al. (2000)
conrm that barriers to competition have a signicant inuence on the degree of prot per-
sistence. However, Bektas (2007) reports an absence of long run bank prot persistence in
Turkey using data for the period 1989 to 2003. In a cross country study for SSA countries
Flamini et al. (2009) nd moderate persistence of bank prots suggesting a marginal de-
parture from perfectly competitive conditions. Similarly, Biekpe (2011) and Mwega (2011)
nd positive prot persistence in Ghana and Kenya respectively.
2Goddard and Wilson (1999) review evidence on the persistence of prots in non bank rms.
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5.3.4 Bank regulation and protability
Of interest in the prot persistence literature as well as to the current study is how nancial
regulation policies and di¤erent government interventions in general a¤ect bank protabil-
ity. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) nd a negative relationship between variables of
required reserve regulation and bank protability, which may reect banksopportunity
cost to holding reserves. The study also reports a negative relationship between deposit
insurance and net interest margins. Arguably, net interest margins may be signicantly
depressed as banks are more likely to lend money at cheaper rates in the presence of deposit
insurance than they would otherwise.
Zarruk and Madura (1992) similarly nd that an increase in bank capital requirements or
deposit insurance premiums has the e¤ect of reducing bank net interest margins. Contrary
to that, Gonzalez (2005) nds that the presence of deposit insurance in a country has a
positive inuence on bank charter value, while regulatory restrictions on bank activities
have a negative inuence.
Hellmann et al. (1999) argue that use of prudential regulatory measures such as stringent
capital requirements, which often accompany deregulation processes, have the side e¤ect
of depressing bank prot levels and hence franchise values. This partly undermines the
bank risk-taking incentives that the prudential regulatory measures sought to curb in the
rst place.
Athanasoglou et al. (2006) argue that there is lack of a formal verication of the e¤ects of
deregulation on bank protability in the literature. On the one hand, deregulation opens up
nancial sectors to new institutions, and at the same time increase the size of existing ones.
However, the e¤ects of size on bank performance is ambigous. However, Athanasoglou et al.
(2006) report a negative relationship between nancial reform and bank protability. In
a seperate study, Kirkpatrick et al. (2008) acknowledges that nancial liberalisation has
important implications for bank performance in SSA, however, it has not improved prot
and cost X-ine¢ ciency in the banking sectors.
In line with the current study, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998b) use correlation
analysis between measures of bank protability and a dummy variable for nancial market
liberalisation to assess the relationship between liberalisation and bank protability. Whilst
they give interesting results, this study argues that correlation may not necessarily imply
causation. This thesis estimates the causal relationship between nancial liberalisation
and bank protability.
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5.3.5 Summary
The implication of this review is that while theory on bank competition predicts a negative
relationship between concentration and bank prots, the empirical literature suggests dif-
ferent performance (prot) outcomes for both high and low concentrated market structures.
However, evidence from the SSA region is very scant. The few exceptions, however, do not
adequately account for the e¤ects of nancial liberalisation policies. Notwithstanding this,
both theoretical and empirical studies agree that nancial liberalisation has a signicant
impact on competition, market structure, and subsequently bank protability. Regarding
bank protability, high positive prot persistence has been identied with less competitive
markets. Finally, some bank regulations are reported to have a negative impact on bank
protability.
5.4 Estimation strategy
This section presents the model used for the empirical analysis. In addition, this section
discusses the data employed, and gives a description of the variables used in the econometric
analysis.
5.4.1 Model Specication
Research on determinants of bank protability faces three main challenges. The rst chal-
lenge pertains to potential endogenous bias that may arise from some of the protability
determinants. For instance, more protable banks are capable of increasing their equity
and therefore enhance protability. Similarly, more protable banks hire more employ-
ees and incur higher operating expenses and may become less e¢ cient compared to less
protable banks. The second problem is the unobserved heterogeneity which likely arises
from omitted variables and may cause correlations between some explanatory variables
and the error term. Lastly, high persitance in protability implies the inclusion of past
prot levels as regressors in current protability regressions. To address these potential
problems, this study uses a two-step Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimator
developed for dynamic panel models by Arellano and Bond (1991). The GMM estimator
is designed for datasets with many panels and few periods, therefore, it suits this studys
dataset perfectly.
To start with, the general dynamic panel data model is specied as follows:
Yict = + Yic;t 1 + Zic;t + ui + eit (5.9)
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where Yict captures protability for bank i in country c for period t. Yic;t 1 is the one period
lagged protability.  measures the speed of mean-reversion, with values between zero and
one indicating the persistence of prots over time.  close to zero signies competitve
markets, while  close to 1, reects markets with less competition. Zic;t is a vector of
explanatory variables. ui is the unobserved panel e¤ect, and eit is the idiosyncratic error.
In this case Yic;t 1 is not strictly exogenous, it is correlated with the panel e¤ects ui,
hence the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator becomes biased and inconsistent. The
random e¤ects estimator (RE) is biased and inconsistent, while the xed e¤ects estimator
(FE) only becomes consistent as T ! 1. As such, the model is no longer robust to
estimate the determinants of bank protability in this chapter.
The two step GMM is adopted to correct for the errors and bias arising from the unobserved
panel level e¤ects and the lagged dependent variable. The estimator removes the panel
specic heterogeneity e¤ect by rst di¤erencing equation (5.9). However, whereas rst
di¤erencing equation 5.9 eliminates the individual e¤ects ui, it introduces another problem.
The transformed error term, eit eit 1, is correlated with the transformed lagged dependent
variable, yic;t 1   yic;t 2, which is one of the explanatory variables. Thus OLS estimates
in the rst di¤erenced model are inconsistent. Arellano-Bond (1991) propose using lagged
values of the endogenous variables, as well as rst di¤erences of the exogenous variables as
instruments.
The consistency of the two-step GMM estimator depends on the validity of the instruments
as well as on the assumption that the error term does not exhibit any serial correlation. This
study uses two tests proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) to test these assumptions. The
rst test, the Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions, evaluates both the specication
of the model and the validity of the instruments, by analysing the sample analog of the
moment conditions used in the estimation preocedure. The other test is the Arrelano-Bond
test for second order serial correlation. In addition, Bond (2002) notes that asymptotic
standard errors of the two step estimators tend to be too small while t-ratios are too
big compared to equivalent tests for similar sample sizes based on one step estimators.
As a result, this study uses a nite-sample correction for the two step GMM estimator
asymptotic variance provided by Windmeijer (2005).
The empirical model to be estimated is thus:
BPict = + BPic;t 1 + Xic;t + RIMct + ui + eit (5.10)
BPict represents prots for bank i in country c at time t and BPic;t 1 is the one period
lagged protability captured by either ROAA (return on average asset ), ROAE (return on
average equity), or NIM (net interest margin). Xic;t is a vector of bank specic variables,
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while RIMct is a vector of regulatory, institutional and macroeconomic control variables.
ui is the unobserved panel e¤ect, and eit is the idiosyncratic error.  and  are slope
coe¢ cients. A detailed discussion of the variables is presented in the next section.
5.4.2 Data and variable description
Data and data sources
The study is based on data from an unbalanced panel of 144 banks from 25 SSA countries
over the 1996 to 2006 period. Table 5.4.1 presents the variables and data sources that are
used in this chapter. All the annual bank balance sheets and income statement data are
obtained from the Bankscope database. Macroeconomic data is from the World Banks
World Development Indicators and International Financial Statistics from the IMF. Data
on liberalisation variables is drawn from the database by Abiad et al. (2008), and extended
in this study. The database by Beck.et.al (2010) provides microeconomic annual banking
data as well as data on bank concentration levels.
Model variables
The dependant variable
The dependent variable in the econometric model is bank protability. This study considers
banks return on average assets (ROAA), calculated as net prots of average total assets, as
the main measure of bank protability. The second and alternative protability measure
that is employed in this study is return on average equity (ROAE), which captures the
return to shareholders on their equity. Several studies in the literature on bank protability
have used these prot measures and derived econometrically plausible results (See for
instance Flamini et al., 2009; Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Goddard et al., 2004; Demirguc-
Kunt and Huizinga, 1999). In robustness checks, this study employs net interest margin
(NIM), as a proxy for bank performance. Although NIM does not directly measure
bank protability, it is a rough index for bank e¢ ciency, and as such, it can be used as a
performance measure.
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Table 5.4.1: Variables and Data Sources
Variable symbol Variable Discription Source
Protability measures
ROA Return on average assets Bankscope, FSDD*
ROE Return on average equity Bankscope, FSDD
NIM Net interest margin, (interest received -interest paid)/ Bankscope, FSDD
total earning assets
Bank specic measures
Size Logarithm of total assets Bankscope, FSDD
Size2 (Logarithm of total assets)2 Bankscope, FSDD
Capital Equity/total assets Bankscope, FSDD
Cr_risk Credit risk. Net loans/total assets Bankscope
Risk non-performing loans/ total loans Bankscope, FSDD
fown Share of assets of foreign banks in Claessens et.al (2008)**,
total bank asets authorscomputations
Conc Concentration ratio, assets of three FSDD
largest banks/total bank assets
CIR Cost to income ratio Bankscope
Costs log (Bank overhead costs) Bankscope,FSDD
Regulatory, institutional and macroeconomic measures
nref, cr, ent, ir, intk Financial reform index, reform of controls on Abiad et.al, Authors
sup,pvt,secmkt credit, entry, interest rate, capital account, compilation
supervision,privatisation and security markets
complib Competitive liberalisation index
gdppc logarithm of GDP per capita WDI
Gov Governance, index ranging from -2.5 to 2.5 with Kaufmann et.al. 2007
higher values corresponding to better outcomes
Press freedom Freedom of media ranging from 0 to 2 Freedom House
with higher values corresponding to more freedom.
rgdpg Rate of growth of real GDP WDI
infn Rate of change of GDP deator WDI
*FSDD refers to the Financial Structure and Development Database, Beck.et.al (2010)
** Foreign bank has at least 50% foreign ownership, see Claessens et al. (2008).
Bank-specic variables
The logarithm of total assets is included to control for bank size. Banks operating in
nancial sectors with few large banks may earn high prots resulting from e¢ ciency gains
due to economies of scale. As a result, low costs for larger banks allow them to earn higher
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prots as long as competition remains low. A banking system with a few large banks may
also earn high prots by charging high lending rates while maintaining low deposit rates.
However, there is a possibility that size may have a negative impact on prots especially
when banks become too large and bureaucracy cause ine¢ ciency. To capture this nonlinear
relationship, this study uses the logarithm of bankstotal assets (size) and their square
(size2) (See for example Berger et al., 2010; Flamini et al., 2009).
This study uses the ratio of bank equity to total assets to proxy for bank capitalisation
(capital). Well capitalised banks are less prone to bankruptcy costs and lower costs of
capital. Therefore, higher bank equity ratios have a positive impact on bank protability
(see for example Naceur and Omran, 2011; Athanasoglou et al., 2008). However, capital
levels may a¤ect bank protability as a regulatory measure. Higher capital adequacy, as
a regulatory cost, is expected to reduce the amount that banks can invest to earn prots.
In addition, while banks with more capital make more prots, protable banks also invest
in more capital. As such, capital is treated as endogenous in the empirical estimations.
The ratio of net loans to total assets is used to measure bank credit risk (cr_risk). High
credit risk may be associated with high prot levels since riskier loans earn the highest
yields. An alternative measure is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans.
Concentration and ownership
The e¤ect of competition on market structure and hence protability is approximated
by bank concentration ratio (conc). Admittedly, the recent literature on SCP hypothesis
criticises the use of such structural indicators of competition arguing that they have a
weak correlation with competition, for instance, competition can still be present in highly
concentrated markets. Furthermore, concentration seem to have a weak correlation with
protability when measures of market share are included in the regressions. The proposed
non-structural measures such as the Learner and Rose-Panzer indices. However, the com-
putations of these indices requires data that is beyond the scope of this study. Therefore,
despite the cited limitations, this study uses the 3-rm concentration ratio as an indicator
of bank competition.
An increase in competition resulting from nancial liberalisation is expected to reduce
concentration levels. Thus, the measure of concentration reects to a greater extend, regu-
latory restrictions, or alternatively, liberalisation of such restrictions on competition. This
study uses the share of assets of the 3 largest banks in total bank assets to capture con-
centration levels in each country. The SCP hypothesis predicts that banks in concentrated
markets may earn above normal prots compared to the prots that their counterparts
in competitive markets may earn. On the other hand the e¢ cient-structure hypothesis
predicts that more e¢ cient rms earn higher prots, obtain larger market shares, and con-
sequently the market becomes concentrated, as such a measure of e¢ ciency, cost to income
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ratio (cir), is included in some of the regressions.
Overhead costs (costs) are considered to capture the e¤ects of operating expenses. This
variable captures managerial ine¢ ciencies and operating expenses that may erode prots
unless they are passed on to consumers. As such, a negative e¤ect is forecast on the
coe¢ ent for bank costs.
Foreign ownership (fown), measured as a proportion of foreign bank assets in total assets
is considered to be an indicator of foreign penetration and hence measures how open the
banking sector is to competition. An alternative measure of this variable is the total num-
ber of foreign banks as a ratio of total banks in the banking system (fown1). Athanasoglou
et al. (2006) argue that presence of foreign banks renders domestic banks more e¢ cient
due to (1) increase in competition which drives domestic banks to cut costs, (ii) the tech-
nological expertise in risk management and co-orperate governance (ii) the technological
spillovers, brought about by the foreign banks.
Macroeconomic indicators
Real GDP growth (rgdpg) is used as a proxy for economic uctuations. Adverse economic
growth exposes banks to risk. For instance, periods of low economic growth, such as
recessions, adversely a¤ect asset quality, and increase loan defaults and thereby reducing
bank returns. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) nd a positive relationship between
bank protability and business cycle.
Ination (infn) is included to control for macroeconomic volatility as measured by the
change in the GDP deator. High ination rates are usually associated with high loan
rates and hence high bank returns. However, Naceur and Omran (2011) and Flamini et al.
(2009) argue that if agents do not correctly forecast ination, then unexpected changes in
ination could raise costs as banks fail to appropriately adjust interest rates, potentially
decreasing bank prots.
Regulatory and institutional variables
To capture the e¤ects of regulatory reforms on bank protability, the study considers
nancial liberalisation indices finref , a composite index of seven liberalisation policies,
and Complib, an index of competitive liberalisation variables comprising 3 liberalisation
dimensions. These include elimination of restrictions on entry and scope of bank activity,
capital account, and security market policy. Angkinand et al. (2009) and Omori (2006)
argue that restrictions on equity markets, international capital transactions and restrictions
on entry and activity- all have the same e¤ect on the competitive environment in which
banks operate. Athanasoglou et al. (2006) use an index that captures the progress for
liberalisation and institutional reforms of banking sectors in countries in South Eastern
Europe. The study also considers the e¤ects of the seven liberalisation policies and indices
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constructed from these policies. Crgdp, a measure of nancial structure and development,
is also used as an alternative measure for the level of nancial liberalisation.
The logarithm of GDP per capita (lgdppc) controls for the level of economic development
in the country and hence general institutional quality. Press freedom (pressf) as well
as an index for governance (gov) control for the quality of the regulatory environment in
which banks operate. Better institutions are likely to boost competition, as such a good
institutional environment is likely to have a negative impact on bank protability. The
summary statistics of the model variables are presented in table C.0.2 in the appendix.
5.5 Model Estimation and Result Analysis
5.5.1 Correlation analysis
Table 5.5.1 provides a summary of results for correlations between di¤erent prot measures
and nancial liberalisation policies. The rst column outlines the composite liberalisation
index, while the second column reports results pertaining to the competitive liberalisation
index. Columns (3) to (9) present results for the rest of the liberalisation components. Al-
though these results are from simple correlation analysis, they give a preliminary indication
of the relationship between liberalisation and measures of bank protability.
The results show a positive correlation between total liberalisation and return on assets,
although the correlation is not statistically signicant. However, competitive liberalisation
leads to lower bank prots. Similarly, return on equity has a negative relationship with
competitive liberalisation. In fact, all the liberalisation policies except bank supervision
are negatively related to two of the protability measures: return on assets and return on
equity. Conversely, finref , ent, ir and cr all have a positive relationship with net interest
margins. However, the statistical signicance levels are generally weak.
There is a positive and signicant correlation between bank capitalisation and the overall
liberalisation index, removal of stringent entry requirements as well as privatisation. Intu-
itively, nancial liberalisation leads to increased bank capitalisation, which has the e¤ect
of reducing bank prots. This relationship holds when restrictions on entry are removed,
where a greater share of banks in a country are privately-owned, as well as when restrictions
on foreign participation in security markets are minimised.
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Table 5.5.1: Correlation Coe¢ cients: Financial Liberalisation and Franchise Value Indica-
tors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Finref complib ent ir cr sup pvt intk secmkt
ROAA 0.04 -0.08** -0.155* -0.191*** -0.097* 0.06 -0.04 -0.077 0.13***
(0.33) (0.05) (0.014) (0.002) (0.06) (0.16) (0.50) (0.21) (0.00)
ROAE -0.05 -0.03* -0.06 -0.04* -0.04 0.04 0.17*** -0.11** 0.10*
(0.2) (0.01) (0.18) (0.08) (0.29) (0.40) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02)
NIM 0.13* 0.09 0.15* 0.29** -0.17** 0.17** 0.23* -0.12** 0.04
(0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.35)
Capital 0.34*** 0.14* 0.07 0.16** -0.10 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.05*
(0.000) (0.06) (0.12) (0.00) (0.02) (0.20) (0.16) (0.02) (0.02)
Size -0.16*** -0.24*** -0.41** 0.13*** -0.12** 0.17*** -0.25** -0.63*** 0.35
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.37)
Conc -0.183*** -0.50*** -0.45*** -0.36*** 0.01 -0.29*** -0.38*** -0.04 -0.27***
(0.002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.74) (0.00) (0.00) (0.37) (0.00)
f.own 0.27*** -0.03 0.34*** 0.13*** 0.44*** 0.27*** 0.21*** 0.02 -0.44***
(0.00) (0.47) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.62) (0.00)
cr_risk 0.18** 0.06** -0.04 -0.34*** 0.04 -0.31*** -0.22*** 0.31*** -0.26
(0.02) (0.01) 0.36 (0.00) (0.30) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pearson correlation coe¢ cients are reported. P-Values in parentheses
* ,** and ***means sig at 10%,5% &1% respectively
The results suggest that total liberalisation and bank privatisation are associated with
lower bank concentration ratios though with greater foreign participation. Increasing en-
try by foreign players alters market structures from being monopolistic to competitive.
Consequently, franchise values are reduced as a result of a decline in monopoly prots.
The positive coe¢ cient on the size variable, though weakly signicant on the liberalisation
index, seem to suggest that deregulation may promote mergers or conglomerates that make
high prot margins from scale e¢ ciency. The other correlations are not signicant.
Overall, these results are consistent with Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998b) ndings,
although their focus is on interest rate liberalisation only.
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5.5.2 Dynamic panel model estimation results
Table 5.5.2 presents results from estimating the model in equation (5.10)3. The Wald
tests for the di¤erent regressions report statistics that reject the null hypothesis of joint
insignicance of parameters. This conrms that the estimated models t the data well.
Tests for rst and second order serial correlation are conducted to check the reliability of the
model estimates. Arellano and Bond (1991) note that if the eit are serially un-correlated in
equation (5.9) then the rst di¤erenced residuals show rst order serial correlation but not
second order serial correlation. This is conrmed by the Arellano-Bond test that rejects
the null hypothesis of no rst order autocorrelation in rst di¤erenced errors. The results
show no second order serial correlation which conrms that the moment conditions used
to identify parameters are valid. Thus, there is no evidence of model mis-specications.
The Sargan tests reports insignicant chi-square for all the 8 regressions reported in Table
5.5.2, indicating that the overidentifying restrictions are valid.
Financial liberalisation, competition and bank protability
Table 5.5.2 reports mixed results on the relationship between measures of nancial liber-
alisation (finref , complib, and crgdp), and bank protability. Columns (2) and (5) show
a negative and signicant relationship between complib and bank return on assets and
return on equity respectively. This seems to suggest that as competition intensies, banks
face declining returns. This result concurs with that presented by Athanasoglou et al.
(2006), who note that banks in highly competitive environments may lend to riskier port-
folios characterised by low returns. Furthermore, this result is consistent with ndings by
Koeva (2003) that increase in competition following nancial liberalisation lowers spreads
and protability in Indian banks. The current result is further substantiated by results
presented in columns (2) and (6), which show a negative relationship between crgdp and
bank ROAA and ROAE respectively. The ratio of domestic credit to GDP is used as an
alternative proxy for nancial liberalisation.
By contrast, the coe¢ cient on total nancial liberalisation bears a positive sign, albeit not
statistically signicant for both measures of bank protability (columns 1 and 4). This
seems to suggest that nancial liberalisation in total may increase bank returns. A possible
explanation for this result may be that as nancial systems adopt liberalisation policies,
initial competition may force them to take on risky portfolios that yield high returns.
However, the risky portfolios may yield less return later on as competition intensies. In
addition, high levels of competition may increase e¢ ciency which in turn increase prot
levels
3Year dummy variables included to account for potential unobservable time e¤ects were generally not
statistically signicant, hence were dropped from the nal estimations.
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Table 5.5.2: Financial Liberalisation and Bank Protability:Two-step GMM Estimation
Results
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ROAA_1 0.25*** 0.24** 0.27*** 0.28***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.04) 0.08
ROAE_1 0.19*** 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.30**
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 0.07
Capital 0.08* 0.16** 0.08** -0.85** -0.72* 0.14** 0.13* -0.41*
(0.07) (0.08) (0.16) (0.43) 0.40 (0.09) 0.08 0.16
Cr_risk 0.15*** 0.19** 0.14** 0.16 0.14* 0.55 0.09* 0.14**
(0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.19) (0.09) (0.56) 0.04 0.07
Costs -2.8** -2.74*** -2.9*** -2.2*** -1.9** -2.0* -2.20*** -1.60**
(0.8) (0.89) (0.9) (0.71) (0.60) (0.70) 0.88 0.60
Size 2.3*** 4.21* 5.02** -1.3* -0.45* -0.40 -1.39*** 2.1*
(1.5) (2.21) (2.5) (0.37) (0.36) (0.30) 0.30 0.30
Size2 -0.28* -0.34* -0.29* 0.10* 0.40* 0.22* -0.35** 0.69**
(0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.04) (0.2) (0.07) 0.17 0.21
gdpg 0.13*** 0.07** 0.11*** 1.17** 1.21** 0.08** 0.10*** 0.26***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.57) (0.53) (0.04) 0.04 0.10
Infn 0.03** 0.01** 0.03** 0.23** 0.21** 0.18** 0.03** 0.17*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) 0.01 0.09
Conc -0.85 -1.6 -5.6 -0.40 -0.49 -0.6 -1.11 -0.36
(0.58) (0.57) (2.8) (0.35) (0.38) (0.4) 0.56 0.30
Finref 0.46 0.18
(0.22) (1.8)
Complib -0.24** -0.31* -0.42** -0.17***
(0.08) (0.10) 0.13 0.05
Crgdp -0.14*** -0.34*
(0.05) (0.09)
fown -0.07 -0.05 -0.08 0.16* 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.08
(0.04) 0.04 (0.04) (0.46) (0.61) (0.07) 0.04* 0.07
gdppc 0.63** 0.71** 0.68** 0.56* 0.70* 0.40* 0.38** 0.53**
(0.15) 0.21 (0.19) (0.21) (0.23) (0.20) 0.17 0.32
pressf -0.22 -0.34 -0.72 -0.18 0.15 -0.20 -0.45 -0.23
(1.4) (1.33) (1.3) (0.11) (0.38) (0.30) 1.06 0.14
gov -0.16 -0.41 0.18 -0.11 -0.20 0.10 -0.11 -0.01
(1.06) (1.40) (1.35) (1.55) (0.39) (0.31) 0.86 0.18
cir -0.04** -0.14**
0.01 0.08
Wald Chi2()1 124.01*** 101.18*** 100.12*** 134.45*** 104.25*** 145.11*** 169.14*** 180.11***
AR(1)2 -3.06*** -2.62** -2.6*** -2.4** -3.2*** -3.0*** -2.65** -3.7**
AR(2)3 0.40 0.18 0.31 0.3 1.10 0.21 -0.35 -0.9
Sargan Test4 112 107 112 114 111 107 101 99
Windmeijer-Corrected robust standard errors in parentheses;*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1 Wald statistic: H0 All coe¢ cients are zero.
2,3 AR(1) and AR(2) tests for 1st and 2nd-order autocorrelation, H0 No autocorrelation of residuals
4 Sargan Test of overidentifying restrictions: H0 Overidentifying restrictions are valid
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E¤ects of individual liberalisation policies
Table C.0.3 in the appendix presents results pertaining to the e¤ects of individual liber-
alisation policies on bank protability4. Contrary to theoretical predictions, the result in
column (1), though not statistically signicant, suggest that removal of controls on credit
allocation has a negative e¤ect on bank protability. Directed credit policies are expected
to reduce bank protability given that banks are forced to charge below-market clearing
interest rates for loans to priority sectors. As such, removal of such controls is expected
to have a positive e¤ect on bank protability. A possible explanation for this unexpected
result may be that removal of directed lending requires new standards of credit and risk
management for banks which imposes some cost on banks. Together with other operating
expenses, such costs negatively a¤ect bank prots.
Columns (2) and (3) show a negative and statistically signicant relationship between re-
moval of entry and interest rate controls and bank protability. This suggests that as more
players enter the market, the competitive pressure increases, and this forces banks to o¤er
increasingly competitive margins on loans and deposits, thereby lowering bank protabil-
ity. This result is comparable to ndings by Keeley (1990) that removal of entry barriers
has a negative inuence on bank performance ratios. In addition, Goddard et al. (2011)
suggest that bank prots are low in banking sectors with less strict entry requirements.
Similarly, Koeva (2003) nds that entry deregulation is associated with decline in bank
protability in India.
Reforms in prudential regulation and bank supervision signicantly increase bank prof-
itability. This result supports observations that most banks in SSA economies with weak
regulatory structures face large numbers of irrecoverable loans as they have little or no
recourse against delinquent borrowers (Brownbridge and Harvey, 1998). Therefore, im-
proving regulatory institutions e¤ectively reduces non-performing loans and strengthens
bank balance sheets.
Table C.0.3 column (5) presents positive and signicant results on the relationship be-
tween privatisation of former state-banks and bank protability. This result is in line
with observations made by Brownbridge and Harvey (1998) that state owned banks in a
majority if liberalising African countries perform dismally compared to privately owned
banks. This result therefore suggests that privatisation of previous loss-making state-
owned banks improves their performance. This concurs with ndings in Boubakri et al.
(2005) that protability increases in post-liberalisation periods for privatised banks in 22
developing countries across the world. Furthermore, Beck et al. (2005) nd evidence of
improved perfomance in nine privatised banks in Nigeria.
4For results presented in Table C.0.3, protability is measured by ROAA. Results obtained from using
bank return on equity are not signicantly di¤erent and hence are not reported.
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With regard to capital account liberalisation and reforms in securities markets (columns 6
and 7), these policies have the e¤ect of reducing bank prots. While the e¤ect of removal of
controls on international capital movement is insignicant, liberalisation of security market
policies has a signicant e¤ect. Stock market development and lowering barriers to inter-
national investment are expected to enhance bank perfomance through their positive e¤ect
on economic development and hence rm perfomance. However, the negative results seem
to support the argument provided by Angkinand et al. (2009) that relaxing restrictions
on these two policies has the same impact on the competitive environment in the banking
sector. The stock market o¤ers an alternative nancing option for rms. Thus, increased
competition has the e¤ect of reducing bank margins and protability.
E¤ects of market concentration
Regarding, the e¤ect of concentration, the empirical results presented in Table 5.5.2 sug-
gest a negative but insignicant e¤ect of market concentration n both measures of bank
protability. Perhaps this suggests that high concentration levels in SSA banking systems
do not necessarily indicate low competition. Instead, pr sence of competition in concen-
trated markets lowers bank protability through reduction in loan rates or increase in
deposit rates.
If the measure of concentration in this study reects the level of regulatory restrictions
on competition, then controlling for nancial liberalisation policies that had e¤ects on
competition and hence concentration levels justies the negative coe¢ cient on conc. In
addition, Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2003) argue that any positive relationship between bank
concentration and bank margins is expected to vanish once regulations pertaining to entry
and actitvity restrictions are controlled for. This outcome is consistent with Berger (1995)
who posits that once institutional and regulatory variables are controlled for, concentration
is negatively related with protability. However, Flamini et al. (2009) nd no signicant
relationship between market concentration measures and bank protability in SSA banking
sectors.
Studies that report a negative relationship between concentration and bank protability
justify their results based on bank e¢ ciency. Higher operational e¢ ciency may induce
e¢ cient banks (facing lower costs) to charge low loan rates and o¤er high deposit rates, and
as a result incur low net interest margins. As such, higher e¢ ciency can be associated with
low protability. To verify this explanation, a measure of bank e¢ ciency, cost to income
ratio (cir) is included in the regression. The results are presented in columns (7) and (8) of
Table 5.5.25. The coe¢ cient on cir is negative and signicant when using either measure
5Using either finref or crgdp as measures of nancial liberalisation does not produce signicantly
di¤erent results.
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of bank protability. This seems to suggest that improvements in e¢ ciency are translated
into improvements in protability. Therefore, the outcome on cir does not render support
for the "high e¢ ciency-low prot" theory in SSA banking systems. However, Naceur and
Omran (2011) reports a negative and signicant relationship between bank concentration,
e¢ ciency, and protability in MENA countries.
Bank specic variables and protability
The coe¢ cient on lagged protability is positive and signicant in all the regressions pre-
sented in Table 5.5.2 ranging from 0.19 to 0.30. This conrms the dynamic character of
the model specied in this chapter. Furthermore, the size of the coe¢ cients suggests mod-
erate persistence in bank prots, and hence marginal departure from perfectly competitive
system.
The value of the coe¢ cient on lagged prots measured by return on assets is higher in
regressions for individual liberalisation policies compared to regressions on total liberali-
sation (finref) and competitive liberalisation (complib). For instance, when considering
removal of credit controls only, the coe¢ cient is 0.27 as shown in Table C.0.3 compared to
0.25 and 0.24 shown in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5.5.2, where the measure of nancial
reform is the total liberalisation and competitive liberalisation indices respectively. This
suggests that persistence levels are negatively related to comprehensive levels of nancial
liberalisation.
Overall, the results on the lagged dependent variables in all regressions are consistent with
ndings by Goddard et al. (2011) that prot persistence is positively related to the size of
entry barriers. Goddard et al. (2004) similarly nd high persistence in prots for countries
where high levels of government regulation seem to have insulated banks from competition.
Similar results were also found by Biekpe (2011), Mwega (2011) and Flamini et al. (2009)
for banks in Ghana, Kenya and SSA countries respectively.
The e¤ect of the capital variable depends on whether protability is measured in terms
of return on assets or on equity. In the rst scenario, columns (1) to (3) in Table 5.5.2
report a positive and signicant relationship between return on assets and the ratio of
equity to total assets, the variable for bank capital. This result suggests that banks that
hold more capital have more opportunities to increase investment in earning assets, hence
protable returns. Furthermore, this agrees with the assertion that banks with a higher
equity to total asset ratio have fewer external funding needs, and hence fewer costs related
to external debt. In addition, the literature posits that highly capitalised banks are safer
(more solvent), and remain protable even during economic downturns. This is consistent
with ndings by Trujillo-Ponce (2011), Athanasoglou et al. (2006), Goddard et al. (2004),
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and Bourke (1989). Demsetz et al. (1996) also report that banks with high charters hold
more capital. On the other hand, bank capital has a negative e¤ect on protability of bank
equity. This result implies that banks with more equity have less return on equity. This
may be explained by the fact that returns for banks holding more capital are spread over a
wider capital base. Furthermore, Trujillo-Ponce (2011) notes that the inverse relationship
between the equity to asset ratio (capital) and return on equity reects a decrease in
bank leverage levels since ROE can be decomposed as ROA  1=(Equity=Total assets).
Therefore, the inverse relationship does not reect a decrease in wealth arising from the
capital invested. This result is consistent with ndings by Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011).
The coe¢ cient of credit risk is generally positive and signicant. This is consistent with
assertions that banks ask for high premiums for investments in perceived high risk assets.
Naceur and Omran (2011) similarly nd a positive relationship between credit risk and net
interest margins for banks in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region.
On the other hand, overhead costs present a negative and signicant impact on protability
of either bank assets or equity. This result suggests that high costs in SSA banks have the
e¤ect of eroding bank prots.
The empirical results pertaining to the e¤ect of bank size show a positive and signicant
e¤ect of bank size on bank return on assets. The implication is that big banks benet from
e¢ ciency gains as well as the relative degree of market power that they have. Furthermore,
big banks are able to engage in a wider scope of income generating activities. This result
is consistent with ndings reported by Athanasoglou et al. (2006). The negative, though
weakly signicant coe¢ cients on size2 (columns (1) to 3) suggest that the impact of size
on bank return on assets is non-linear. The results in columns (4) to (6) suggest that
large banks are less protable when considering return on equity. However this e¤ect is
statistically not signicant.
Macroeconomic and institutional variables and bank protability
Most of the macroeconomic variables have expected signs and are generally signicant.
Real GDP growth shows a positive impact on bank prots. Ination has a positive and
signicant e¤ect on bank protability as expected.
GDP per capita, a proxy for institutional development, has a positive and signicant e¤ect
on bank protability. This relationship suggests that banks in developed economies earn
more prots compared to their counterparts in developing economies with poor institutional
structures. Banks in poor economies maybe susceptible to loan defaults and hence low
prots. This may be aggravated by weak contract enforcements which are typical in such
countries. The other institutional measures, press freedom and quality of governance, are
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insignicant in determining bank prots in SSA. Flamini et al. (2009) use a Corruption
Perception Index and Ease-of-doing Business Index to proxy the legal environment in SSA
and nd that they both have no signicant impact on bank protability. Lastly, foreign
ownership of banks in SSA does not have any signicant e¤ect on protability.
5.5.3 Robustness checks
This study performs several tests to conrm the main empirical results of this chapter.
Firstly, the study employs NIM as the dependent variable. The results presented in Table
C.0.4 in the appendix do not di¤er much from the ones reported previously. One notable
exception is the positive coe¢ cient on the variable for market concentration, conc in col-
umn (2). Although the coe¢ cient is statistically not signicant at the 5% level, the result
suggests that concentrated markets earn higher margins as suggested by the SCP theory.
In addition, together with the negative and signicant coe¢ cient on cir, the result suggest
that the increase in protability in concentrated markets maybe a result of improved e¢ -
ciency. Higher e¢ ciency (low cir) translates to high protability, resultantly, e¢ cient and
protable banks may gain market share and hence the market becomes concentrated. Oth-
erwise the coe¢ cient on cir remains negative and insignicant in the other 3 specications,
conrming our earlier results.
Another exception is the positive coe¢ cient on the cost variable. This result suggests that
bank net interest margins increase with overhead expenses. As such, banks in SSA pass
on most of their overhead costs to customers through higher spreads. On the other hand,
wider margins are usually associated with riskier loans which entail high monitoring costs.
The size of the coe¢ cients on lagged values of net interest margins are larger (as high as
0.53) than those on lagged return on assets as well as equity. This suggests that prot
persistence is higher for net interest margins than for return on assets and equity. The
implication of this result is that there is less competition using interest rates, probably
suggesting that interest rates are not completely liberalised in SSA banking systems.
The nancial liberalisation variables have negative and signicant coe¢ cients. This con-
rms the results reported previously, that nancial liberalisation causes banks to o¤er
increasingly competitive margins on loans and deposits, which in turn reduces bank prof-
itability.
Secondly, the study estimates a linear regression model in the spirit of Bourke (1989) and
Athanasoglou et al. (2006). Results presented in Table C.0.5 conrm that the Hausman
test rejects the null hypothesis that the coe¢ cients between xed e¤ects and random
e¤ects are not systematic, weighing in support for the xed e¤ects model. In addition
the Breusch-Pagan LM test conrms the presence of xed e¤ects in the data, as such this
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study estimates a xed e¤ects model in place of the dynamic panel model to check if the
results are sensitive to the estimation technique.
Table C.0.5 in the appendix present the results from estimating the linear model apply-
ing the least squares methods of xed e¤ects. The reported results agree to a greater
extend with those presented earlier. Regarding bank specic characteristics, the results
still mantain that bank size, capital, and credit risk positively a¤ect bank protability
while overhead costs and ine¢ ciency have negative e¤ects. Macroeconomic growth and
stabilty similarly have positive e¤ects while measures of institutional environment do not
have signicant e¤ects. Of interest, the index for total liberalisation exerts no inuence,
while competitive libelisation index as well as ratio of private sector credit to GDP both
reduce bank protability. Finally, foreign ownership, as well as market concentration do
not have any inuence on bank protability.
5.6 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter investigated the determinants of bank protability in SSA, accounting for the
e¤ects of nancial liberalisation policies. A majority of SSA countries implemented nan-
cial liberalisation policies in varying degrees over the past few decades, which signicantly
a¤ected the market structures banks operated in. A survey of the literatute highlights
that research on the impact of these reforms on bank performance has focused mostly on
developed countries, emerging markets, and developing countries outside SSA. This has
left a knowledge gap regarding the protability of SSA banks following implementation of
a wide array of liberalisation policies.
This chapter uses annual bank and country level data in 25 SSA countries to assess the
extent to which seven liberalisation policies, (and indices constructed from these seven
policies) and market structure determine bank protability. The main protability measure
employed in the econometric analysis is return on average assets, while return on average
equity is employed as an alternative protability measure. The analysis covers the 1996 to
2006 period and controls for bank specic, macroeconomic as well as institutional factors.
The study tests the hypothesis that liberalisation policies have a negative impact on the
levels of bank protability. The results from correlation analysis among di¤erent liber-
alisation components and measures of bank protability, generally show a negative and
signicant relationship. Specically, competitive liberalisation, removal of entry barriers,
interest rate and credit controls are negatively correlated with bank protability measures.
The results from the correlation analysis are substantiated by regression results from a
dynamic panel model in a two step GMM framework. The results a¢ rm that the extent
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of nancial liberalisation in di¤erent nancial markets provides one of the most important
explanations for bank returns in the region. While the variable for total liberalisation does
not seem to have any explanatory power for bank protability per se, the one for com-
petitive liberalisation policies suggests a negative impact on bank protability. Pertaining
to individual liberalisation dimensions- removal of controls on entry, interest rates, and
security market policies signicantly decrease bank returns. On the other hand reforms
directed at prudential regulation and bank supervision, and bank privatisation signicantly
increase bank returns.
Regarding bank specic variables, the results conrm that higher ine¢ ciency has a negative
inuence on bank protability in SSA. As such, countries that liberalised their nancial
sectors targetting to improve e¢ ciency would expect improvements in bank protability
as well. The results also conrm low prot persistence which suggests signicant levels
of competition in the banking sectors in SSA. Bank capitalisation signicantly increases
bank return on assets. In addition, credit risk signicantly increases bank returns, while
bank overhead costs have an e¤ect of eroding bank prots. The e¤ect of bank size on
protability is non-linear.
Finally, real GDP growth, GDP per capita, and ination all have positive e¤ects on bank
prots. Bank concentration, foreign ownership and the legal and institutional environment,
do not appear to have any explanatory power for bank protability.
The results obtained when using return on equity as well as net interest margin as the
dependent variables conrm the key results from using return on assets as the measure
of bank protability. Finally, the results from the main model are not sensitive to the
estimation techniques employed. Estimating a xed e¤ects model gives similar results.
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Chapter 6
Financial Liberalisation, Franchise
Value and Banking Crises in Sub
Saharan Africa
6.1 Introduction
One of the key ndings of the theoretical literature on bank regulation is that nancial
sector reforms lead to more stable banking systems. Financial liberalisation brings sta-
bility to the banking sectors by promoting competition which enables diversication of
bank portfolios and adoption of advanced risk-management standards (World Develop-
ment Report, 2002; Demirguc-Kunt et al., 1998). Some researchers have found empirical
evidence in support of this liberalisation-stability hypothesis (Boyd et al., 2006; Boyd and
De Nicolo, 2005).
However, another body of research supports the liberalisation-fragility hypothesis that links
high incidences of banking crises to nancial liberalisation through increased competition
and reduction of bank prots (Berger et al., 2009; Hellmann et al., 2000; Keeley, 1990).
The previous chapter of this thesis suggests that nancial liberalisation has a negative
e¤ect on bank prot, which transmits to lowering capitalised values of expected future
prots (franchise or charter value). Franchise value serves as a self regulatory device
by discouraging banks from engaging in high risk bahaviour. Therefore, banks with low
charter values may branch into riskier lines of business, since what they stand to lose, in
the event of bank failure, is lower compared to banks with a high charter value.
A bank franchise can originate either externally from the market within which the banks
operate (market-related) or from within the banking system (bank related) (Demsetz et al.,
1996). Market-related bank franchise is made valuable by: (i) regulations that limit the
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supply of bank charters through restricting the number of bank licences and (ii) various
regulations that limit inter-bank competition as well as competition by non-bank rms.
As such, anti-competitive laws that exist in controlled nancial markets allow banks to
earn supernormal prots and hence acquire high franchise values. However, with nancial
liberalisation, franchise values decrease while opportunities for risky investment increase.
Banks with low franchise values have higher expected rate of return from taking risk than
those with high franchise values. The latter would therefore only have an incentive to hold
a more risky portfolio if the value of their franchise decreases relative to the rate of return
on the risky portfolio.
Bank-related franchise values arise from e¢ ciency di¤erences amongst banks and variations
in the value of lending relationships established by banks. In this case the value of the
franchise is increased by banks serving their clients e¢ ciently and establishing long-term
relationships with them. As a result banks gain informational advantage over other banks
and hence generate informational rents (Demsetz et al., 1996). As long as banks appro-
priate at least part of these rents, they have an incentive to limit their risk exposure and
continue to enjoy the value of the relationship. However, as competition increases, banks
are inclined to reduce expenditure on establishing client relations in a bid to sustain their
prots (Besanko and Thakor, 1995). As a result, they face reduction in the rents, and in
incentives to hold safe portfolios .
Notably, both market and bank-related sources of bank franchise are more valuable in
heavily regulated nancial sectors. The goal of this chapter is to empirically test if the
link between nancial liberalisation and banking crises is accounted for by changes in
bank franchise value. The hypothesis for this chapter is that liberalisation of nancial
markets in SSA countries severed the importance of bank franchise values, discouraged
bank prudent behaviour, and increased the probability of banking crises occurring. To
test this hypothesis, this chapter rst considers an indicator for the e¤ect of nancial
liberalisation on bank protability (which is the coe¢ cient of the nancial liberalisation
variable, from regressing liberalisation on bank prots). This indicator expresses the extent
of reduction in franchise value due to nancial liberalisation policies. The predicted values
of this indicator are then included as one of the regressors in an ordered logit model for
the likelihood of having a banking crisis. The ordered logit model is ideal given that the
dependent variable, banking crises, can be categorised into one of the three states; no crisis,
non-systemic crisis, and systemic crisis.
The empirical results conrm that some liberalisation policies signicantly increase the
probability of banking crises through reduction in franchise values. In robustness checks,
a negative and signicant relationship between banking crises and both observed and fore-
casted franchise value further conrms the e¤ects of franchise value on bank stability. This
e¤ect is however minimal in countries with e¤ective prudential supervisory structures and
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well developed legal institutions.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 outlines the stylised facts
on liberalisation, bank protability and banking sector fragility. An overview of previous
reserch is outlined in section 6.3, while 6.4 presents the data and model specication.
Section 6.5 discusses the empirical results, while section 6.6 presents robustness checks.
Section 6.7 presents a summary of ndings and conclusions drawn from this chapter.
6.2 Financial Liberalisation, Bank Prots and Fragility
Patterns
Figure 6.1 depicts the relationship between bank fragility and protability measures for
countries in the study sample. Bank z-score is the ratio of the sum of return on assets
and capital to asset ratio, to the standard deviation of return on assets. As such it gives
the number of standard deviations by which bank return on assets have to fall to wipe
out bank equity and cause the bank to become insolvent (Beck et al., 2009). By assuming
that prots follow a normal distribution, it can be shown that z-score is the inverse of the
probability of insolvency. Therefore, higher values of the z-score imply more stable banks.
Figure 6.1: Bank Prot Measures and Bank Fragility
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Source: Author's calculations based on Financial Structure Data by Beck,et.al (2010) and Bankscope
Zscore is scaled down by 10. Data is for 26 SSA countries
Figure 6.1 shows that bank prots have increased from the early 1990s until around 1999,
and have been on a decline since then. On the other hand, bank z-scores exhibit a declining
trend and signicant volatility over the period 1990 to 2006. The implication is that bank
stability has worsened over the past two decades. Periods marked by high prot levels also
have high z-scores, and vice-versa. The trends for both bank z-scores and prots, seem to
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suggest that high prots are associated with low solvent ratios, which is reected by stable
banking systems.
6.3 Literature Review
Studies on the link between liberalisation, competition, bank risk-taking and banking crises
show two competing views; a liberalisation-stability view which suggests that banks take
more risk in concentrated markets and a liberalisation-fragility view which provides a
counter argument that bank stability decreases with increase in competition1.
Liberalisation-stability view
This strand of the literature provides evidence of a positive relationship between market
concentration and bank risk-taking (De Nicolo et al., 2007; De Nicolo and Loukoianova,
2007; Boyd et al., 2006; Boyd and De Nicolo, 2005; De Nicolo, 2000). Boyd and De Ni-
colo (2005) introduce theoretical models that allow competition in both deposit and loan
markets. In their model, market power in concentrated markets results in higher interest
rates that are charged on business loans. High interest rates foster increases in credit risk
for borrowers as a result of moral hazard and adverse selection problems. The consequent
increase in rm default risk could lead to high non-performing loans and greater bank
instability. In other studies Boyd et al. (2006), De Nicolo et al. (2007) and De Nicolo
and Loukoianova (2007) nd a positive and signicant relationship between bank concen-
tration and bank risk of failure implying that increased competition does not necessarily
lead to unstable banking systems. Using data from 21 industrialized countries, De Nicolo
(2000) shows that bank return on assets decreases with size and that large banks facing
low competition usually take high risks and have higher returns.
There is also a theoretical explanation for the positive relationship between competition
and bank stability. Regulators in concentrated markets are overly concerned about bank
failures. As such, they adopt too-big-to fail policies that tend to provide large subsidies
to banks. Such subsidies however enhance risk-taking incentives. It is further argued that
large banks in concentrated markets may be too complex to supervise. As a result, these
banks tend to indulge in high risk activities (Berger et al., 2004).
1Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) reviews empirical literature on the relationship between competition and
risk in banking.
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Liberalisation-fragility view
Literature pertaining to the liberalisation-fragility view has been reviewed in detail in
Chapter 4 of this thesis, therefore, this section gives a summary of that review. Financial
liberalisation leads to nancial instability because of either of two factors. (i) Financial
liberalisation erodes increases competition and previously earned monopoly prots that
prior to liberalisation, served as an incentive for prudent bank behavior. (ii) Inadequate
supervisory capacities translate to failure to monitor nancial institutions. Several studies
nd evidence to support these assertions (Berger et al., 2009; Gonzalez, 2005; Allen and
Gale, 2004; Hellmann et al., 2000; Hellmann et al., 1999; Demsetz et al., 1996; Matutes
and Vives, 1996; Keeley, 1990).
Gan (2004) investigates the relationship between bank franchise value and a measure of
market concentration dened as log (1+number of thrifts) in Texas. The study shows that
market concentration is positively related to franchise value. Furthermore, the study gives
evidence that the propensity of thrifts to increase risk is negatively related to franchise
value.
Regarding bank-related franchise value, Bauer and Ryser (2004) investigate the impact
of depository rents on bank risk-taking. The study nds that banks with some degree of
monopolistic power or with valuable lending relationships take less risk. Similarly, Chan
et al. (1986) suggest that increased competition erodes the surplus prots that banks earn
through identifying high quality borrowers. The fall in bank franchise value then leaves
banks with fewer incentives to screen their potential borrowers and hence the overall loan
quality declines. These studies however do not investigate the link between the levels of
franchise value and occurrence of banking crises.
Observations from the literature
As the debate on whether nancial liberalisation and competition enhance bank fragility
or not continues, the question that remains unanswered, at least empirically, is how this
e¤ect is precisely transmitted to the actual occurrence of banking crises. In other words,
the channel through which the positive or negative link is attained has not been empirically
veried, more so in SSA. One of the few exceptions is the work of Schaeck and Cihak (2010)
who present evidence of a positive link between competition and bank soundness via the
bank e¢ ciency channel for European and US banks. The study employs a competition
indicator developed by Boone (2008) to draw inferences on the e¤ects of competition on
e¢ ciency and then link the derived competition indicator to measures of bank soundness.
The thrust of the current study is similar to the work of Schaeck and Cihak (2010) except
that this study focuses on franchise value as the channel linking liberalisation to banking
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crises.
Contributions by Keeley (1990) and Gonzalez (2005) are also closely related to the current
study. Keeley (1990) nds evidence of a negative inuence of liberalisation on bank charter
value and bank risk taking behaviour in the US banking industry. The study by Gonzalez
(2005) conrms that the e¤ect of regulatory restrictions on bank risk-taking incentives
depends on the impact of these restrictions on franchise value.
The current study di¤ers from previous studies in the following ways. The variable used
by Gonzalez (2005) to dene regulatory restrictions refers to freedom of banks to engage in
securities, insurance and real estate activities. This is equivalent to elimination of activity
restrictions in the context of the current study. On the other hand, liberalisation variables
used by Keeley (1990) relate to reforms in the US laws governing state branching, multi-
bank holding company and interstate expansion. The current study considers measures
of liberalisation that track the presence of restrictions along seven aspects of the nancial
system. As already highlighted, these measures capture and reect the extent and level of
liberalisation; the actual types of restrictions that existed or have been abolished; policy
reversals and the implementation rate. Furthermore, this study considers the impact of
these liberalisation policies on franchise value but, most importantly, on the actual oc-
currence of both systemic and non-systemic banking crises instead of measures of bank
risk-taking. By so doing, this study allows for a clear examination of the severity of the
e¤ects of franchise value on banks which could lead to banking crises.
6.3.1 Conceptual Framework
The majority of studies that nd a positive link between liberalisation and banking sector
stability point to reduction in franchise value as a source of imprudent bank behaviour.
This section reviews a simplied theoretical framework for this link following the work
of Weisbrod et al. (1992)2. The framework illustrates why incentives for banks to take
on more risk increase when banks hold less valuable charters. The model is described as
follows:
Consider an economy with 2 banks
Assume an economy with 2 banks, X and Y in the banking industry with a government
guaranteed insurance scheme. The banksinsurance costs are una¤ected by the risks they
take. This assumption is not abstract especially in the context of SSA countries with
government implicit insurance schemes3. Bank X accepts deposits and issues out loans.
2This section draws signicantly from Weisbrod et al. (1992).
3Under implicit insurance, governments rescue failing deposit-taking institutions in the absence of an
explicit statutory obligation on the part of government to protect depositors.
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Bank Y has some investment in payments business and assume that the bank earns some
positive fees from the investment per annum.
Both banks receive the same amount of deposits, Pd in current period t which is all given
out as loans Pl, hence:
Pd = Pl (6.1)
The loans are funded by the deposits, which are fully insured by the government.
Assuming an interest rate of 0:5 per period, then the future value of loans given out in
period t is 1:5Pl;t in period t + 1 in the event that the loans are repaid and 0 in the case
of loan default i.e.
Pl;t+1 =
(
1:5Pl;t
0
if
loans are fully serviced
loans are not serviced
(6.2)
Period 1 BanksExpected Gains
In period 1, Bank X has no equity, since the only assets for this bank are Pl that are being
funded by Pd: However, Bank X has an expected gain realised from the issued loans, Pl:
(1; 5Pl;t   Pd) (6.3)
On the other hand, Bank Y has an equity equal to Ey representing the value of the income
stream from its investment. Thus it has expected gains from the issued loans and an income
stream from the investment. Assume the discounted value of the yearly cashow from the
income stream Bank Y earns is Ey, then the banks expected gain is
Ey + (1; 5Pl;t   Pd) (6.4)
First period banks balance sheets are illustrated in (6.5)
Bank X
Assets Liabilities
loans Pl;t Deposits Pd
Bank Y
Assets Liabilities
loans Pl;t Deposits Pd
Investment Ey Equity E
*
y
* N.B Pl = Pd
(6.5)
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Banksequity: assuming full loan repayments
Assuming that the risky loans issued by the banks are fully serviced, Bank X realises some
equity equivalent to the expected gain, in equation (6.3), of (1; 5Pl;t   Pd). On the other
hand, bank Y has an increase in its original equity of (1; 5Pl;t Pd); thus has a total equity
equivalent to Ey+(1; 5Pl;t Pd): The balance sheets for the two banks are as shown in 6.6.
Bank X
Assets Liabilities
Loans 1; 5Pl;t Deposits Pd
Equity (1:5Pl;t   Pd)
Bank Y
Assets Liabilities
Loans 1; 5Pl;t Deposits Pd
Investment Ey Equity (1; 5Pl;t + Ey)  Pd
(6.6)
Losses resulting from loan defaults.
If the loans are not paid o¤, then both bank X and Y realise a loss of the total loan
amount Pl;t which would have been wholly funded by deposits Pd. The balance sheets are
as shown in table 6.7.
Bank X
Assets Liabilities
Loans 0 Deposits Pd
Equity  Pd
Bank Y
Assets Liabilities
Loans 0 Deposits Pd
Investment Ey Equity Ey   Pd
(6.7)
In the event of loan loss, Bank X has a negative equity, which happens to be a liability of
the deposit insurance scheme. Bank Y has reduced equity compared to the rst period.
Bank Y has not only lost the loan amount, but also part of its original equity4. If both
banks pursue a risky loan strategy, with deposit insurance, Bank X stands to lose nothing
but gains 1; 5Pl   Pd. On the other hand, bank Y risks at most Ey, for a possible gain of
1; 5Pl Pd, which is the same as that of Bank X. Therefore, type Y bank has less incentive
to pursue a risky portfolio for fear of losing part of its income stream in the event of loan
defaults compared to type X bank. The same would hold if Ey is the capital for Bank Y.
The following hypothesis is deduced:
Type X banks incentive to pursue risky portfolio is greater than that of type Y bank.
In a liberalised banking system, less stringent entry requirements may result in more type
X banks in the market. As a result, the return on the risky portfolio is driven down. In
4In stage 1, Bank Ys original equity is Ey which is the ow of income from the its business.
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such cases, type Y banks have very little to gain. For instance, if the future value of loans
declines to 1; 05Pl, type X banks still risk nothing for a possible gain of 1; 05Pl   Pd, yet
type Y banks still risk the discounted value of their yearly cashows from the investments
business, Ey, but for a lesser gain of 1; 05Pl   Pd. Type Y banks would only have an
incentive to hold more of the risky portfolio if the value of Ey decreases relative to the rate
of return on the risky portfolio. Thus, the following hypothesis can be derived:
Financial liberalisation that increases competition in the banking sector drives down the
rate of return on investment and makes type Y banks less willing to hold the risky portfolio
compared to type X bank.
Overall, if a risky strategy is pursued, type X banks gain more relative to type Y banks,
if their deposits are insured. If more type X banks enter the market, the rate of return on
the risky portfolio is driven down to low levels that makes the investment less attractive
for type Y banks. It only makes business sense for type Y banks to hold less risky
portfolios to safeguard their payments franchise. However, without an explicit deposit
insurance scheme, depositors who lodged their funds with bank X would lose all their
money whereas those who banked with bank Y would get some fraction of their deposited
funds depending on the value of Ey. This would imply that those who bank with bank X
would demand a higher ex ante deposit rate, ceteris paribus. The presence of the deposit
insurance scheme however, means no depositor loses out, hence all investors are willing to
make deposits with either bank at the same deposit rate.
In sum, insured banks with a protable business and hence high franchise have lower ex-
pected return from taking risks than banks with less or no protable business (no franchise
value). If competition in the banking sector drives down prots for type Y banks, they
become more inclined to take on risky portfolios since what they stand to lose (value of the
franchise) decreases relative to the possible gain in the event that the loans are fully ser-
viced. In view of this, a valuable franchise should be a powerful incentive to reduce banks
involvement in high risk activities. In this chapter, the study analyses the interactions
between the franchise value of banks and incidences of bank failure.
The two hypothesis drawn from the present theoretical model are combined to form the
following hypothesis that is then tested empirically.
A reduction in franchise values increases the incentives of banks with low franchise value
to pursue risky portfolios, and hence increase the probability of banking crises occuring.
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6.4 Estimation Strategy
This section presents the empirical models, data, as well as the description of the variables
used in the empirical analysis.
6.4.1 Empirical Model
The ordered logit model is the main model employed in the empirical estimations. Ordered
logit/probit models are an extension of the binary logit/probit models and are used to
model a discrete dependent variable that takes ordered multinomial outcomes. This model
specication is ideal given the discrete nature of the dependent variable, banking crises.
The dependent variable takes the values of 0 for no crisis, 1 for non-systemic crises, and 2
for systemic crises. The probability that a crisis occurs at a given time t is assumed to be
a function of bank frachise value and other explanatory variables. Thus, the likelihood of
a crisis is modelled as follows;
Crisisit = i + BPit + Xit + i + "it (6.8)
where Crisisit is the crisis variable , BPit is the proxy for bank franchise value for country
i at time t. Xit is a matrix of control variables which are (a) macroeconomic (real GDP
growth, ination, real interest rate and change in terms of trade); (b) banking system
characteristics (liquidity, share of private sector loans to GDP, real credit growth and
ratio of M2 to foreign reserves); and (c) institutional and regulatory quality variables
(liberalisation policies, GDP per capita, rule of law and presence of deposit insurance
scheme).  and  are slope coe¢ cients, "it is a vector of error terms while i is a vector of
individual country e¤ects.
This empirical specication is similar to model (4.1) in chapter 4 of this thesis. There-
fore, the details of the model construction and the discussion on marginal e¤ects that are
reported from estimating such models will not be repeated for this chapter.
Although equation (6.8) is the baseline regression equation for this chapter, this thesis
considers an indicator of the relationship between liberalisation and bank franchise value.
This is presented next.
Franchise value-liberalisation indicator
The hypothesis that the negative impact of nancial liberalisation on banking stability is
transmitted via the franchise value channel entirely rests on the assumption that di¤erent
liberalisation policies have the e¤ect of reducing bank franchise values. In this regard,
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this chapter considers an indicator that makes it possible to obtain information on how
much bank protability covaries with liberalisation policies that are important sources of
bank franchise value. This is done by expressing franchise value as a function of nancial
liberalisation:
BPct = + libct (6.9)
where libct is an index for competitive liberalisation and  is the franchise value-liberalisation
indicator.  captures the impact of nancial liberalisation on bank prots. Competitive
liberalisation is an index of three liberalisation policies. (1) elimination of restrictions on
entry and scope of bank activity, (2) elimination of capital account restrictions, and (3)
removal of controls that govern security market policy. As discussed earlier in this thesis,
all these policies have the same e¤ect on the competitive environment in the nancial sec-
tor and hence should have a similar impact on bank protability. In sensitivity analysis,
the study considers regressing total nancial liberalisation index (finref) on bank prots
as well as other sub indices constructed from the seven liberalisation policies. Empiri-
cally, from equation (5.10), measures of bank franchise value are regressed on the index for
competitive liberalisation in a GMM framework.
BPict = + BPic;t 1 + libct + i + "it (6.10)
Since a negative relationship between bank prots and liberalisation is expected apriori,
  0 therefore expresses a reduction in bank prots arising from the e¤ects of imple-
menting nancial liberalisation policies that have the e¤ect of increasing competition in
the banking sector. The larger the absolute value of , the smaller the prot margins and
the higher will be the reduction in franchise value due to competitive liberalisation.
The next step is to include  in the crisis equation (6.8). The empirical model estimated
is thus:
crisisit = i + it + Xit + i + "it (6.11)
As discussed above, Xit is a matrix of control variables which are (a) macroeconomic,
(b) banking system characteristics, and (c) institutional variables.  and  are slope
coe¢ cients. Apriori, the coe¢ cient for  is expected to be positive. Intuitively, a positive
relationship between crisis and  implies that a high reduction in franchise value due to
liberalisation increases the chances of having a banking crisis. This would therefore conrm
the assertion that franchise value is the conduit through which nancial liberalisation
increases the likelihood of having either systemic or non-systemic banking crises.
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The empirical model incorporates interaction terms for the franchise value-liberalisation
indicator rst, with a deposit insurance dummy variable depins
^
libroa, and second, with
the variable for presence of prudential supervision superv 
^
libroa. These are included to
capture di¤erent e¤ects that competitive liberalisation policies may have on franchise value
in countries with explicit deposit insurance and e¤ective prudential supervision policies.
6.4.2 Data and variable description
Data
The regression analysis is carried out on data for 25 countries in SSA. The macroeconomic
data is obtained from WDI, a World Bank database, and microeconomic data is from the
IMFs International Financial Statistics. Data on liberalisation variables is obtained from
the database by Abiad et al. (2008) and extended in this study. Bank-level data used for
measures of franchise value is from Bankscope. This is for 144 banks in 25 countries in
SSA. However, data on return on assets and on equity is limited in terms of time coverage.
As such, the emperical analysis is carried out on data from 1996 to 2006. The variables are
summarised in Table 6.4.1. Table 6.4.1 also presents the expected relationships between
these variables and banking crises, as well as summary statistics. A detailed list of the
data sources for the variables used in this chapter are presented in tables B.0.1 and B.0.2
in the appendix.
Model Variables
Banking crisis variable
The dependant variable is banking crisis. This variable is dened and similarly used in
the baseline econometric model in chapter 4 of this thesis. To reiterate, a systemic crisis is
dened as such by at least one of the following conditions: (i) the ratio of non-performing
loans to total loans in the banking sector is at least 10%, (ii) the cost of a rescue operation
is at least 2% of GDP, (iii) banking problems have resulted in large scale nationalization
of banks, (iv) occurrence of extensive bank runs, (iii) the adoption of emergency measures
such as a deposit freeze, prolonged bank holidays or deposit guarantees by the government
in response to the crisis. On the other hand, a crisis is classied as non-systemic if only a
small segment of a countrys banking sector is a¤ected by bank failures.
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Table 6.4.1: Variables used in evaluating e¤ect of franchise value on banking crises
Variable Variable name Expected sign mean Std dev
Crises Crises=Dependant variable 0.45 0.81
^
libroa Franchise value-liberalisation indicator - 0.40 0.49
rgdpg Rate of growth of real gdp - 3.6 4.9
gdppc Log of GDP per capita - 2.7 0.48
tot Change in terms of trade - 0.18 10.7
infn Ination rate, change in GDP deator + 17.85 40.02
rir Real interest rate + 5.63 14.33
m2res Ratio of M2 to international reserves + 9.8 21.53
crgdp Ratio of private credit to GDP + 29.6 19.2
liq Ratio of bank liquid reserves to bank assets 17.36 10
crgr_2 Two period lag of growth rate of domestic credit to GDP + 10.97 33.96
depins Deposit insurance dummy variable + 0.12 0.33
regq Regulatory quality= prees freedom - -0.56 0.68
sup Bank supervision - 0.51 0.66
dinslib Interaction between deposit insurance and liberalisation +/- 0.88 2.1
suplib Interaction between bank supervision and liberalisation - 0.38 0.61
^
libroe Alternative franchise value-liberalisation indicator - 0.59 0.40
nref Total nancial liberalisation index + 9.06 5.8
complib competitive liberalisation index (ent +intk+secmkt) + 5.80 1.50
Source: Authors calculations
Explanatory variables
Bank franchise value
Franchise value or charter value is dened as the present value of a rms future prots.
To quantify franchise value, one can look at the di¤erence between a rms market value
and its replacement costs. This denition implies that a rm has a large franchise value
when it has huge prots for the rm as a going concern. Both the market value of assets
and replacement costs are generally di¢ cult to measure directly. As such, some studies
have used the sum of market value of equity and book value of liabilities to approximate a
banks market value of assets, net of replacement costs (calculated di¤erently in di¤erent
studies) (Demsetz et al., 1996; Keeley, 1990). From these, a ratio or proxy of Tobins Q is
derived5. Other measures, such as ratio of market to book equity ratios and measures of
bank protability (for instance net interest margin and after tax return on assets/equity)
5Tobins Q= MVE+BV LBV A where MVE is market value of equity and BVA/L is book value of as-
sets/liabilities.
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have been used in the literature to measure bank franchise value (Demirguc-Kunt and
Detragiache, 1998b).
For the purpose of this study, ROAA and ROAE are used as bank franchise value proxies.
Net interest margin is also considered for robustness tests. Some criticisms have been
raised against the use of ROAA to proxy bank franchise values. Some researchers argue
that ROAA may be biased due to o¤-balance-sheet activities, whilst ROAE disregards
nancial leverage and the associated risk (Flamini et al., 2009). These researchers suggest
that an alternative risk adjusted prot estimate would be ideal considering that banks may
be seeking to maximize the value of owners equity. However, other previous studies have
used both ROAA and ROAE with substantive results. For instance De Nicolo (2000) and
Gan (2004) used ROAA and ROAE to proxy bank franchise value in separate studies.
Franchise value-liberalisation indicator
This is the coe¢ cient on the liberalisation variable ( in equation (6.10)) after regressing
bank prots on di¤erent indices of nancial liberalisation policies and other explanatory
variables. In the results for the baseline model, equation (6.11),  is derived from regressing
complib on ROAA and is denoted by
^
libroa in Table 6.5.1. Similarly, the co¢ cient on
complib after regressing complib on ROAE is
^
libroe. The study also uses
^
refroa and
^
refroe derived from regressing finref , the total liberalisation index, onROAA andROAE
respectively.
Other explanatory variables
The rest of the explanatory variables used in this chapter are similar to the ones adopted
in chapter 4 of this thesis. These include (i) macroeconomic variables (real gdp growth
(rgdpg), ination (infn), real interest rate (rir) as well as change in terms of trade (tot)),
(ii) banking system characteristics variables (liquidity (liq), share of private sector loans
to GDP (cr=gdp), lagged real credit growth (crgrt 2), as well as ratio of broad money
to foreign reserves (m2res)), (iii) institutional and regulatory quality variables (GDP per
capita (gdppc), press freedom (pressf), governance (gov), required reserves (reqres), as
well as presence of explicit deposit insurance (depins)).
6.5 Model Estimation and Result Analysis
Regression results on the link between franchise value and crises are presented in Table
6.5.1. The results are explained in terms of marginal e¤ects.
In Column (1) ROAA is the measure of franchise value whilst in column (2) ROAE is
used as a proxy for franchise value. After controlling for macroeconomic and bank spe-
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Table 6.5.1: Franchise Value and Banking Crises: Prot-Liberalisation Indicator
(1) (2)
Variables crises=0 crises=1 crises=2 crises=0 crises=1 crises=2
^
libroa -0.122*** 0.0199** 0.102***
(0.012) (0.008) (0.006)
rgdpg 0.016*** -0.004*** -0.012*** 0.016*** -0.004*** -0.016***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.0009)
gdppc 0.021* -0.023* -0.028* 0.024* -0.009* -0.255*
(0.0015) (0.006) (0.001) (0.0090) (0.0007) (0.133)
tot 0.0041*** -0.001*** -0.0031*** 0.0044*** -0.0015*** -0.0034***
(0.0058) (0.0002) (0.074) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0055)
infn -0.0011** 0.0002** 0.001** -0.001** 0.008** 0.008**
(0.0001) (0.00002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0052) (0.015)
rir -0.004*** 0.0080*** 0.0025*** -0.0034*** 0.0082*** 0.0025***
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.003) (0.006)
m2res -0.0033*** 0.0003*** 0.0031*** -0.0033*** 0.0004*** 0.0029***
(0.0002) (0.004) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.005)
crgdp -0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0005 0.0002
(0.002) (0.008) (0.009) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0004)
liq -0.005* 0.004* 0.006* -0.004* 0.005* 0.003*
(0.0023) (0.0007) (0.0033) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.002)
crgr_2 -0.007* 0.0208* 0.0006* -0.001* 0.0002* 0.0001*
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.005) (0.0002) (0.002)
depins -0457*** 0.0589** 0.498** -0.571*** 0.0589* 0.513***
0.0127 0.0260 0.0252 0.0131 0.0293 0.0270
gov 0.0212 -0.0133 -0.0079 0.0146 -0.0163 -0.0018
0.0130 0.0155 0.0191 0.0147 0.0158 0.0220
sup 0.0942*** -0.0125*** -0.0817*** 0.108*** -0.015** -0.0929***
0.0163 0.0084 0.0205 0.0167 0.0087 0.0211
dinslib 0.0525* -0.279* -0.0247* 0.0631** -0.0356** -0.0275**
0.0141 0.0175 0.0232 0.165 0.0263 0.0333
suplib 0.170*** -0.038*** -0.132*** 0.155*** -0.04*** -0.115***
0.0195 0.0121 0.0233 0.0192 0.0151 0.0248
^
libroe -0.131*** 0.0205*** 0.014***
0.0133 0.0107 0.016
Prob>chi2 0.00 0.00
log likelihood -462.7 -459.1
Pseudo R2 0.32 0.291
Robust standard errors in parentheses ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *<0.1
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cic e¤ects on crises occurrence, the results show that the liberalisation-franchise value
indicator has positive and signicant marginal probability e¤ects on both systemic and
non-systemic banking crises. The marginal probability e¤ects are stronger for systemic
than for non-systemic banking crises. The result suggests that  increases the marginal
probability of occurrence of crises for both systemic and non-systemic crises. Since higher
values of  translate to higher reduction in franchise value due to liberalisation, this result
underscores the notion that liberalisation increases the marginal probability e¤ects of hav-
ing either type of crises because of its negative impact on bank franchise value. Column
(2) provides evidence that this relationship holds even when return on equity is used to
measure franchise value. This result is consistent with established theory and empirical
ndings of mitigating e¤ects of charter value on bank risk-taking reported by Keeley (1990)
and Gonzalez (2005).
Table D.0.1 in the appendix presents results where the franchise value indicator
^
refroa
is derived from regressing finref , the total liberalisation index, on ROAA and
^
refroe
is derived from regressing finref on ROAE. The results in column (1) indicate that
^
refroa has positive but insignicant marginal probability e¤ects on both systemic and
non-systemic banking crises. However,
^
refroe reports a positive and signicant coe¢ cient,
concuring with the earlier results.
With respect to institutional and regulatory environment, the results show that the mar-
ginal probability e¤ects of having either type of crisis are greater in countries with ex-
plicit deposit insurance and less likely in countries with e¤ective prudential supervision.
This nding conrms the importance of directing e¤orts towards strengthening bank su-
pervisory systems alongside nancial liberalisation. This would ensure that risk-taking
incentives that may arise from a decline in franchise value resulting from liberalisation are
minimised.
Interestingly, the presence of explicit deposit insurance reduces the mitigating e¤ects of
franchise value as evidenced by the negative and signicant coe¢ cient on the interaction
term
^
dinslibroa. This indirect inuence of deposit insurance on crises may be due to the
positive impact such schemes may have on bank protability. Gonzalez (2005) argues that
the presence of deposit insurance may increase bank prot margins6.
The coe¢ cient on the interaction term sup
^
libroa is negative and signicant. This result
shows that while the marginal e¤ect of a reduction in franchise value increases the chances
of systemic crises, this e¤ect can be reduced further if regulators employ e¤ective prudential
supervision.
6Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) however nd that explicit deposit insurance schemes lower net
interest margins, because of design and implementation problems of the schemes.
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The other macroeconomic and bank characteristic variables generally have signicant mar-
ginal probability e¤ects. High GDP growth reduce the chances of having either type of
crisis at least at the 10% signicance level, while adverse terms of trade shocks signicantly
increases the likelihood of banking sector crises. High interest rates and high ination also
increase the probability of banking crises occuring.
Regarding bank specic e¤ects, the ratio of broad money to foreign exchange reserves, ratio
of private sector credit to GDP, and real credit growth have positive marginal probability
e¤ects on both systemic and non-systemic bank crises, while liquidity has the opposite
e¤ect. However, the private sector credit to GDP ratio is generally not signicant.
Finally, the coe¢ cient on GDP per capita is negative and signicant, suggesting that legal
institutions capable of e¤ective contract enforcement reduces the probability of having
either type of crisis. The coe¢ cient on the governance variable is however generally not
signicant.
6.6 Sensitivity Analysis
6.6.1 Two stage analysis
A two-stage least squares analysis is employed to check the robustness of the baseline
results. Using this approach, predicted values of franchise values from the rst stage
(equation 5.10), duplicated below as equation (6.12), are incorporated in the second stage
equation. The second stage equation tests the e¤ect of franchise value on the likelihood of
having a banking crisis7. The estimated models are thus:
BPict = + BPic;t 1 + Xic;t + RIMct + ui + eit (6.12)
crisisit = i + 
^
BPit + Xit + i + "it (6.13)
All variables for equations (6.12) and (6.13) are as discussed in the baseline models, equa-
tions (5.10) and (6.8) respectively8.
This two stage procedure takes into account the potential endogeneity of franchise value.
It specically deals with the potential bias likely to result from the correlation between
7Keeley (1990) uses a similar procedure in analysing how liberalisation a¤ects charter value and how
charter value a¤ects bank risk-taking in the US banking sector. Gonzalez (2005) uses the same procedure
to analyse the impact of bank regulation on bank charter value and risk-taking in 36 countries.
8The matrix Xit in equation (6.13) includes the nancial liberalisation variables.
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franchise value and the error term when observed values of bank protability (ROAA and
ROAE) are instead used in equation (6.13).
Tables 6.6.1 and 6.6.2 present results from the second stage regressions9.
^
roa and
^
roe are
the predicted values for franchise values indicators from equation (6.12). The coe¢ cients
on the predicted values,
^
roa in column (1) and
^
roe in column (2) have signicant negative
marginal probability e¤ects on either type of crises. The marginal probability e¤ects on
systemic crises are higher than on non-systemic crises. This conrms the negative e¤ects
of low franchise value on banking stability.
The positive coe¢ cients on competitive liberalisation and deposit insurance suggest that
the chances of systemic crisis occurrence are higher in more liberalised countries with
explicit deposit insurance schemes.The compound e¤ect of nancial liberalisation, pruden-
tial supervision and franchise value on banking crisis is accounted for by the interaction
terms. The coe¢ cient of the interaction term of franchise value and liberalisation,
^
roalib,
is positive and signicant. This suggests that the e¤ect of franchise value on bank stabil-
ity increases in more liberalised banking sectors. In fact, there are more chances that a
decline in franchise value increases the probability of having systemic crises in a liberalised
nancial system than in highly regulated banking sectors.
Interacting franchise value with bank supervision,
^
roasup, gives an indication of the counter-
e¤ect of supervision on the e¤ects of franchise value on banking crises. This shows that
e¤ective supervision reduces the e¤ects of franchise value on the probability of having
either systemic or non-systemic crises. Both sets of results suggest that an increase in
franchise value reduces the probability of occurrence of both systemic and non-systemic
crises in more liberalised countries. However, this only holds if such countries have e¤ective
prudential supervision in place.
Whilst results from Table 5.5.2 suggest that nancial liberalisation reduces bank franchise
value, those reported in table 6.6.1 show that franchise value has a negative impact on
banking crises occurrence. Taken together, this implies that a fall in franchise value due to
liberalisation increases the chances of having a crisis. This e¤ect of franchise value is higher
in more liberalised nancial sectors with less e¤ective bank supervision. This may suggest
that high franchise values in less liberalised nancial systems provide an incentive for banks
to take less risk in order to protect their bank franchise. As a result, this reduces chances
of banking crises occurring. This is consistent with ndings by Gonzalez (2005) that low
values of Tobins Q, increases bank non-performing loans and stock price volatility.
9The rst stage results are the same as presented already in chapter 4 of this thesis, hence are not
presented here again.
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Table 6.6.1: Bank franchise value and banking crises: Two-stage analysis
(1) (2)
Variables crises=0 crises=1 crises=2 crises=0 crises=1 crises=2
^
roa 0.152*** -0.0336** -0.118***
(0.0281) (0.0146) (0.0305)
rgdpg 0.0146*** -0.0035*** -0.0114*** 0.0143*** -0.003*** -0.0113***
(0.0014) (0.003) (0.006) (0.001) (0.0028) (0.0088)
gdppc 0.252** -0.0474** -0.205** 0.189* -0.0145* -0.175*
(0.109) (0.0567) (0.118) (0.0976) (0.0530) (0.108)
tot 0.0058*** -0.0014*** -0.0044*** 0.0062*** -0.0016*** -0.0056***
(0.0011) (0.0037) (0.0013) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.002)
infn 0.0012 -0.0027 -0.0039 -0.0012* 0.0002* 0.001*
(0.0017) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.002)
rir -0.0031*** 0.001*** 0.0023*** -0.003*** 0.001*** 0.0023***
(0.0087) (0.0011) (0.0038) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004)
m2res -0.0033*** 0.0031*** 0.003*** -0.0032*** 0.002*** 0.003***
(0.0002) (0.003) (0.0195) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
crgdp -0.00102* 0.0005* 0.0002* -0.002 0.02 0.004
(0.0006) (0.001) (0.004) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0005)
liq 0.0033* -0.0004* -0.003* 0.0034* -0.0004* -0.003*
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003)
crgr_2 -0.0076 0.0069 0.007 0.008 -0.003 -0.006
(0.002) (0.0010) (0.002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0004)
depins -0.526*** 0.0684*** 0.458*** -0.532*** 0.0583** 0.474***
(0.0311) (0.0156) (0.0421) (0.0353) (0.0223) (0.0520)
gov 0.0002* -0.0129* -0.0131* 0.00995 0.0120 -0.0220
(0.0152) (0.0170) (0.0177) (0.0175) (0.0180) (0.0201)
complib -0.0341*** 0.0071** 0.0270*** -0.0312* 0.001* 0.0321*
(0.0057) (0.0032) (0.0068) (0.0057) (0.008) (0.009)
sup 0.0268* -0.0037* -0.0232* 0.0441** -0.0169** -0.0272**
(0.0156) (0.0094) (0.0194) (0.0161) (0.0096) (0.0197)
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Table 6.6.2: Franchise value and crises:Ttwo-stage analysis continued
crises=0 crises=1 crises=2 crises=0 crises=1 crises=2
roalib -0.0697*** 0.0119** 0.0578***
(0.0082) (0.0043) (0.0091)
roasup 0.248*** -0.0537*** -0.194***
(0.0235) (0.0151) (0.0252)
^
roe 0.167*** -0.0107*** -0.157***
(0.0321) (0.0293) (0.0405)
roelib -0.0687*** 0.0031*** 0.0656***
(0.009) (0.0098) (0.0123)
roesup 0.229*** -0.0439** -0.185***
(0.0258) (0.0221) (0.0278)
Prob>chi2 0.00 0.00
log likelihood -466.1 -469.5
Pseudo R2 0.223 0.219
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
6.6.2 Exogenous franchise value
In this section, a crisis model is estimated using observed values of franchise value to further
check the robustness of the results presented above. Using observed values instead of
predicted values of bank franchise value assumes that bank franchise value is an exogenous
variable, its e¤ect on the probability of occurrence of crisis is therefore independent of the
e¤ects of nancial liberalisation10. In this case, the estimated model is equation (6.8) and
the results are presented in Tables D.0.3 and D.0.4 in the appendix .
From column (1), the crisis-reducing e¤ect of high franchise value is conrmed when ROAA
is considered as the measure of franchise value. The presence of explicit deposit insurance
still has a positive impact on crisis occurrence. While nancial liberalisation has a positive
e¤ect on crisis as shown in previous results, this e¤ect is not signicant at least at 10% level.
Prudential supervision still has a negative though weak relationship with bank crises. The
interaction terms on franchise value and liberalisation (roalib and roelib) show a signicant
and positive relationship with crises. Similarly, the coe¢ cient on the interaction terms on
franchise value and supervision (roasup and roesup) are negative and signicant. This
suggests that the e¤ect of franchise value on banking crises is more in liberalised than
controlled economies and this e¤ect is reduced by the presence of prudential supervision.
While in previous specications the results were consistent for the di¤erent denitions of
10See Gonzalez (2005).
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franchise value, this is not so for the current specication. Column (2) shows that franchise
value has a negative but insignicant relationship with crises. Column (3) shows instead
a positive and signicant relationship between franchise value, as dened ROAE, and the
probability of occurrence of either type of crises. Furthermore, while liberalisation and
supervision coe¢ cients are signicant and with expected signs, the interaction terms are
all insignicant. These results seem to suggest some bias that may be due to the exogeneity
assumption placed on franchise value in the current model specication.
6.6.3 Alternative liberalisation and crisis variable denitions
Finally, a robustness test is carried out by considering di¤erent denitions of the liberal-
isation and crisis variables. In both cases, logit and probit models are estimated instead
of the ordered logit/probit models. Bank Z-scores as a measure of bank soundness are
also considered instead of the banking crises variable. The results, are not signicantly
di¤erent from the ones already reported.
6.7 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter examined the relationship between bank franchise value and the actual oc-
currence of bank crises in selected African countries. Specically, this chapter explores
if the negative causal relationship be ween nancial liberalisation and bank protability
conrmed in the previous chapter is the conduit through which liberalisation increases the
chances of having either systemic or non-systemic crises.
This chapter tested the hypothesis that the likelihood of either systemic or non-systemic
banking crises increases as a result of a decline in franchise value. To do so, a fran-
chise value-liberalisation indicator that expresses the reduction in franchise value due to
increased liberalisation is introduced. This indicator, obtained from regressing franchise
value on the nancial liberalisation indices, is then included in an ordered logit regression
of the probability of having either no crisis, non-systemic crisis or systemic crisis.
The regression results show that this indicator has positive and signicant marginal proba-
bility e¤ects on both systemic and non-systemic banking crises. High values of the franchise
value-liberalisation indicator translate to a further decline in franchise value. Therefore, the
positive relationship reported implies that increased liberalisation signicantly increases
the probability of crises via the franchise value channel. Furthermore, the results show
that while liberalisation promotes the e¤ects of franchise value on banking crises, this ef-
fect is minimal in countries with prudential supervisory structures in place. Similarly, the
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presence of explicit deposit insurance increases the probability of banking crises occurrence.
However, a possible positive e¤ect of deposit insurance on bank protability reduces the
negative impact of franchise value on the probability of crises occurrence. Consistent with
existing literature, both macroeconomic and bank specic variables included in the models
have signicant marginal probability e¤ects on either non-systemic or systemic crises.
The results from the main model are substantiated by di¤erent robustness tests. A two
stage least squares analysis is employed in the rst test. Forecasted values of franchise
value estimated from the equation of the determinants of bank protabilityare included
in the regression for determinants of banking crises. The results conrm the negative
relationship between franchise value and actual occurrence of banking crises. However,
using observed values of franchise value seem to produce biased results. Overall, use
of alternative liberalisation measures, franchise value and crises denitions together with
di¤erent model specications does not alter the main ndings of this study.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Policy Implications
7.1 Summary
This research is an in-depth analysis of the e¤ects of liberalisation policies on banking sector
stability in a sample of 26 countries in Sub Saharan Africa. The sample was determined
mainly by data availability and covers the period 1986 to 2006 for the empirical analysis
in chapter 4, and from 1996 to 2006 for chapters 5 and 6. This time frame covers periods
before, during and after implementation of nancial liberalisation in a majority of the
countries. The study goes beyond a general investigation of overall nancial sector reforms
by examining the impact of disaggregated measures of nancial liberalisation. The research
is presented in seven chapters, including the introductory chapter. Three of these chapters
are devoted to empirical analysis of inter-related research issues. Each of the empirical
chapters species the relevant objective and hypotheses tested.
Chapter 1 introduced the main theme of the thesis by describing the problem statement,
motivation and justication for the study, research questions and rationale of the study.
Chapter 2, put the study into policy and historical context by providing the macroeconomic
and nancial landscape in Africa and presented both liberalisation and bank stability in-
dicators for the countries under investigation. Chapter 3 presented an overview of banking
crises theories. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 presented the empirical examination of the three
themes of the study.
Chapter 4 investigated the e¤ect of nancial liberalisation on actual occurrence of systemic
and non-systemic banking crises. This chapter examined the e¤ect of the degree and
intensity of liberalisation on the probability of occurrence of either type of crisis. Questions
regarding whether the e¤ect of liberalisation depends on institutional and development
characteristics inherent in the liberalising countries are also addressed. These issues stem
from policy concerns that the nancial systems in SSA despite adopting nancial reform
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programmes, have been in distress for a long time, and generally lack the breadth necessary
to foster economic development.
Chapter 5 examined the hypothesis that nancial liberalisation by increasing competition,
erodes market power and bank prots. Thus, Chapter 5 examined the determinants of
bank protability in SSA, specically accounting for the e¤ects of nancial liberalisation.
Lastly, Chapter 6 tested the link between nancial liberalisation, bank franchise values.
and the probability of having a banking crisis. The empirical tests in this chapter tied
together methods and ndings from chapters four and ve.
7.2 Main Findings
The main objective of this study was to evaluate the inuence of di¤erent liberalisation
policies on bank protability, and the probability of occurrence f banking crises in coun-
tries in SSA. The main ndings from the empirical chapters are highlighted below.
7.2.1 Liberalisation policies and banking sector crises
Chapter 4 assesed the contribution of each of the seven liberalisation policies to bank-
ing sector fragility. This chapter examined if disaggregating nancial liberalisation into
specic policies can reveal any new evidence regarding the relationship between nancial
liberalisation and banking crises occurrence.
The main ndings are:
 Total nancial liberalisation has a negative marginal e¤ect on the likelihood of hav-
ing either non-systemic or systemic banking sector crises. The result suggests that
liberalisation might have improved bank stability through improved e¢ ciency, more
diversied asset portfolios and wider depositor bases.
 Regarding specic policies, the results indicate that policies that directly inuence
the competitive behaviour of banks have positive marginal probability e¤ects on
banking crises. Specically, elimination of restrictions on entry and activity, as well
as on international capital ows have a positive causal e¤ect.
 By contrast, removal of credit controls, security market policy, and privatisation of
previously state-owned banks all have negative and signicant marginal probabil-
ity e¤ects on banking crises occurrence. Interestingly, privatisation has the largest
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marginal e¤ect. Against a backdrop of poorly performing state-owned banks char-
acterised by low loan recovery rates and moral hazard problems, this result conrms
that privately owned banks are more stable than state-owned banks.
 Financial reforms that entail the strengthening of supervision and prudential reg-
ulation have signicant and negative marginal probability e¤ects on both systemic
and non-systemic crises. Furthermore, interacting the prudential supervision vari-
able with policies that positively impact on banking crises reduces the signicance
of the relationship or changes the sign on the coe¢ cients. This puts weight behind
calls for reforming and strengthening of bank supervisory capacities, especially after
regulatory oversight was cited as one of the contributing factors to the recent US
subprime crises.
 The result pertaining to total liberalisation is overturned by the introducing of an in-
teraction term with the prudential regulation and supervision variable. Thus, condi-
tional on prudential supervision, the results report that overall nancial liberalisation
does not necessarily increase the chances of banking crises.
 The study replicates models that use a binary variable to proxy total nancial lib-
eralisation as presented in previous studies. The result suggests that the absence
of interest rate controls has a positive marginal e¤ect on the likelihood of having
systemic crises. In the baseline model, it is shown that elimination of interest rate
controls has a positive but insignicant e¤ect. This may be due to the fact that
unlike the binary variable, the graded interest rate liberalisation variable in the base-
line model is able to capture policy changes regarding variations in both deposit and
lending rates.
 Results from the regression of the e¤ect of institutional and regulatory quality, and
other control variables suggest that crisis frequency is high in economies characterised
by low liquidity, high ination, high real interest rates, and low economic growth. In
addition, credit expansion precedes banking crises.
 In sum, the results in this chapter suggest that some liberalisation policies have a
negative causal relationship with banking crises, while other policies have a neg-
ative e¤ect. The destabilising e¤ects of these policies is evident in counties with
macroeconomic instability as well as countries with poor supervisory and regulatory
frameworks.
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7.2.2 Financial liberalisation and bank protability
Chapter 5 tested the hypothesis that liberalisation policies have a negative inuence on the
levels of bank protability. The main conclusions drawn from this analysis are summarised
below.
 Correlation analysis results show a negative and highly signicant correlation be-
tween total liberalisation and removal of entry barriers on one hand, and return on
assets, net interest margin as well as market concentration, on the other. Intuitively,
increasing liberalisation reduces bank protability as banks begin to earn competi-
tive prots, unlike previously earned monopoly prots. This is substantiated by the
e¤ect of liberalisation in reducing market concentration levels.
 The regression results for individual liberalisation policies are mixed. Elimination of
entry barriers, and interest rate controls has negative and signicant marginal e¤ects.
Strengthening supervisory capacities and institutional frameworks has a positive ef-
fect on bank protability.
 Low prot persistence, as indicated by a positive and signicant result on lagged
protability conrms signicant levels of competition in the banking sectors in SSA
economies. Furthermore, an analysis of results indicate that persistence levels are
negatively related to comprehensive levels of nancial liberalisation. In sum, the
results indicate that following nancial liberalisation, structural changes set in, which
gave rise to changes in compet tion and prot levels.
 The results also indicate a positive causal e¤ect of bank size, capital, and credit risk
on bank prot measures. On the other hand, overhead costs have a negative impact,
while foreign ownership, market concerntration and instituitional variables have no
signicant e¤ect on bank prots.
 Stable economies provide enabling environments for good bank performance, whereas
poor institutional structures expose banks to high loan defaults, resulting in poor
performance.
7.2.3 Franchise value and banking crises
Chapter 6 reconciles ndings from Chapters 4 and 5 to further explore whether the link
between liberalisation and banking sector crises is transmitted through the e¤ect of liber-
alisation on bank franchise value. This examination sought to give guidance on balancing
the e¢ ciency gains from competition and destabilising e¤ects that competition may impose
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through erosion of bank franchise value. An indicator that captures how much franchise
value covaries with competitive liberalisation is introduced and included in a model for the
probability of occurrence of banking crises. An alternative two stage analysis is employed
where predicted values of bank protability value in the rst stage are included in a second
stage regression on the likelihood of banking crises occurrence. The main results from this
analysis are as follows:
 Controlling for macroeconomic and bank-specic e¤ects, the results show a positive
and signicant marginal probability e¤ects of the franchise value-liberalisation indi-
cator on banking crisis incidences. Higher values of the indicator translate to higher
reduction in franchise value due to liberalisation. Therefore, high levels of liber-
alisation increase the probability of systemic banking crises through the impact of
liberalisation on bank franchise value. Using an alternative franchise value measure,
ROAE, gives similar results.
 The results show that the chances of having either type of crises are more in countries
with explicit deposit insurance schemes compared to countries with well developed
institutions and supervisory capacities.
 The study also revealed an important issue regarding explicit deposit insurance
schemes. It was observed that the presence of a deposit insurance scheme mitigates
the e¤ects of franchise value on banking crises. This is conrmed by a negative and
signicant result on the interaction term between the franchise value-liberalisation
indicator and deposit insurance. This result likely stems from the positive causal
impact of deposit insurance on bank prot margins.
 Interacting the variable for bank supervision and the indicator for franchise value
shows that bank supervision can e¤ectively mitigate the negative impact of low fran-
chise values on bank stability.
 In sum, the impact of competitive liberalisation on banking crisis incidences is trans-
mitted via a decline in bank franchise value. However, the marginal e¤ects are
minimised by the presence of deposit insurance schemes as well as prudential bank
supervision.
7.2.4 Policy implications and recommendations
The analysis carried out in this study produced results from which valuable policy lessons
can be derived. The main policy recommendations are discussed below.
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 While nancial liberalisation is important for nancial stability, some policies nega-
tively a¤ect bank stability, especially in the absence of e¢ ctive prudential regulation
and supervision.
 The importance of macroeconomic determinants suggests that policy-makers must
ensure that comprehensive assessments of both the macroeconomic and specically
nancial sector environments precede any implementation of liberalisation policies.
 Although nancial liberalisation increases competition that in turn erodes bank fran-
chise value, the results presented here do not advocate for policies that stie competi-
tion, as a trade-o¤ for bank stability. Instead, policy makers should consider policies
that strengthen institutional capacities to curb risk-taking incentives that may arise
due to decline in franchise value. This way, both bank e¢ ciency and stability goals
can be attained concurrently.
 Governments must prioritise development of legal and governance frameworks. These
include upholding the rule of law, contract enforcement, good public sector manage-
ment as well as updating regulations to ensure they are not overtaken by nancial
innovation and globalisation, together with nancial liberalisation.
 In line with good governance, emphasis must be put on developing prudential reg-
ulatory and supervisory infrastructure. These should be designed to cater for new
institutions (both bank and non-bank), nancial instruments and activities resulting
from liberalised nancial systems, as well as nancial innovation. This process of "re-
regulation" must be a continous one, to allow supervisors to adapt to new challenges
of bank risk that are inherent in free markets.
 Policy makers must also emphasise liberalisation policies that have an immediate
positive impact on bank stability, for instance privatisation of state-owned banks
that have been found to be highly fragile and have a long history of making losses.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 2
Table A.0.1: Financial Sector Deposits and Liquid Liabilities in SSA 1986-2006
SSA South Africa Sychelles Chad Madagasca
Year llgdp fdgdp llgdp fdgdp llgdp fdgdp llgdp fdgdp llgdp fdgdp
1986-1990 24.8 19.2 49.8 47.2 29.4 24.6 16.5 6.1 14.9 10.2
1990-1995 26.2 19.9 47.9 43.5 49.9 44.5 13.3 4 19.1 13.9
1996-2000 26.7 21.5 51.6 49.1 78.7 72.1 12 3.5 18.4 12.9
2001 28.7 23.5 48.3 50.9 96.7 87.2 11.1 3.8 20.4 13.7
2002 29.1 23.8 42.5 50 100.8 90.1 12.3 4.5 24.8 16.85
2003 30.7 25.2 41.9 51.4 108.7 97.8 11.8 4.5 22.2 15
2004 31.7 26.2 40.4 51.3 117.7 100.4 8 3.2 21.8 15
2005 32.6 27.1 41.4 53.2 127.2 104.8 7.3 2.9 20 14
2006 34.2 28.6 52.9 57.4 116.9 98.1 9.6 3.9 19.5 13.9
2007 25.1 22.6 45.3 61.4 98.4 85.2 11.6 4.6 20.5 14.9
Source: Authors calculations using Financial Structure & Development Database. Beck et.al (2009).
137
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Figure A.1: External Sector Indicators
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Source: Authors calculations based on data from IFS and Laeven and Valencia (2010)
Panels (a) and (b) are for countries outside the CFA franc zone and (c) and (d) are for CFA franc zone countries
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Table A.0.2: Episodes of Banking Crisis in Sub Saharan Africa
Country &Dates Scope
Botswana 1994-5 non-systemic: 1bank merged in 1994, 1 liquidated in 1995. State owned bank
Reform=1991 recapitalised at 0.6% of GDP
Cameroon (1995-98) 3 banks were restructured & 5 closed during 1987-93. Two banks were
Reform =1990 restructured and 2 were closed during 1995-98. 118% of GDP output loss. 65% NPL
Chad 2 state banks liquidated; 2 privatized during 1979-83.Banking system almost totally
1979-83; 1992-3 collapsed in 1992; liquidity crises in 1993. Output loss = 37% of GDP, 75% NPL
Cote dIvoire (1987-91) 4 large banks (90% of loans) distressed. 6 state banks closed. Government
Reform =1988 estimated costs were 25% of GDP. 50%NPL
Ghana (1989-91) 7 out of 11 banks insolvent. 40% of bank credit non-performing. 1 bank insolvent
(1997-2003**) in 1991 due to excessive forex exposure.1 bank closed in 1995,later recapitalized
Reform=1987 In 1997 two state banks (34% market share) in bad shape.3 banks (4% of total
deposits) insolvent in 2003. Output loss equivalent to 16% of GDP, 35% NPL
Kenya (1986-89) 3 banks failed in 1986. 4 banks, 24 NBFI (15% of nancial system liabilities) had
(1992-98) solvency problems. During 1985-89 banks holding 30% of total assets distressed.
Reform= 1989 2 banks were liquidated in 1993-94, estimated output loss, 23% GDP.
non-systemic:3 banks liquidated in 1996,5 under management in 1998.66%, 32% NPL
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Table A.0.3: Episodes of Banking Crisis Continued
Nigeria (1991-95) 8 banks insolvent in1992, 34 out of 115 banks (10% of deposits) insolvent in 1994. In 1995,
(1998-99) 60 of 115 banks were distressed. In 1997 distressed banks held 4% of total assets. 26 banks
Reform=1986 were liquidated in 1998 and another 7 in 1999. Output loss was 0.4% of GDP, 77% NPL
Senegal (1988) 7 banks (20-30% of total banking assets) closed in 1988, 2 in 1990, loss= 17% of GDP, 50% NPL
Reform =1989
South Africa non-systemic: By end of 1994, 60%-80% of loans at state banks were non-performing
(1989-94)
Tanzania (1987, 1992) In 1990 3 public banks insolvent, with 75% NPL. In 1992 a state bank (95%
Reform =1991 of total banking assets) declared to have been insolvent since 1990. Implied losses10% of GDP
Uganda Half of the banking system faced insolvency between 1994 and 1998. 3 private banks were
(1994-2004) liquidated in 1995. In 1998 UCB was recapitalized and privatized. In1998, 2 banks were closed,
Reform=1992 another 2 in 1999. In 2002 one small bank was bailed out, 2 others had serious problems.
Zambia (1995-1999) 3 banks closed in 1995, 4 failed in 1997 & 1 in 1998. 4 banks underwent liquidation in 1998/99
Reform=1992 Estimated losses were 0.5% of GDP
Zimbabwe (1991-2004) 1 bank failed in 1991 & was wholly taken over by the state. 2 of 5 commercial banks had high NPL
Reform=1990 in 1995. One big bank closed & 3 reported near to collapse in 1998. In 2004, 9 banks placed under
curatorship, 3 were consolidated into a single bank & 3 were liquidated. 2.4% of GDP implied losses.
* NPL share in Total Loans at crisis peak, ** non-systemic Crisis
Reform indicates year in which initial libelarisation measures were implemented. Crises years in parenthesis
Sources: Laeven and Valencia (2010), Caprio and Klingebiel (2003); Kane and Rice (2001); IMF country reports,
and various central bank reports for di¤erent countries.
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Table A.0.4: Financial Liberalisation and Banking Crises Episodes
Liberalisation policy start date
Country Lib year* cr ir ent sup pvt intk secmkt Banking Crisisy
Botswana 1989 1986 1990 1991 1990 1990 1989 1994**
Burkina Faso 1989 p1980 1989 p1980 1991 1995 1975 1993 1988
Cameroon 1990 1991 1990 1992 1997 1992 p1980 1996 1987
Chad 1991 1991 1991 1992 1997 1992 0 1992
Cote dIvoire 1988 p1980 1990 p1980 1991 p1980 p1980 1976 1988
Ethiopia 1996 1991 1998 1994 1996 0 2001 1997 1994
Gabon 1992 1990 1992 1997 1992 0 1995**
Gambia 1986 1987 1985 1980 1985 1985 1988 1995 1985**
Ghana 1987 1990 1987 1988 2001 1996 1987 1990 1982, 1997**
Kenya 1991 p1980 1991 p1980 1997 1978 p1980 p1980 1985, 1996**
Lesotho 1993 1993 1993 1999 2003 1988**1999**
Madagascar 1994 1986 1983 p1980 1991 1991 p73 1987 1988
Malawi 1988 1989 1988 1990 1989 1994 1996
Mali 1989 1989 1989 1990 1990 1987
Mauritius 1981 1981 1988 1986 1988 1995 1989 1996**
Mozambique 1991 1991 1994 p1980 1995 1996 1993 1998 1987
Nigeria 1986 p1980 1987 p1980 1991 p73 1990 p1980 1991, 1997**
Senegal 1989 p1980 1989 p1980 1988 1989 p1980 1986 1988
Seychelles 1993 1994 1996 1993 1996
Siera Leone 1991 1993 1992 2001 1994 1992 0 1990
Swaziland 1997 1995
South Africa 1980 p73 1980 1983 1986 p1980 1993 1982 1989**
Tanzania 1991 1993 1991 1991 1995 2000 1994 1994 1987
Uganda 1992 p1980 1992 p1980 1993 1995 1993 1993 1994
Zambia 1992 1992 1991 1994 1995 1992 1994 1995
Zimbabwe 1990 1990 1990 1993 2004 p1980 p1980 1979 1995
* Starting date of major steps towards nancial liberalisation.
p1980 means some form of liberalisation was in place as early as 1980, 0 means no liberalisation yet.
Sources: Abiad et.al (2008), updated by authors using various central bank reports, SADC CCBG reports, various
yYear of rst major bank closures/systemic crisis or borderline crisis (**)
Crisis data sources Caprio et.al (2003), Laevine (2010)
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 4
Table B.0.1: Variable Denition and Data Sources
Variable Denition Source
Crisis Variables
Banking Crises Dummy : =2 for systemic cries,= 1 for Laeven & Valencia (2010,2008), Caprio
borderline crises, 0 otherwise & Klingebiel (2003), Kane & Rice (2001)
NPL Non Performing loans Beck et.al (2010), WDI*, Bankscope
Z-score Beck et.al (2010), Bankscope
Liberalisation Variables
Fin lib Dummy Variable, =1 in year when interest , Various published papers,
rate controls were scrapped, 0 otherwise central banks and IMF reports
Finreform; credit,entry interest rate, liberalisation index & liberalisation policies Abiad et.al (2008), Authors
supervision, privatisation, security computations
policies, international capital
Macroeconomic Variables
rgdpg Rate of growth of real GDP WDI
tot Change in terms of Trade WDI
rir Real interest rate WDI
Infn Rate of Change of GDP Deator WDI
Banking System Characteristics
M2/Res Ratio of M2 to International Reserves IFS**
cr/gdp Ratio of private credit to GDP WDI
crgr Rate of Growth of real Domestic credit to WDI
private sector
Liq Ratio of bank liquid reservesto bank assets WDI
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Table B.0.2: Denitions and Sources continued
Institutional and regulatory quality measures
gdppc Real GDP per capita WDI
DepIns Dummy Variable, =1 if a country has explicit Demirguc-Kunt, et.al. (2004), completed
deposit insurance, 0 otherwise for a given year using IMF and World Bank reports
ReqRes Required reserves is the percentage of reserves
regulators require to hold.
Press freedom Freedom of media ranging from 0 to 2 Freedom House
with higher values corresponding to more freedom.
Gov Governance, index ranging from -2.5 to 2.5 with Governance Indicators, Kaufmann et.al. 2007
higher values corresponding to better outcomes
*World Development Indicators **International Financial Statistics
Table B.0.3: Correlations Among Liberalisation Components: Levels
cr ir ent sup pvt intk secmkt
cr 1
ir 0.5047 1
ent 0.5655 0.4576 1
sup 0.5930 0.5570 0.6197 1
pvt 0.5381 0.5004 0.5824 0.5564 1
intk 0.3413 0.3748 0.3148 0.3560 0.3599 1
secmkt 0.3682 0.3540 0.3483 0.5308 0.4435 0.4379 1
Table B.0.4: Correlations Among Liberalisation Components: Changes
cr ir ent sup pvt intk secmkt
cr 1
ir -0.0046 1
ent 0.0055 0.0234 1
sup 0.2296 0.3000 0.1233 1
pvt -0.0067 -0.0284 -0.0340 0.0766 1
intk -0.1646 0.0655 0.2095 -0.0087 -0.0282 1
secmkt -0.0248 -0.0299 -0.0358 -0.0572 -0.1312 0.1109 1
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Table B.0.11: Robustness Tests: Logit Estimation Results; Using Di¤erent Crises Deni-
tion
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
rgdpg -0.012** -0.012** -0.011* -0.010* -0.011* -0.011** -0.011* -0.012**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
lgdppc -0.05* -0.063* -0.072** -0.04** -0.07** -0.03** -0.064* -0.061*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.036) (0.003) (0.037) (0.004) (0.04) (0.035)
ctot -0.001 -0.001 0.0004 0.0001 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0027)
infn 0.03** 0.02* 0.04** 0.003* 0.0004* 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
rir 0.004** 0.0041** 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.0036* 0.0037* 0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.0018) (0.002) (0.002)
m2res 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.0034*** 0.0033***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0011) (0.001) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.001)
crgdp 0.0001* -0.0003 0.0004* 0.0001 0.0004 0.0001* 0.0004* 0.0001*
(0.0001) (0.0009) (0.0001) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.00001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
liq 0.003** 0.004** 0.002 0.004*** 0.003* 0.003** 0.002 0.003***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
crgr_2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0005 0.0005 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0009) (0.001)
depins 0.232*** 0.187*** 0.208** 0.238*** 0.203*** 0.232** 0.226** 0.197**
(0.104) (0.097) (0.104) (0.107) (0.103) (0.105) (0.108) (0.100)
pressf -0.095** -0.09** -0.13*** 0.116 0.128 0.098 -0.125*** -0.093**
(0.040) (0.041) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.040) (0.044) (0.041)
sup -0.130** -0.197*** -0.167*** -0.170*** -0.176*** -0.0964*** -0.153*** -0.184***
(0.052) (0.043) (0.046) (0.048) (0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.041)
nreform -0.010*
(0.008)
ir 0.03
(0.02)
ent 0.01**
(0.003)
cr -0.05
(0.03)
intk 0.01**
(0.0032)
pvt -0.099***
(0.0322)
secmkt -0.04*
(0.03)
nlib 0.04*
(0.006)
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.00 0.000 0.002
Pseudo R2 0.24 0.26 0.22 0.30 0.24 0.27 0.26 0.25
log likelihood -469 -467 -477.4 -467.2 -472 -471 -468.6 -472.2
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; marginal e¤ects reported.
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Table B.0.12: Robustness Tests: Using Removal of Interest Rate Controls to Proxy Overal
Liberalisation
(1) (2) (3)
Variable crises=0 crises=1 crises=2
rgdpg 0.013*** -0.003*** -0.010***
(0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0005)
lgdppc 0.101** -0.03** -0.08*
(0.05) (0.011) (0.05)
ctot -0.001 0.0002 0.001
(0.001) (0.005) (0.0024)
infn -0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
rir -0.001*** 0.0004*** 0.001***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
m2res -0.005*** 0.0004*** 0.004***
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003)
crgdp 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.00002)
liq -0.003*** 0.0004*** 0.003***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
crgr_2 -0.001*** 0.0001*** 0.001***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
depins -0.217*** 0.043*** 0.174***
(0.011) (0.007) (0.015)
nlib -0.143*** 0.024*** 0.119***
(0.0112) (0.006) (0.002)
Constant -0.0003 -0.0004 0.0006
(0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0008)
Prob>chi2 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.35
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 5
Table C.0.1: Countries in Sample
Country Banks Country Banks Country Banks
Botswana 3 Kenya 14 Sierra Leone 4
Burkina Faso 7 Lesotho 3 Swaziland 5
Cameroon 7 Madagasca 6 South Africa 6
Chad 3 Malawi 3 Seychelles 2
Cote dIvoire 7 Mali 3 Tanzania 6
Ethiopia 7 Mauritius 7 Uganda 7
Ghana 12 Mozambique 5 Zambia 8
Gabon 3 Nigeria 7 Zimbabwe 3
Gambia 3 Senegal 7
Source: Bankscope data
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Table C.0.2: Summary statistics for the entire sample
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
ROAA 1266 2.2 4.26 -56.7 49.46
ROAE 1246 19.98 35.08 -317 454
NIM 1281 7.06 6.88 -6.57 107.34
Size 1288 5.54 2.9 2.3 15.8
Size2 1288 39.33 44.9 0 251.1
Costs 1260 3.06 2.92 -3.21 13.4
Capital 1118 12.67 9.75 -40.7 80.2
Cr_risk 1034 42.9 19.56 0.03 89
risk 824 9.0 14 0 108
Conc 1343 0.77 0.18 0.38 1
fown 1255 50.54 27.50 0 100
fown1 1193 53.74 31.73 0 100
Finref 1343 12.68 4.58 0 20
Finlib 1343 0.99 0.54 0 1
Complib 1231 5.8 1.47 1 9
Crgdp 1343 21.18 26.04 2.07 157.1
gdpg 1343 4.19 4.2 -17.6 33.6
Infn 1343 13.32 37.32 -30.16 495.3
lgdppc 1343 6.2 0.96 4.7 9.3
pressf 1343 0.73 0.68 0 2
gov 1343 -0.1 1.22 -4.15 2.69
rlaw 1343 -0.64 0.64 -2.27 0.93
Source: Authors calculations
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Table C.0.3: Financial Liberalisation and Bank Protability:Two-step GMM Estimation
Results
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ROA_1 0.27*** 0.26** 0.28*** 0.25** 0.27*** 0.29*** 0.26***
(0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.11) (0.07) 0.09
Capital -0.09* 0.09 -0.11** -0.07* 0.08 -0.06* -0.09
(0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.16) (0.01) 0.08
Cr_risk 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.15** 0.15*** 0.14** 0.15*** 0.16***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) 0.04
Costs -2.7*** -2.8*** -2.6*** -2.9*** -2.4*** -2.8** -2.7***
(0.92) (0.91) (0.86) (0.07) (0.9) (0.84) 0.89
Size 10.7** 10.14* 10.93* 8.21* 6.02** 2.3*** 10.5**
(4.8) (4.9) (5.05) (3.21) (2.9) (1.6) 4.7
Size2 -0.30* -0.29* -0.33 -0.33* -0.33* -0.28 -0.29
(0.23) (0.24) (0.21) (0.2) (0.21) (0.2) 0.23
gdpg 0.13** 0.11** 0.12* 0.11** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.11***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) 0.04
Infn 0.34** 0.03*** 0.02** 0.01** 0.03** 0.03** 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 0.01
Conc -0.11 -6.7 -3.7 -1.6 -5.6 -0.85 -7.06
(0.87) (3.84) (3.3) (0.57) (2.8) (0.58) 5.4
fown 0.11 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05* -0.07 -0.05
(0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
lgdppc 0.97** 0.67** 0.74** 0.38* 0.36* 0.63* 0.71*
(0.33) (1.02) (0.40) (0.20) (0.22) (0.25) (0.31)
pressf 0.11 -0.09 -0.26 0.9 -0.72 -1.26* 1.38*
(0.87) (1.01) (0.95) (0.96) (1.3) (0.4) (0.55)
ycr/ir/ent/superv/pvt/intk/secmkt -0.19 -0.75* -2.99* 1.83** 0.65* -0.4 -0.16*
(0.41) (1.4) (1.2) (0.85) (0.15) (1.0) (1.06)
Wald Chi2()1 132*** 189*** 105*** 119*** 101*** 124*** 201***
AR(1)2 -1.57** -1.69*** -2.1*** -1.62** -2.0*** -1.5*** -1.32***
AR(2)3 0.39 0.4 0.9 -0.36 0.36 0.4 -0.9
Sargan Test4 100 104 102 105 112 104 103
y
Windmeijer (2005)-corrected robust standard errors in parentheses;*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
yColumns 1 to 7 correspond to liberalisation of credit controls, interest rates, entry restrictions, bank
supervision, privatisation, international capital ows, and security market policies respectively
1 Wald statistic: H0 All coe¢ cients are zero.
2;3AR(1) and AR(2) tests for 1st and 2nd-order autocorrelation, H0 No autocorrelation of residuals
4Sargan Test of overidentifying restrictions: H0 Overidentifying restrictions are valid
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Table C.0.4: Financial liberalisation and bank net interest margins: 2-step GMM results
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NIM_1 0.53*** 0.46** 0.38*** 0.46** 0.25** 0.34**
(0.21) (0.17) (0.14) (0.20) (0.11) (0.03)
Capital 0.04* 0.03 0.11** 0.16*** 0.19*** 0.14***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Cr_risk 0.21*** 0.16*** 0.25** 0.03* 0.19*** 0.02*
(0.08) (0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.08) (0.01)
Costs 2.36* 2.8** 2.58** 3.06** 3.94** 2.81**
(1.12) (1.5) (1.64) (1.47) (2.24) (1.27)
Size 3.1** 2.54** 2.4** 2.6* 0.17* 2.16*
(1.16) (0.91) (0.89) (1.30) (0.12) (1.10)
Size2 -0.17* -0.18* -0.14** -0.04 -0.09* -0.06*
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.14) (0.11) (0.03)
gdpg 0.09** 0.08** 0.12** 0.08** 0.10** 0.07**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03)
Infn 0.04** 0.03*** 0.01** 0.03** 0.01** 0.02**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Conc -0.74 0.70 -0.4 -0.62 -0.39 -4.3
(0.62) (0.9) (0.36) (0.57) (0.59) (2.20)
fown -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 0.01 -0.02 -0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
lgdppc 0.17** 0.21** 0.14** 1.64* 0.23** 2.4**
(0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.42) (0.09) (0.50)
pressf -0.31 -0.09 -0.26 0.29 0.71 0.62
(0.17) (1.01) (0.95) (2.11) (0.51) (2.50)
gov 0.15 0.26 0.36 -0.09 0.90 -1.6
(0.38) (0.04) (0.12) (1.20) (0.74) (1.90)
nref 0.05 0.01
(0.36) (0.35)
complib -0.12** -0.25***
(0.04) (0.07)
crgdp -0.24*** -0.29***
(0.08) (0.08)
cir -0.04*** -0.02** -0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
AR(1)2 -2.14** -2.05*** -2.01*** -1.78** -2.6** -2.61***
AR(2)3 -0.27 -0.84 1.2 -0.21 0.92 0.14
Sargan Test4 89 80 101 97 93 94
Windmeijer (2005)-corrected robust standard errors in parentheses
***=p<0.01, **= p<0.05, *= p<0.1
2,3 AR(1) and AR(2) tests for 1st and 2nd-order autocorrelation, H0 No autocorrelation of residuals
4 Sargan Test of overidentifying restrictions: H0 Overidentifying restrictions are valid
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Table C.0.5: Estimation Results Using Fixed E¤ects
Dep Var ROA (1) (2) (3)
Variable coe¤ std error coe¤ std error coe¤ std error
costs -0.56* 0.24 -0.40* 0.12 -0.52* 0.15
size 3.12** 1.5 3.22** 1.63 3.25** 1.6
size2 -0.04* 0.04 -0.06 0.15 -0.07* 0.06
capital 0.20*** 0.06 0.21** 0.06 0.19** 0.06
cr_risk 0.02 0.01 0.06* 0.03 0.01* 0.01
gdpg 0.19*** 0.07 0.21** 0.09 0.15*** 0.07***
infn 0.04** 0.01 0.04*** 0.02 0.09** 0.04
conc -1.66 1.88 -1.80 2.2 -3.2 2.07
fown 0.03* 0.02 0.04 0.12 0.09 0.16
lgdppc 3.7** 1.8 3.9** 2.01 3.1** 1.10
rlaw -0.94 1.2 -1.23 1.31 -0.53 1.19
gov 0.46 0.83 0.73 0.87 0.02 0.78
nref 0.20 0.12
complib -0.29** 0.09
crgdp -0.09*** 0.02
constant 1.11* 0.38 1.54 0.56 1.16 0.58*
R2 0.46 0.61 0.59
Hausman specication test
chi2(14) 163.03 193.94 241
Prob>chi2 0.0001 0.0020 0.0002
H0: di¤erence in coe¢ cients not systematic
Breusch-Pagan LM test
chi2(1) 13.73 8.35 13.52
Prob>ch2 0.0002 0.0039 0.0002
H0:Var(vi) = 0
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Appendix D
Appendix for chapter 6
Table D.0.1: Franchise Value and Banking Crises: Alternative Prot-Liberalisation Indi-
cator
Variables crises=0 crises=1 crises=2 crises=0 crises=1 crises=2
^
refroa -0.10 0.014 0.09
(0.022) (0.019) (0.124)
rgdpg 0.026*** -0.14*** -0.013*** 0.014*** -0.014*** -0.017***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
gdppc 0.021* -0.013* -0.027* 0.026* -0.008* -0.245*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.0090) (0.0008) (0.101)
tot 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 0.0054 -0.0014 -0.003
(0.058) (0.002) (0.074) (0.065) (0.012) (0.04)
infn -0.001** 0.004** 0.002** -0.003** 0.006** 0.01**
(0.0001) (0.002) (0.0001) (0.001) (0.0032) (0.005)
rir -0.04*** 0.007*** 0.005*** -0.004*** 0.007*** 0.005***
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.004) (0.001)
m2res -0.003*** 0.0002*** 0.011*** -0.004*** 0.0005*** 0.0019***
(0.0002) (0.004) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.005)
crgdp -0.0002 0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.0004 0.0002
(0.002) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.0009) (0.0003)
liq -0.005* 0.005* 0.006* -0.004* 0.004* 0.003*
(0.0023) (0.0004) (0.0033) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.002)
crgr_2 -0.009* 0.021* 0.0006* -0.001* 0.0002* 0.0001*
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.005) (0.0002) (0.002)
depins -047*** 0.059** 0.498** -0.51*** 0.069* 0.517***
0.0127 0.0260 0.0212 0.0131 0.0233 0.0210
gov 0.021 -0.0143 -0.008 0.0156 -0.0169 -0.0018
0.0130 0.0155 0.0191 0.0147 0.0158 0.0220
sup 0.062*** -0.015*** -0.077*** 0.018*** -0.015** -0.069***
0.0163 0.0084 0.0205 0.0167 0.0087 0.0211
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Table D.0.2: Alternative Prot-Liberalisation Indicator continued
dinslib 0.055* -0.29* -0.47* 0.031** -0.06** -0.05**
0.011 0.018 0.023 0.155 0.0233 0.033
suplib 0.150*** -0.048*** -0.135*** 0.145*** -0.046*** -0.125***
0.015 0.0121 0.0243 0.0112 0.0152 0.0238
^
refroe -0.19* 0.04* 0.06*
0.013 0.011 0.04
Prob>chi2 0.00 0.00
log likelihood -482 -469
Pseudo R2 0.22 0.26
Robust standard errors in parentheses ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *<0.1
Table D.0.3: Robustness Test: Exogenous Franchise Value
(1) (2) (3)
Variables crises=0 crises=1 crises=2 crises=0 crises=1 crises=2 crises=0 crises=1 crises=2
roa 0.616*** -0.180** -0.436***
(0.110) (0.0803) (0.115)
rgdpg 0.0054** -0.0023*** -0.0032** 0.0037** -0.0014** -0.0023* 0.0054** -0.002** -0.004**
(0.002) (0.007) (0.0015) (0.00146) (0.000488) (0.00130) (0.0015) (0.0006) (0.0015)
gdppc 0.0168 -0.181 -0.198 0.228* -0.236* -0.0082* -0.0301 -0.0718 0.102
(0.290) (0.195) (0.184) (0.137) (0.0595) (0.154) (0.138) (0.0728) (0.140)
tot -0.003* 0.003* 0.005* 0.0014** -0.0019** -0.0005** 0.004** -0.003*** -0.0011***
(0.0018) (0.007) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0006) (0.003) (0.0012) (0.0004) (0.0008)
infn 0.005 -0.004 -0.003 0.009 -0.005 -0.001 -0.002 -0.0003 0.0002
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0031) (0.005) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.005) (0.0002)
rir -0.0017*** 0.0015*** 0.006*** -0.041*** 0.0038*** 0.008** -0.0012*** 0.0003** 0.001**
(0.0005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.098) (0.0079) (0.0015) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
m2res -0.0015*** 0.0006*** 0.0009*** -0.002*** 0.0006*** 0.0013*** -0.0003*** 0.008** 0.007**
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0001)
crgdp 0.0011 -0.0024 -0.0013 0.006 -0.0011 0.005 -0.0003 0.0003 0.0006
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.0082) (0.0074) (0.0052) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0005)
liq 0.0073** -0.0052** -0.0011** 0.0005 -0.005 -0.0004 0.0027*** -0.0012*** -0.0015**
(0.007) (0.009) (0.0055) (0.0068) (0.055) (0.000592) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0005)
crgr_1 -0.001*** 0.008** 0.008*** 0.003 -0.0004 -0.006 -0.0015*** 0.0005*** 0.0009***
(0.000182) (8.05e-05) (0.000162) (0.0014) (0.0002) (0.008) (0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0002)
depins -0.405*** 0.122*** 0.283*** -0.388*** 0.0634** 0.325*** -0.0003* 0.009* 0.009*
(0.0544) (0.0381) (0.0823) (0.0826) (0.0234) (0.0813) (0.0417) (0.0118) (0.0477)
rlaw 0.131*** -0.0165** -0.147*** 0.151*** -0.0032** -0.148*** 0.251*** -0.0431** -0.208***
(0.0181) (0.0378) (0.0424) (0.0261) (0.0367) (0.0395) (0.0301) (0.0383) (0.0552)
complib -0.0011 0.017 0.04 -0.0201** 0.0106** 0.0095** -0.0672*** 0.0304*** 0.0368***
(0.0084) (0.0042) (0.0083) (0.0087) (0.004) (0.0087) (0.0140) (0.0075) (0.0115)
sup 0.104** -0.0455** -0.0580** 0.0810* -0.0436* -0.0374* 0.0828** -0.0519** -0.031**
(0.0297) (0.0202) (0.0337) (0.0317) (0.0165) (0.0389) (0.0326) (0.0199) (0.0327)
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Table D.0.4: Exogenous Franchise Value Continued
crises=0 crises=1 crises=2 crises=0 crises=1 crises=2 crises=0 crises=1 crises=2
roalib -0.170** 0.0348** 0.135**
(0.0214) (0.0223) (0.0323)
roasup 0.445** -0.0975** -0.347**
(0.0900) (0.0527) (0.0927)
roe 0.741 -1.023 -1.764
(1.169) (0.855) (1.639)
roelib -0.206 0.180 0.286
(0.309) (0.250) (0.490)
roesup 4.947 -1.098 -3.849
(0.751) (0.498) (1.098)
nim -0.296** 0.528** 0.768**
(0.644) (0.380) (0.677)
nimlib 0.332** -0.250** -0.0820**
(0.139) (0.1) (0.158)
nimsup 0.647* -0.199* -0.449*
(0.286) (0.116) (0.286)
Prob>chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00
log likelihood -456.2 -461.7 -455.1
Pseudo R2 0.29 0.31 0.34
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix E
Data Appendix
E.1 Computation of liberalisation Variables
A score is given for each of the questions that are set for a specic dimension. Next, a
nal score is given along each dimension. This score ranges between zero and three, with
three corresponding to full liberalisation, 2 refers to largely liberalised, 1 means partially
repressed, while zero indicates highly repressed nancial system. For bank regulation and
supervision, 0 correspond to unregulated and unsupervised through to 3 which corresponds
to strongly regulated and supervised.1
After assigning scores to the seven nancial liberalisation policies, we derive a matrix X of
liberalisation, with scores for each dimension being the columns of the matrix. Using this
information, we construct two main indices of nancial reform. The rst one, finreform
is a sum of individual components for each country in each year2. Since the scale ranges
between 0 and 3, the index ranges between 0 and 21. Figure E.1 displays the two indices
for nancial reform.
1The study uses information from various country and regional IMF and World Bank reports, SADC
Committee for Central bank Governors (CCBG) reports, published papers, as well as central bank reports
to assign the codes and the scores.
2The second index is constructed using principal component analysis.
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Figure E.1: Financial Liberalisation Index by Data Groups
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Data for reform1 is from Abiad et.al. (2008), for 14 countries. reform2 data has been
computed in this study, covering 12 countries.
Figure E.1 conrms that total nancial liberalisation was less gradual between 1986 and
about 1992, before accelerating sharply between 1993 and 2000 in both sets of countries.
Thereafter, the liberalisation process slowed down, maybe because most countries had by
then liberalised a greater part of their nancial sectors (Abiad et al., 2008). The aggregate
index in Figure E.2 conrms that nancial liberalisation process was most intense from the
early 1990s to about the year 2000. The index for total liberalisation increased by about
120% in 2000 from its 1990 level, but only increased by about 4% in 2006 from its 1990
level.
Figure E.2: Aggregate Financial Liberalisation Index for SSA 1986 to 2006
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At country level, the process was less smooth, with periods of no change in policy as well as
policy reversals. For instance, Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda and Zimbabwe experienced policy
reversals between 1994 and 2000.
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Turning now to individual policies, the liberalisation components are highly correlated
(Table B.0.3 and Figure E.3), signifying that countries with restrictive policies in one area
are more likely to have restrictive policies in other areas as well.
Figure E.3: Financial Liberalisation Index in SSA by Components
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Table E.1.1: Financial Liberalisation in SSA by Component
year cr ir ent sup pvt intk secmkt
1986 0.53 0.46 0.81 0.04 0.65 0.50 0.23
1987 0.57 0.62 0.81 0.08 0.69 0.46 0.27
1988 0.60 0.69 0.85 0.12 0.69 0.50 0.27
1989 0.86 0.92 0.92 0.15 0.73 0.50 0.54
1990 1.02 1.08 1.15 0.23 0.88 0.54 0.58
1991 1.09 1.50 1.46 0.42 0.92 0.54 0.58
1992 1.14 1.85 1.54 0.46 1.04 0.58 0.58
1993 1.28 1.96 1.65 0.46 1.04 0.62 0.62
1994 1.34 2.27 1.73 0.65 1.04 1.00 0.77
1995 1.37 2.31 1.73 0.69 1.12 1.08 0.81
1996 1.57 2.35 2.08 0.77 1.46 1.15 0.96
1997 1.77 2.35 2.12 0.96 1.50 1.23 0.96
1998 1.87 2.35 2.12 1.00 1.58 1.31 1.08
1999 1.84 2.38 2.12 1.04 1.65 1.42 1.08
2000 1.87 2.38 2.15 1.08 1.85 1.42 1.15
2001 1.91 2.38 2.23 1.15 1.96 1.46 1.19
2002 1.94 2.38 2.27 1.19 1.96 1.50 1.19
2003 1.93 2.35 2.27 1.19 1.96 1.42 1.31
2004 1.93 2.35 2.27 1.27 2.04 1.31 1.31
2005 1.93 2.35 2.31 1.35 2.04 1.31 1.31
2006 1.82 2.31 2.31 1.35 2.04 1.31 1.31
The data in Table E.1.1 shows that interest rate liberalisation is the most advanced dimen-
sion for each year, and by end of period average. Second and third is liberalisation of bank
entry and activity restrictions, as well as bank privatisation respectively. On the other
hand, the least advanced dimensions are security market policies, international capital
controls, and bank supervision and prudential regulation, respectively.
We also computed annual changes for each liberalisation policy. The corresponding corre-
lations are presented in table B.0.4. The annual changes in the component indices are less
correlated. This suggests that liberalisation may have been carried out at di¤erent times
for di¤erent dimensions and in di¤erent countries.
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E.2 Coding Rules for Financial Liberalisation Policies
and Indices
To construct indices for the seven facets of liberalisation, the following questions were
considered. The questions and the coding rules were adopted from Abiad et al. (2008).
Each dimension has various sub-dimensions. A raw score is assigned according to set rules
for each sub-dimension. This raw score is then normalised on a 0 to 3 scale. The scale
is as follows. Fully liberalised = 3, partially liberalised = 2, partially repressed = 1, and
fully repressed = 0.
E.2.1 Credit Controls and Reserve Requirement
1) Are reserve requirements restrictive?
 Coded as 0 if reserve requirement is more than 20%
 Coded as 1 if reserve requirements are reduced to 10-20% or regulations to set reserve
requirements are simplied as a step towards reducing reserve requirements.
 Coded as 2 if reserve requirements are less than 10%
2) Are there minimum amounts of credit that must be channelled to certain sectors?
 Coded as 0 if credit allocations are determined by the central bank or mandatory
allocations to certain sectors exist.
 Coded as 1 if mandatory allocations to certain sectors are eliminated or do not exist.
3) Are there any credits supplied to certain sectors at subsidised rates?
 Coded as 0 when banks have to supply credits at subsidised rates to certain sectors.
 Coded as 1 when the mandatory requirement of credit allocation at subsidised rates
is eliminated or banks do not have to supply credits at subsidised rates.
4) Aggregate credit ceilings
 Coded as 0 if ceilings on expansion of bank credit are in place. This includes bank-
specic credit ceilings imposed by the central bank.
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 Coded as 1 if no restrictions exist on the expansion of bank credit.
The scores from these questions are then summed as follows: Fully liberalised = 4, Largely
liberalised = 3, Partially repressed = (1,2), Fully repressed = 0. This is then referred to
the normalisation and the nal scale is given below.
Sum/raw score Normalised scale
4 3
3 2
1,2 1
0 0
E.2.2 Interest rate liberalisation
Deposit and lending rates are seperately considered and coded as being government set
(code =0), uctuating within a band (code=1) or freely oating (code =2). The following
describes the coding rules used.
1) Fully liberalised (FL) = 4 [2, 2]
 Both deposit rates and interest rates are market determined.
2) Largely liberalised (LL) = 3 [2,1]
 Either deposit rates or lending rates are freed but the other rates are subject to a
band or only a part of interest rates are determined at market rates.
3) Partially repressed (PR) = 2/1 [2,0] [1,1] [1,0]
 Either deposit or lending rates are freed but the other interest rates are set by
the government, or subject to ceiling or oor; or both deposit and lending rates are
sublect to a band or partially liberalised; or either deposit or lending rates are subject
to band or partially liberalised.
4) Fully repressed (FR) = [0,0]
 Both deposit and lending rates are set by the government or subject to a ceiling or
oor.
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Score Normalised scale
FL=4 3
LL=3 2
PR=2/1 1
FR=0 0
E.2.3 Banking sector entry and activity restrictions
The rst question examines the extent of foreign bank entry into the domestic market,
branching restrictions on foreign banks, as well as equity ownership of domestic banks by
non-residents.
1) To what extent does government allow foreign banks to enter into a domestic market?
 Coded as 0 when no entry of foreign banks is allowed; or tight restrictions on the
opening of new foreign banks are in place.
 Coded as 1 when foreign bank entry is allowed, but nonresidents must hold less than
50% equity share.
 Coded as 2 when the majority of share of equity ownership of domestic banks by
nonresidents is allowed; or equal treatment is ensured for both foreign banks and
domestic banks; or an unlimited number of branching is allowed for foreign banks.
Questions 2 to 4 consider policies to enhance the competition in the domestic banking
market.
2) Does the government allow the entry of new domestic banks?
 Coded as zero when the entry of new domestic banks is not allowed or strictly regu-
lated.
 Coded as 1 when the entry of new domestic banks or other nancial institutions is
allowed into the domestic market.
3) Are there restrictions on branching?
 Coded as 0 when restrictions are in place
 Coded as 1 when there are no branching restrictions or if restrictions are eased.
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4) Does the government allow banks to engage in a wide range of activities?
 Coded as 0 when the range of activities that banks can take consists of only banking
activities.
 Coded as 1 when banks are allowed to become unioversal banks.
The sum of scores from these four questions is then scaled as follows.
Score Normalised Scale
FL = 4 or 5 3
LL = 3 2
PR = 1 or 2 1
FR = 0 0
E.2.4 International capital account controls
1) Is the exchange rate unied?
 Coded as 0 when a special exchange rate regime for either capital or current account
transactions exists.
 Coded as 1 when the exchange rate system is unied
2) Does the country set restrictions on capital inow?
 Coded as 0 when signicant restrictions exist on capital inows.
 Coded as 1 when banks are allowed to borrow from abroad freely without restrictions
and there are no tight restrictions on other capital inows.
3) Does a country set restrictions on capital outow?
 Coded as 0 when restrictions exist on capital outows.
 Coded as 1 when capital outows are allowed to ow freely or with minimal approval
restrictions.
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The sum of these three sub-scores are coded as follows.
Score Scale
FL = 3 3
LL = 2 2
PR = 1 1
FR = 0 0
E.2.5 Privatisation
Privatisation is coded as follows.
 Fully liberalised if no state banks exist or state-owned banks do not consist of any
signicant portion of banks and/ or the percentage of bank assets is less than 10%.
 Largely liberalised if most banks are privately owned and/or the percentage of of
public bank assets is from 10% to 25%.
 Partially repressed if many banks are privately owned but major banks are still
state-owned and/ or the percentage of public bank assets is above 25% upto 50%
 Fully repressed if major banks are all state owned banks and/ or the percentage of
public bank assets is from from 50% to 100%.
Score Scale
FL 3
LL 2
PR 1
FR 0
E.2.6 Securities markets
Has a country taken measures to develop securities markets?
 Coded as 0 if a securities market does not exist.
 Coded as 1 when a securities market is starting to form with the introduction of
auctioning of T-bills or the establishment of a security commission.
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 Coded as 2 when further measures have been taken to develop securities markets
(tax exemptions, introduction of medium and long-term government bonds in order
to build the benchmark of a yield curve, policies to develop corporate bond and
equity markets, or the introduction of a primary dealer system to develop government
security markets).
 Coded as 3 when further policy measures have been taken to develop derivative
markets or to broaden the institutional investor base by deregulating portfolio in-
vestments and pension funds or completing the full deregulation of stock exchanges.
2) Is a countrys equity market open to foreign investors?
 Coded as 0 if no foreign equity ownership is allowed
 Coded as 1 when foreign equity ownership is allowed but there is less than 50 percent
foreign ownership.
 Coded as 2 when majority equity share of foreign ownership is allowed.
The sum of these 2 questions are then coded as follows.
Score Scale
FL 4 or 5
LL 3
PR 1,2
FR 0
If information on question 2 is not available, the measure is coded using information from
question 1, in which case, a 0 -3 scale is assigned based on the score on question 1.
E.2.7 Banking sector supervision
1) Has a country adopted a capital adequacy ratio based on the Basle standard?
 Coded as 0 if the Basle risk-weighted CAR is not implemented. Date of implemen-
tattion is important, in terms of passing legislation to enforce the Basle requirement
of 8% CAR.
 Coded as 1 when Basle CAR is in force (if the large majority of banks meet the
prudential requirement of an 8% risk-weighted CAR, but this is not a mandatory
ratio as in Basle, the measure is still classied as 1).
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Prior to 1993, when the Basle regulations were not in place internationally, this measure
takes the value of 0.
2) Is the banking supervisory agency independent from the inuence of the executives.
 Coded as 0 when the banking supervisory agency does not have an adequate le-
gal framework to promptly interven in banksactivities; and/ or when there is lack
of legal framework for the independence of the supervisory agency such as the ap-
pointment and removal of the head of banking supervisory agency; or the ultimate
jurisdiction of the banking supervision is under the ministry of nance; or when a
frequent turnover of the head of the supervisory agency is experienced.
 Coded as 1 when the objective of supervisory agency is clearly dened and an ade-
quate legal framework to resolve banking problems is provided ( the revocation and
suspension of authorisation of banks, and the removal of banksexecutives etc.) but
potential problems remain concerning the independence of the banking supervisory
agency (for example, when the ministry of nance may intervene into the banking
supervision in such cases as when the board of the banking supervisory agency is
chaired by the ministry of nance, although the xed term of the board is ensured
by law); or although clear legal objectives and legal independence are observed, the
adequate legal framework for resolving problems is not well articulated.
 Coded as 2 when a legal framework for the objectives and resolution of troubled
banks is set up and if the banking supervisory agency is legally independent from
the executive branch and actually not interfered with by the executive branch.
3) Does a banking supervisory agency conduct e¤ective supervisions through on-site and
o¤-site examinations (done to monitor balance sheets)?
 Coded as 0 when a country has no legal framework and practices of on-site and o¤-
site examinations is not provided or when no on-site and o¤-site examinations are
conducted.
 Coded as 1 when the legal framework of on-site and o¤-site examinations is set up and
the banking supervisory agency have conducted examinations but in an ine¤ective
or insu¢ cient manner.
 Coded as 2 when the banking supervisory agency conducts e¤ective and sophisticated
examinations.
4) Does a countrys banking supervisory agency cover all nancial institutions without
exception?
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 Coded as 1 when all banks are under supervision by the supervisory agencies without
exception.
 Coded as 0 if some kind of nancial institutions are not exclusively supervised or are
excluded from banking supervisory agency oversights.
These four dimensions are summed up and are assigned a degree of freedom as follows.
Score Normalised Scale
Highly regulated = 6 3
Largely regulated = 4-5 2
Less regulated = 2-3 1
Not regulated = 0-1 0
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